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Mirror, Mirror, On the Wall—Biased
Impartiality, Appearances, and the
Need for Recusal Reform
Zygmont A. Pines*

ABSTRACT
The article focuses on a troubling aspect of contemporary
judicial morality.
Impartiality—and the appearance of impartiality—are the
foundation of judicial decision-making, judicial morality, and the
public’s trust in the rule of law. Recusal, in which a jurist voluntarily removes himself or herself from participating in a case, is a
process that attempts to preserve and promote the substance and
the appearance of judicial impartiality. Nevertheless, the traditional common law recusal process, prevalent in many of our
state court systems, manifestly subverts basic legal and ethical
norms.
Today’s recusal practice—whether rooted in unintentional
hypocrisy, wishful thinking, or a pathological cognitive dissonance—has been habitually relegated to the periphery of our administration of justice when its rightful place should be its
nucleus. Impartiality of judgment and the integrity of the judicial
process are critical weaknesses of a recusal regime that vests virtually unfettered discretion in a jurist to conduct an ad hoc selfassessment of his or own impartiality, i.e., the paradox of biased
* Former State Court Administrator of Pennsylvania (2000–2015); Chief Legal
Counsel, Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (1991-2000); member,
Board of Advisors, Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts (PMC). The genesis of this
article was a conversation the author had in 2018 with Maida Milone, former Executive Director of PMC, regarding the critical importance of recusal, which was
scheduled to be a focus of PMC’s future programs. Ms. Milone had participated in
a national recusal project (“IAALS REPORT”). See note 39, infra. Gratitude is
extended to Ms. Milone and PMC members for their encouragement and support
for this article. The author is also grateful for the research assistance provided by
Christopher Iacono, who graciously extended much time and effort while he was a
third-year student at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. The views
herein are solely those of the author who assumes responsibility for any errors or
omissions.
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impartiality. In such circumstances, actual and apparent impartiality of a jurist, fortified by the mechanical application of the
common law’s presumption of judicial impartiality, is misguided
and delusional.
The article opens with a brief overview of the historical development of recusal principles and judicial ethical codes, followed by an exposition of recusal theory and practice in a
representative state (Pennsylvania). The background of ethical
principles and practice culminates in a specific recusal proposal
(a potential judicial rule or statute) based on over-arching categorical and procedural imperatives that can guide recusal reform
efforts. The article, thus, goes well beyond the many good, but
general, commentaries on recusal and fills the void of a prescribed process. The detailed recusal procedures represent an
amalgamation of best practices urged by commentators and implemented, in varying degrees, in some states. The proposal is
both practical and workable, applicable to elected and appointed
judiciaries, and pertinent to the disturbing specter of judges’ increasing reliance on money in judicial campaigns.
Thus, the article seeks to highlight the importance of specific
procedural processes to meaningfully promote judicial fairness
and ethical conduct in substance and appearance.
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INTRODUCTION
Are judges human? If judges are human, are they like
umpires?
In 1931, a prominent legal philosopher and later federal circuit
court judge, Jerome Frank, authored a law review article1 teasingly
questioning whether judges are human. Frank’s answer? Judges
are indeed “incurably human”—their background and personality
affect all their thinking and, therefore, their decisions. Fast forward
75 years when the Chief Justice of the United States addressed the
U.S. Congress and employed a metaphor to describe the role of a
1. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931). See also
infra note 26. In her study encouraging a more holistic and humanistic legal framework through a better understanding and incorporation of psychoanalysis, Professor Dailey points out that Jerome Frank was responsible for bringing
psychoanalytic ideas to the attention of the legal world. In quoting from Frank’s
work, Dailey points out that Frank was critical of an unexamined assumption of
purely objective reasoning, stating “[w]e shall not learn how judges think until we
are able and ready to engage in ventures of self-discovery.” See ANNE C. DAILEY,
LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 59 (Yale Univ.
Press 2017).
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judge. In his view, judges are like umpires.2 The sporting theory of
justice, as Roscoe Pound vividly described America’s peculiarly
contentious procedural approach3 in his 1906 address to the American Bar Association (“ABA”), is a metaphor that possesses great
didactic and rhetorical appeal.4
The reliance on such an often-invoked, simplistic sports analogy to describe the role of judging remains an interesting one because it brings into dramatic focus a critical aspect that the worlds
of sports and law share—fundamental fairness of a highly formal2. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be the
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be the Chief Justice of the United States). See Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709 (2007) (federal judge’s reflections on Chief Justice Robert’s
metaphor); and William J. Stevens, Aside: The Common Law Origins of the Infield
Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474, 1478–79 (1975) (discussing the English origins
of baseball and noting that the sporting concept of fair play has a moral basis
analogous to the Anglo-American concepts of due process and justice).
3. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, reprinted at Symposium, Centennial Reflections on Roscoe
Pound’s 1906 Address to the American Bar Association, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 853,
861 (2007), wherein Pound decried America’s peculiar atavistic impulse to treat
justice as a dueling sport that contributed to the public’s crisis of confidence in the
legal system, noting “[h]ence in America we take it as a matter of course that a
judge should be a mere umpire, to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the
rules of the game, and that the parties should fight out their own game in their own
way without judicial interference . . . . The idea that procedure must of necessity be
wholly contentious disfigures our judicial administration at every point.” See also
Edward F. Sherman, Dean Pound’s Dissatisfaction with the “Sporting Theory of
Justice”: Where Are We a Hundred Years Later?, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 983 (2007). In
response to Judge Learned Hand’s jocular adieu to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
to “do justice,” Justice Holmes replied: “That is not my job. My job is to play the
game according to the rules.” See STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 415 (2019). See also David R.
Barnhizer, On the Make: Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American
Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 375 (2001) (“Judges are therefore the umpires
of the community’s conflicts and their fair and equitable treatment of disputants is
required for the process to be legitimate.”). Professor Friedman of the University
of Michigan School of Law has expressed his interest in drafting a law school
course that would study sports as legal systems. See Richard D. Friedman, Just Say
No to the Cheap Double Play, 13 FIU L. REV. 931, 931 (2019) (noting that “the
rules of sports offer fertile ground to explore legal concepts”).
4. But see McKee, supra note 2, at 1710 and 1724, who posits that the metaphor is useful in a simplistic sense for public communication purposes but obscures
a complex dynamic given that judges may not be able to systematically decide
cases upon an objective and mechanical application of a set of rules, free of bias,
personal, ideological, or political leanings. Id. at 1701. Judge McKee concludes
that it may be more accurate to say that an umpire does not merely call balls and
strikes but is also responsible for defining baseball’s “strike zone.” Id. at 1723–25.
See also Chad M. Oldfather, Umpires, Judges, and the Aesthetics of the Infield Fly,
13 FIU L. REV. 957 (2019) (micro-symposium article that comments on the umpire
metaphor and its tenuous relation to judicial decision-making).
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ized process (i.e., a game or litigation) and the integrity of the person who sits in the awesome seat of judgment (i.e. an umpire, a
referee, a judge). Fairness—in both substance and appearance—is
integral to the public’s trust and confidence in the respective endeavors of sports and law.
When Serena Williams lost the U.S. Open finals tennis tournament in 2018, controversy swirled over whether gender bias had influenced the umpire.5 The public speculation was understandable
given the tennis legend’s dramatic loss and the tempestuous circumstances leading to the umpire’s final and unreviewable decision that
penalized Ms. Williams’ conduct on the court.6 The dramatic scenario between the referee and Ms. Williams was akin to a summary
contempt of court confrontation. Regarding fairness in sports, one
commentator has observed that psychological biases are endemic
across every sport, stating, “[the referees] are just being human.”7
Studies have supported the existence of referee or umpire bias in
various sports—tennis, baseball, soccer, hockey. Whether it is the
“homey” (home field) advantage, or the sex, race, or even height of
the players, bias exists in sports, as research demonstrates.8 As the
New York Times columnist, David Brooks, noted:
5. See Frank Meehan, It’s Time to Have AI Tennis Umpires. No Sexism, Racism or Bias, MEDIUM (Sept. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2ZUCmKt [https://perma.cc/
T7ZV-D8XM]. See also Phil Birnbaum, Is There Racial Bias Among Umpires?,
BASEBALL RES. J., Fall 2010, at 65–70, reprinted at https://bit.ly/3iKdTA0 [https://
perma.cc/LJA7-JZF2]; Arthur Dobrin, Do Umpires Call Them as They Are or as
They See Them?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (July 8, 2014), https://bit.ly/2OdpNEj
[https://perma.cc/4X8Y-SCRX]; Raj Persaud & Peter Bruggen, Are Referees Unfair to Female Players?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Sept. 12, 2018), https://bit.ly/
3gLw5HZ [https://perma.cc/JE9M-5WF9]; and Phil Hank, Hands on Wisconsin:
Kavanaugh Seems Like a Biased Umpire, LA CROSSE TRIBUNE (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2DlePdP [https://perma.cc/K7T4-VPWG].
6. Ms. Williams was seeking a record-tying 24th Grand Slam singles title. She
was defeated by Naomi Osaka. Ms. Williams had been warned by the referee
about “coaching,” which is tantamount to cheating. A second violation occurred
when Ms. Williams slammed her racket on the ground. She then received a penalty for “verbal abuse” when she called the referee a “thief” and a “liar.” Ms.
Williams claimed she was being treated harsher than male players. Some commentators questioned whether sexism played a role in the umpire’s call, and others
suggested a “soft warning” would have been more appropriate. See Danielle Rossingh, Serena Williams’ U.S. Open Outburst Leaves Women’s Tour Divided, CNN
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://cnn.it/3iRcbNe [https://perma.cc/6HDM-WAR7]. For a
post-script, see infra note 340.
7. Persaud & Bruggen supra note 5.
8. See, e.g., Christopher A. Parsons et al., White Favoritism by Major League
Home Plate Umps Lowers Minority Pitcher Performance and Pay Baseball Study
Finds, SCIENCE DAILY (Sept. 9, 2011), https://bit.ly/3ejxAeJ [https://perma.cc/
A2FN-D9EU]; Thomas Dolmen & Jan Sauermann, Referee Bias, 30 J. ECON.
SURVEYS 679, 691–92 (noting, in reference to a referee’s principal duty of impartiality, that referees may “adapt their behavior consciously if there are monitoring
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“In all societies, there are rules defining good conduct, and there
are supposed to be impartial, honest referees that enforce those
rules and make sure the game is fair . . . . And today, across
society, two things are happening: Referees are being undermined, and many are abandoning their own impartiality . . . .
Things begin to topple.”9

Another commentator, in analyzing the National Hockey League,
has expressed the problem in terms of a subconscious “biased impartiality.” This bias results from a host of pressures on referees—
e.g. spectators, peers, league officials, financial interests, maintenance of strong working relationships, good entertainment, appeasing a partisan crowd, audience noise—all of which have the
potential to undermine public confidence in the fairness of the
game.10
The question in both sports and the justice system is how does
one deal with the human element in such high-stakes public decision-making? Some have suggested that the answer may rest in the
promise of technology. One commentator asked if it is time to have
artificial intelligence (“AI”) tennis umpires.11 The AI idea has
some allure. In a similar vein, another commentator asked: “Do
we need human judges in the age of artificial intelligence?”—noting
that technology and the law are converging in a way that challenges
our notions of justice.12 Such a facile approach, however, is missystems” in place; and that “increased awareness [may also] inhibit[ ] subconscious
decision-making s[o] that referees are less susceptible to succumb to social pressure”); Gil Imber, Referee Bias: Quantifying the Homer Effect and Officiating
Home-Field Advantage, BLEACHER REP. (Nov. 29, 2011), https://bit.ly/2Zg0b0d
[https://perma.cc/UG5L-9YEH](noting two types of soccer referees, the “homey”
or “homer,” which operates subconsciously and favors the home team; and the
“brave” type).
9. David Brooks, It’s Not the Collusion, It’s the Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
19, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2DnLn7j [https://perma.cc/M86Z-C5ZG].
10. See Michael Lopez & Kevin Snyder, Biased Impartiality Among National
Hockey League Referees, 8 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 208, 221–22 (2013) (noting that the
incentive to “even up” penalty calls to compensate for bias in favor of the home
team may be motivated by the desire to achieve the perception of fairness and
balance); cf. Charles G. Geyh, Roscoe Pound and the Future of the Good Government Movement, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 871, 886 (2007) (discussing the concept of
“partial impartiality” as representing the emergence of a new frontier in the regulation of appearances, in the context of judicial campaign speech that encourages
judges to be upfront about their positions and predilections, concluding that relaxed disqualification standards, brought about by a “brave new world of judicial
speech,” foster rather than ameliorate appearance problems).
11. See Meehan, supra note 5.
12. Ziyaad Bhorat, Do We Still Need Human Judges in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence?, OPENDEMOCRACY (Aug. 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Cf4bF9 [https://
perma.cc/987C-QCKX].
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guided. Professor Kartid Hosan Agar of The Wharton School expressed his concern about algorithmic bias and its increasing use in
scenarios in the justice system that must deal with life and death
situations. Algorithms, he said, can go wrong because they are behavior-driven by the code that engineers give it and the data that
they selectively input—such algorithms are neither 100 percent objective nor rational.13 Algorithmic bias exists. Agar brings this fairness-impartiality dilemma full circle by recognizing that humans—
yes, humans—must be kept in the loop.14
Since judges and referees are human and must be kept in the
decision-making loop, how does one deal with the problem of bias?
Ironically, like a high fly ball that landed at the feet of the justice
system, the genesis for ethical guidance may have come from Major
League Baseball. In the 1920s, eight Chicago White Sox members
were criminally charged in the so-called “Black Sox Scandal.” Various baseball players allegedly lost the 1919 World Series intentionally in exchange for money from a gambling syndicate. As a result
of the national scandal, a federal judge—Kenesaw Mountain Landis—was brought in as baseball’s first commissioner to combat
13. See Christian Hetrick, In New Book, Wharton Prof Shows How Facebook,
Amazon, and Netflix Algorithms Shape our Decisions, PHILA. INQ. (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2XvZYoc.
14. See id. See also Will Knight, Biased Algorithms are Everywhere and No
One Seems to Care, MIT TECH. REV. (July 12, 2017), https://bit.ly/3fw3MMY
[https://perma.cc/7WKS-DVQF]; Hannah Sassaman, Pennsylvania’s Proposed
Risk-Assessment Algorithm Is Racist, PHILA. INQ. (last updated Sept. 4, 2019),
https://bit.ly/3ki5btm. Aside from the public policy issue of using algorithms for
decision-making in the justice system, there remains the fundamental challenge of
the ability to define and embed elusive, fluid value judgments (like fairness, justice,
ethics) into algorithmic design. The potential ethical dimensions of algorithmic
design are the subject of an intriguing and thought-provoking study by two professors who explore how social norms could be defined and incorporated into algorithms. The authors acknowledge that qualitative decisions and judgments must
remain firmly in the domain of human decision-making and that there may be
some norms and values that we do not want to formalize or encode in algorithm
design. In other words, there may be both scientific and moral limits to machine
coding. See MICHAEL KEARNS & AARON ROTH, THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM: THE
SCIENCE OF SOCIALLY AWARE ALGORITHM DESIGN (Oxford Univ. Press, 2019).
See BRIAN CHRISTIAN & TOM GRIFFITHS, ALGORITHMS TO LIVE BY: THE COMPUTER SCIENCE OF HUMAN DECISIONS 167 (2016) (regarding the dilemma of uncertainty and the compulsion to over-seek information in decision-making, the
authors quote a Canadian academic and management consultant who asked:
“What would happen if we started from the premise that we can’t measure matters
and go from there? Then instead of measurement we’d have to use something
very scary: it’s called judgment”). Cf. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Bias in Regulatory
Administration, Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 19-14 (2019), nn.
242–43 (Aug. 1, 2019), available at https://bit.ly/3grDegu [https://perma.cc/6QAQQCJR] (discussing the role and evolving use of algorithms in administrative agency
decision-making).
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gambling and bribery influences in baseball. Through Landis’s
landmark leadership, eight players were barred for life—although
later acquitted of criminal charges—and baseball’s reputation for
being a clean game was salvaged, an enduring benefit of Judge Landis’s courageous leadership. Nevertheless, consistent with the adage that no good deed goes unpunished, lawyers harshly criticized
Judge Landis for retaining his federal judgeship while serving as a
baseball commissioner. His annual salary as a baseball commissioner was $45,000, compared to his annual salary of $7,500 as a
federal judge. At the time, Judge Landis had not violated any ethical precept or law. Regardless, the ABA thereafter censured the
controversial judge.15
Serendipitously, the Landis controversy provided the impetus
and inspiration for the ABA to undertake the effort of promulgating, in 1924, the first comprehensive code of judicial ethics.16 The
code counseled judges to avoid impropriety as well as the appear-

15. See Peter W. Bowie, The Last 100 Years: An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 911, 915–17 (2007) (discussing the Landis controversy
and the ABA censure). Kenesaw Mountain Landis (his name was derived from a
Civil War battle) resigned from the bench but served as baseball commissioner
until his death in 1944. Regarding his judicial career, Judge Landis had imposed a
staggering $29 million fine on John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company in a
1907 antitrust case based on a 1462-count complaint. The fine, which electrified
the nation, was the largest then imposed by an American court. See David Pietrusza, Judge and Jury: The Life and Times of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis 63
(1998). See also Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (regarding disqualification of Judge Landis because of his biased statements about Germany and German-Americans where the defendants were of German ancestry). For particularly
good narratives of Judge Landis and the evolution of judicial ethics, see also Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the
Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1922–25 (2010);
Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109 (2011); Lomas v. Kravitz, 130 A.3d 107, 132–45 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2015) (Stabile, J. concurring in part) [hereinafter referred to as “Lomas
– OISR”], aff’d 170 A.3d 380 (Pa. 2017) [hereinafter referred to as “Lomas-II”].
Landis remains a controversial figure regarding allegations of his apparent racial
bias when he was a baseball commissioner. See Ben Walker, MLB: MVP Plaque
Presenters to Discuss Landis’ Name on Trophy, GARDNER NEWS (July 2, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3gJzhEh [https://perma.cc/4GRD-YTCV].
16. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and
the Proposed New ABA Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1350 n.67 (2006) (noting
prior unsuccessful ABA attempts to promulgate canons of ethics in 1909 and 1917
and the ABA’s approval to form a commission to draft rules in 1922); Bowie, supra
note 15, at 911–41 (providing a good history of the development of the ABA’s
canons); and Symposium, supra note 3, at 1099 (noting that the professionalization
of the organized bar during the Progressive Movement may have also influenced
judicial ethical reform).
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ance of impropriety. These nascent ethical precepts, however, were
vague and purely advisory.17
Concerted efforts to systematically reform judicial conduct began in the 20th century.18 Central to ethical judicial conduct is the
concept of “disqualification,” also commonly referred to as
“recusal,” a process by which a judge—either voluntarily or pursuant to a motion—withdraws from participation in a judicial proceeding.19 The objective of recusal has been to identify and
eliminate the potential for impropriety, such as bias or prejudice, in
the judicial decision-making process. The terms “recusal” and “disqualification” will be used interchangeably herein.
While the issue of recusal, as it relates to bias and prejudice,
has received considerable public attention—for example, in highlevel federal confirmation proceedings20—legal commentators view
17. See Rotunda, supra note 16, at 1350–51; McKoski, supra note 15, at
1923–24. Professor Geyh describes this period as the appearance of appearances.
See Geyh, supra note 10, at 877. Professor Virelli has noted that recusal had been
linked to specific scenarios, including a judge’s pecuniary interest in the proceeding, service as counsel for either party in the same case, appearance of a relative as
a party before the judge, participation in an appeal of a case in which the judge
presided below, or where he was a material witness in the case before him. See
LOUIS J. VIRELLI, III, DISQUALIFYING THE HIGH COURT: SUPREME COURT
RECUSAL AND THE CONSTITUTION 5–6 (2016). While these scenarios are not specifically linked to the concept of appearance, appearance is arguably implicated.
Professor Virelli notes that the ABA’s actions concerning the appearance of impropriety formally introduced the concept of public perception as grounds for
recusal. Id. at 8–9.
18. See, e.g., Charles G. Geyh et al., The State of Recusal Reform, 18 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2015) (identifying four phases of disqualification development); Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should
Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 512–16 (2007); M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot The Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of Propriety Standard,
7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS, 45, 46–48 (2005).
19. See Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 504 n.5 (observing that the terms are
technically different, disqualification being mandatory, and recusal as voluntary,
but functionally similar); MATTHEW MENENDEZ & DOROTHY SAMUELS, JUDICIAL
RECUSAL REFORM: TOWARD INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION OF DISQUALIFICATION 19 n.1 (2016) (noting that the terms are blurred in practice); and Judicial
Ethics Comm., Pa. Conference of State Trial Judges, Formal Advisory Opinion
2015-4 (2015) [hereinafter referred to as PA Formal Advisory Op.] (defining disqualification as “a specified fact, circumstance, or condition that makes one ineligible or unfit to serve or otherwise deprives the judge of the power to preside”; and
defines recusal as an “act of removing or absenting oneself in a particular case
because the judge concludes that the prevailing facts or circumstances could engender a substantial question in reasonable minds whether the judge can be impartial”). Rule 2.7 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, however, does not
employ the qualifier “substantial.” See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.7
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
20. See LAURENCE TRIBE ET AL., UNRESOLVED RECUSAL ISSUES REQUIRE A
PAUSE IN THE KAVANAUGH HEARINGS (2016). See also Amanda Frost, Keeping
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recusal as a linchpin in the preservation of a fair and impartial judicial system21 and an important component of the litigation process.22 The subject has received considerable commentary from
prominent legal and judicial organizations, as well as legal scholars.23 The scrutiny is understandable. One commentator has observed that there is a “terrible affliction” of biased judges.24 And
another has said that it is often the most biased judges who are least

Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusals, 53 U. KANS.
L. REV. 531, 539 n.31 (2005) (referring to the early case of Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137 (1803), wherein Chief Justice Marshall chose not to recuse himself in a
case involving his failure to deliver a judicial commission and involving the legality
of the commission which Marshall had to deliver as the Acting Secretary of State).
Frost also offers commentary on the refusal of Justice Antonin Scalia to recuse in a
case involving Vice-President Dick Cheney, which, she argues, undermined the
reputation of the judiciary. Id. at 576–81. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S.
913 (2004). In the executive branch context, the Administrative Conference of the
United States adopted five recommendations to address actual and apparent bias.
See Adoption of Recommendations, 84 Fed. Reg. 2139, 2139 (Feb. 6, 2019). For an
interesting extended discussion of the limits of traditional due process or jurisprudential bias principles with respect to the assessment of bias in administrative decision-making and rule-making, see Rodriguez, supra note 14. For a high-profile
exposure of a recusal controversy within the executive branch, consider the U.S.
Department of Justice’s investigation into alleged Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election, which involved Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ decision to
recuse and President Trump’s attempt to have him “unrecuse.” See THE MUELLER
REPORT 310–13 (2019) and infra note 320. As to such “reversible recusal” at the
judicial level, Justice Kelly of the Wisconsin Supreme Court announced his intention to unrecuse in a high-profile case involving the potentially substantial purging
of Wisconsin’s voter list. In justifying his decision, he pointed to the absence of
objections by the parties to his participation, the changed circumstances (the election, in which he lost his bid for a ten-year term, had been held) as well as his
affirmative duty to hear every case. See Shawn Johnson, Justice Daniel Kelly Will
Lift Recusal in Voter Purge Case (Apr. 29, 2020), https://bit.ly/2W1Z7uF [https://
perma.cc/LF6X-XLX4].
21. Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of
Bias, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 949 (2011).
22. Dmitry Bam, Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135,
1174 (2015).
23. Commentators include the ABA, the Brennan Center for Justice at Stake
(“Brennan Center”), the Center for American Progress, the Conference of Chief
Justices (“CCJ”), and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System (“IAALS”), whose works are cited passim. The focus of this article is on
recusal as it applies to state judicial systems. For an extended description and enlightening analysis of federal recusal through a constitutional lens, as applied primarily to the United States Supreme Court, see VIRELLI, supra note 17; see also
JOHN G. ROBERTS JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(2011), https://bit.ly/2O7Le9Z [https://perma.cc/KP46-C6WT] (addressing recusal
and ethics in the Supreme Court).
24. See Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 631
(2015).
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likely to recuse.25 Judge Frank, a proponent of the philosophy of
Legal Realism, viewed judicial bias as tantamount to corruption.26
Others have stated that judicial bias represents a structural error
that can have enormous corrosive and destructive impact.27 The
impact of judicial bias reaches beyond the parties and attorneys of a
particular legal matter—it affects the legal profession, the judicial
system, and the body politic because it undermines public trust and
confidence in the fundamental fairness of our legal system. Recusal
goes to the heart of our rule of law. As the U.S. Supreme Court
cautioned in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.: “ . . .
[P]eople who have not served on the bench are often all too willing
to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of
judges.”28 The guiding principle, the Court added, is that “the administration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested
as well as be so in fact.”29
Against a backdrop of claims that current recusal processes are
unconstitutional30 and that the appearance-based recusal regime in
25. See Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal
Defendants, Their Lawyers and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L.J. 521, 537
(2007).
26. See Frank, supra note 1 at 34–35. Judge Jerome Frank (1889-1957) was an
American legal philosopher and author who played a significant role in the Legal
Realism movement. Frank served on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
(1941–57). Frank also presided in the trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. See
United States v. Rosenberg et al., 195 F. 2d 583 (1952), aff’d 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
As to the Legal Realism movement, Professor Whittington has noted that in the
early twentieth century, the “Realists” challenged old assumptions of the stability
and objectivity of the law, contending that judges not only made policy from the
bench but also did so in accordance with internal preferences instead of objective
principles. The Legal Realists, whose heyday was in the 1920s and 1930s, eschewed a formalistic approach and believed that judges should be guided by a
sense of purpose and attentive to policy concerns. It has been noted that others
have referred to Legal Realism as the gastrointestinal theory of judicial decisionmaking. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1975, 1979 (2015); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997). The Realists believed that judges were
influenced by psychological, sociological, and extralegal forces. See KEITH E. WITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1999).
27. See Peter David Blanck, The Appearance of Justice Revisited, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 887, 893 (citing Arizona v. Fulminate, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991));
Raymond McKoski, Living with Judicial Elections, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 491, 516 (2017) (noting that partiality destroys the foundation of the judicial
process and can have an enormous destructive impact on the public’s perception of
the judiciary). See also Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 9 n.32 (commenting on bias as
arguably an aspect of corruption within the context of administrative decisionmaking).
28. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988).
29. Id.
30. See Bam, supra note 22, at 1136.
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America is in trouble,31 ignoring the need to reform the principles
and processes of recusal may be a fatal mistake.32 Recusal, of
course, applies to both appointed and elected judges. Moreover,
recusal reform may have acute relevance to judicial systems that
elect their judges,33 given the challenging realities of a significantly
changed legal landscape—because of cases such as Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n,34 Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White,35 and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.36—as well as the
corrosive impact of elected judges relying on money for their judicial campaigns and the consequential skeptical public perception of
judicial impartiality.
Thus, it is important to analyze the principles and processes
governing judicial disqualification. To provide a practical dimension to the nature of the recusal reformation challenge, particular
attention will be given to one state, Pennsylvania, which has been
criticized over the years for its recusal process.37 Pennsylvania’s judiciary is an elected one, and its predominant recusal feature—a
judge’s independent assessment of his/her own impartiality, subject
to belated deferential standard of review in the event of an appeal—represents the most serious procedural and jurisprudential
infirmity,38 a structural problem it shares with many other states.39
31. Charles G. Geyh, Why Disqualification Matters. Again, 30 REV. LITIG.
671, 676 (2011). In a critique of the appearance standard, the author observes that
the legal establishment is deeply divided over when it is reasonable for the presumption of impartiality to yield to the suspicion that extralegal influences may
have compromised a judge’s impartiality. The author advocates a revamped procedural recusal reform to promote public confidence. See text accompanying notes
160–75 regarding the problematic role of presumptions in the recusal context.
32. See Bam, supra note 21, at 953.
33. See generally Goldberg et al., supra note 18.
34. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
35. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
36. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). See AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, HOUSE OF DELEGATES REPORT AND RESOLUTION 107 at 2
(August 8–9, 2011) [hereinafter referred to as “ABA RESOLUTION 107”] (noting
that the Caperton, Citizens United, and White decisions “have significantly altered
the landscape of judicial disqualification in the context of judicial election campaign support and have considerably raised the stakes in those 39 states where
judges face some form of election”). ABA Resolution 107, adopted by the House
of Delegates, called for clearly articulated procedures for judicial disqualification
determinations, prompt review by another judge of denials of such requests, and,
for states with judicial elections, disclosure requirements for litigants and lawyers,
including guidelines for disclosure and disqualification.
37. See Kenneth S. Kilimnik, Recusal Standards for Judges in Pennsylvania:
Cause for Concern, 36 VILL. L. REV. 713, 773 (1991).
38. Pennsylvania’s recusal processes have been referred to as a “black hole of
judicial ethics.” See The Legal Intelligencer, Recusal “Black Hole of Judicial Eth-
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This article culminates in a proposed recusal process—adaptable as a judicial rule or statute—incorporating overarching ethical
and procedural imperatives that can guide recusal reform efforts.
In this endeavor, it is beneficial to recall the sage advice that Judge
Franks, the legal realist, once offered: “Ours is a system where [justice] is active but concealed. The concealment prevents our understanding our system. Let us become aware of its true nature. In
that way, we can use it more efficiently and, if possible, improve
it.”40
I.

RECUSAL AND THE CODIFICATION OF JUDICIAL ETHICS:
FROM SUSPICION TO APPEARANCES

The pursuit of impartiality, regarding both the decision-making
process and the decision-maker, is rooted in antiquity. In Egypt’s
18th dynasty, the vizier—one who occupied an exalted government
position—swore to carry out his duties impartially in accordance
with the Egyptian concept of maat (truth, justice, and righteousness). For example, at the vizier Rekhmira’s installation, the king
admonished him: “These, then, are the teachings: you shall treat
just[ly] the one known to you and the one not known to you, the
one near you and the one far away.”41
Roman law afforded the right to disqualify a judge who was
“under suspicion.” The Justinian Codex (circa 530 A.D.) provided:
It is the clearest right under general provisions laid down from
thy exalted seat, that before hearings litigants may recuse judges
. . . Although a judge has been appointed by imperial power yet
because it is our pleasure that all litigations should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who thinks the judge
under suspicion to recuse him before the issue is joined, so that
the cause may go to another; the right to recuse having been held
out to him . . . .42
ics” in Pennsylvania, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 26, 2010), https://bit.ly/
2B0lvx8 [https://perma.cc/67SJ-4G7E].
39. See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding on Recusal Motions: Who Judges
the Judges?, 28 VAL. L. REV. 543 (1994) (identifying states with self-disqualification procedures); Serbulea, supra note 15, at 1151–73 (appendix of state recusal
practices); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM, JUDICIAL
RECUSAL PROCEDURES (2017) [hereinafter referred to as the “IAALS REPORT”].
40. See Frank, supra note 1, at 31.
41. See TOBY WILKINSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF ANCIENT EGYPT 226
(2010). The 18th dynasty spanned from 1539 B.C. to 1292 B.C.
42. See Geyh, supra note 31, at 677–78 (citing Codex of Justinian, Book III,
title 1, No. 16); MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 19, at 3; Ralph Slovenko, Je
Recuse! The Disqualification of a Judge, 19 LA L. REV. 644, 664 n.78 (1959). The
historian, Caroline Humfress, remarks that Justinian (r. 527–565) made use of cler-
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Common law adopted a considerably restricted disqualification
approach. As Justice Scalia noted in Liteky v. United States,43
mandatory judicial recusal for bias did not exist in England during
the time of William Blackstone, an influential English law commentator.44 Blackstone rejected absolutely that a judge could be challenged for bias. As Blackstone explained: “[T]he law will not
suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is sworn to
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends
upon that presumption and idea.”45 The one incursion in the
hardline common law stance on recusal was direct financial interest.46 Nevertheless, the traditional direct financial interest exception was subject to its own exception, the so-called “rule of
necessity,” an ethical dispensation that remains in recusal theory
and practice today.47
ics in many different legal contexts, including assigning bishops when a provincial
judge’s neutrality or trustworthiness had been questioned. See CAROLINE HUMFRESS, AGE OF JUSTINIAN 179 (Michael Maas ed., 2005).
43. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
44. Id. at 541. See also Symposium, supra note 3, at 1097 (noting that the
development of ethical standards for judges and means of enforcement can be
traced back to 13th century England).
45. See Geyh, supra note 31, at 677–90 (identifying four historical stages of
disqualification). See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, III, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 361 (1768), cited by Justice Scalia in Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540,
543–44 (1994).
46. See Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1610) (Coke, C.J.) (holding that a judge could not preside over a case in which he stood to benefit financially); see also John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L. REV. 605,
611–12 n.27 (1947). On the issue of citing Dr. Bonham’s Case, see George P.
Smith, II, Marbury v. Madison, Lord Coke And Dr. Bonham: Relics of the Past,
Guidelines for the Present – Judicial Review in Transition?, 2 UNIV. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 255 n.2 (1979) (pointing out that “[t]he case is more properly referred to
as The Case of the College of Physicians and is reported both by Coke in his capacity as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and by Brownlow, who served
as the Court Prothonotary. See 8 Co. 114a, 77 ENG. REP. 646 (1610) and 2
BROWNL. 255, 77 ENG. REP. 646 (1610)”).
47. See Thomas McKevitt, Note, The Rule of Necessity: Is Judicial Non-Disqualification Really Necessary?, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 818 (1996); United States v.
Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (providing a history of the common law rule); Aaron S.
Bayer, The Rule of Necessity, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 23, 2007), https://bit.ly/30z45Su
[https://perma.cc/M6WV-BW5M]. The ABA Model Code, Rule 2.11, cmt. 3, acknowledges that the rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification, for
example, where there is judicial review of a judicial salary statute or where the
judge is the only one available in a matter requiring immediate action. See, e.g.,
Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2006) (judicial salary dispute). Application of the rule of necessity has been largely limited to courts of last resort. In
actuality, the rule is neither a rule nor required given the modern realities of inherent judicial power and rules/statutes that provide an opportunity to replace or assign judges. Replacement is arguably a preferable approach given concerns of due
process, fairness, and public perception when judges rule in cases in which they
clearly have a self-interest. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,
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The U.S. Congress enacted the country’s first recusal statute in
1792, incorporating the common law’s financial conflict-of-interest
(“concerned in interest”) disqualification as well as the restriction
regarding prior representation of a party.48 The 1792 statute would
eventually evolve into the current statutory provision—section
45549—which, by its terms, applies to any “justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States.”50 Judicial recusal was discretionary, and courts applied the restricted English standard narrowly.51
Over the years, Congress identified additional grounds as justifications for judicial disqualification, including factors such as relationship to a party; in appeals, prior participation as the trial judge; and
being a material witness in the case. These categorical disqualifying
factors are common today.52 Courts continue to narrowly construe
these mandatory grounds of disqualification.53
It was not until 1911 that Congress enacted legislation providing for recusal for bias and prejudice through a seemingly automatic
disqualification process based on a party’s affidavit alleging the
judge’s “personal bias or prejudice” for or against a party. The pro828 n.5 (1986) (Court notes that Alabama law authorized the appointment of a
special justice in the event of a justice’s disqualification); Barrow v. Raffensperger,
Case Nos S20M100, S20M1020 (Ga. Mar. 23, 2020) (in a high profile case involving
the cancellation of a state election pertaining to a vacancy on the Georgia Supreme
Court, five justices recused; the order noted that substitute justices were selected
by the clerk of court at random from a pre-existing list). See also VIRELLI, supra
note 17, at 42, 83–84 (discussing application of the rule to the United States Supreme Court); and infra note 331 (reassignment of cases).
48. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, sec. 11, 1 Stat. 178–79 (1792).
49. 28 U.S.C § 455 (2018).
50. See Geyh, supra note 31, at 680–81, 688–90 (providing a history of section
455’s genesis and development); Randall J. Litteneker, Disqualification of Federal
Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236 (1978) (providing a good
critical analysis of section 455 and its problematic relationship to section 144); see
also infra note 66.
51. See Frost, supra note 20, at 540–41; see also Note, Disqualification of a
Judge on the Grounds of Bias, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78, 79–80 (1927); Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876–77 (noting that at common law disqualification for bias or prejudice was not permitted, necessarily relegating the issue to
statutes and judicial codes).
52. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543–44 (1994); Melinda Marbes,
Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating Decisionmaker Bias and Promoting
Public Confidence, 49 VAL. L. REV. 807, 811–19 (2015) (identifying common partiality problems); Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need
for a Per Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintances), 33 PEPP. L. REV. 575 (2006)
(discussing the development of recusal and urging expansion with respect to a
friendship between the judge and a named party or attorney of record that exceeds
ordinary and reasonable social intercourse and business associations).
53. See Frost, supra note 20, at 541.
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vision to force recusal—section 144—applied to district judges.54
Courts also interpret the statutory disqualification-by-affidavit provision narrowly.55 The limited effectiveness of this disqualification
provision has been largely attributable to its vulnerability to discretionary and varying judicial interpretations regarding facial sufficiency, timeliness, and definition of bias and prejudice.56 The
principal federal disqualification statutes—sections 144 and 455—
overlap and have notably been the source of confusion.57 Section
144 disqualification aims at actual bias or prejudice, whereas section
455 also deals with the appearance of partiality, the latter viewed as
effectively subsuming the former.58
Beyond the federal legislative sphere, the 20th century, spurred
by the era’s progressive movement, witnessed a more concerted national effort to address judicial impartiality through the codification
of rules or codes of judicial conduct.59 From a constitutional perspective, while fundamental fairness and impartiality are significant
and overarching constitutional values, they have provided little
practical guidance or assistance in judicial disqualification and
54. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2018), which was originally enacted as section 21 of the
Judicial Code of 1911, and later re-codified as section 144 without significant
change. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 544. Judge Bowie has noted that “issues of appearances of possible lack of impartiality remained on Congress’s stove from 1911 forward, in one form or another.” See Bowie, supra note 15, at 924.
55. See Frost, supra note 20, at 543, citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22
(1921), positing that the statute’s peremptory intent was eviscerated when the trial
judge was given the authority to assess the legal sufficiency and timeliness of the
motion.
56. See Frost, supra note 20, at 543–44, 587 (suggesting that peremptory procedure is a less efficient method of recusal, more susceptible to abuse, and does
not give a jurist an opportunity to reflect on allegations of bias); Geyh, supra note
31, at 685 (noting that section 144 has been a failed experiment); Liteky, 510 U.S.
at 544; and FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL CASE LAW UNDER SECS. 455 AND 144 3, 84 (2d ed., 2010). The recusalby-affidavit or peremptory challenge is in use in a substantial minority (estimated
to be approximately one-third) of states, primarily in the west and southwest. See
Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 522 n.103; ABA RESOLUTION 107, supra note 36,
at 6 n.17; Serbulea, supra note 15, at 1123 (noting the risk of giving litigants a “free
pass” to disqualify judges perceived as unfavorable). The IAALS REPORT, supra
note 39, at 7, stated that the members of the recusal study were unable to reach a
consensus about recommending the peremptory challenge approach to recusal.
57. Relevant, to a lesser extent, is 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2000), which concerns disqualification of a judge in an appeal where the judge had determined the underlying case or issue in the trial court.
58. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 56, at 83–84.
59. See McKeown, supra, note 18, at 46; Mark I. Harrison, The 2007 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Blueprint for a Generation of Judges, 28 JUST.
SYS. J. 258 (noting that there was no prescribed code of judicial conduct at the turn
of the 20th century).
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recusal matters, a reality that persists today.60 Thus, the more significant route for safeguarding against judicial bias among the states
came through the promulgation of codes or rules of ethical conduct,
generally through the valiant reform efforts of the ABA.61 Against
the backdrop of the White Sox scandal,62 the ABA approved the
formation of a commission—chaired by Chief Justice William Howard Taft—to draft rules of judicial conduct in 1922. In 1924, the
ABA promulgated its first set of ethical codes, Canons of Judicial
Ethics (“1924 Canons”), which contained 36 canons.63
Two facts about the 1924 Canons are noteworthy. First, the
1924 Canons were essentially an aspirational and advisory guide
rather than a source of judicial disciplinary enforcement. Second,
the concept of appearance of impropriety made its formal entrance
onto the national stage. Canon 4 of the 1924 Canons, titled “Avoidance of Impropriety,” expressly stated, in part, that “[a] judge’s official conduct should be free of impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.”64
Over the years, discontent with the essentially anemic 1924 Canons, exacerbated to some degree by public controversies implicating judicial improprieties,65 helped create a climate of support for
60. See Marbes, supra note 52, at 824 (noting that due process represents an
ideal and is least important for judicial disqualification); Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887–88 (due process demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualification); Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d 107, 136 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
Professor Virelli examines recusal in the United States Supreme Court from the
more stringent constitutional perspective. His analysis concludes that the Supreme
Court’s treatment of recusal is evolving toward a more expansive and flexible approach. See VIRELLI, supra note 17, at 135–37. His study contains a good examination of the history and development of due process-based recusal.
61. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 17–20 (noting that states have adopted the
ABA’s model appearance of impropriety standard and that the Court’s due process disqualification cases deal with extreme or extraordinary facts and acknowledging that states are free to adopt more rigorous standards); Geyh et al., supra
note 18, at 516–19; Rotunda, supra note 16, at 1350–52; Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d
107, 132 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
62. See text accompanying supra notes 3 and 15.
63. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924). See Rotunda, supra
note 16, at 1350 n.67 (noting prior resolutions in 1909 and 1917); Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUSTICE SYS. J. 271, 273–74 (2007). See generally Bowie, supra
note 15 (providing a good historical narrative of the codification of judicial ethics).
64. See Rotunda, supra note 16, at 1350–51 (noting that the 1924 canons
paved the way for more meaningful reforms); and VIRELLI, supra note 17, at 7–9.
65. See Lievense & Cohn, supra note 63, at 274–75 (mentioning the ethics
controversies regarding the nomination of Abe Fortas and two other nominees);
and Bowie, supra note 15, at 927–31 (discussing the backdrop of the Fortas and
Haynesworth controversies as well as the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council’s removal
of cases from District Judge Chandler, who unsuccessfully sought a writ of manda-
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significantly revising the ABA’s canons. In 1972, the ABA adopted
the Code of Judicial Conduct (“1972 Code”) to replace the 1924
Canons formulated almost 50 years earlier. The Canons were reduced from 36 to seven.66 Significantly, the 1972 Code radically revamped judicial ethics by changing the lens of disqualification and
recusal from a subjective to an objective one. In addition to specific
categorical or per se circumstances of disqualification,67 under Canon 3C(1), a judge was subject to an overarching disqualification
when “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” This has
often been described by commentators in varying terms, such as the
reasonable observer, the objective appearance, the default or catchall standard of disqualification.68 As stressed in Liteky, under the

mus). Consider also Justice Rehnquist’s refusal to recuse in Laird v. Tatum, 409
U.S. 824 (1972).
66. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1972). Congressional action followed, resulting in a substantial revision to 28 U.S.C. § 455 based
on the revised ABA Model Code. Justice Scalia in Liteky, 510 U.S. 540, 546
(1994), observed that before 1974, section 455 was nothing more than the 1821
prohibition against a judge’s presiding in a case in which he had an interest or
relationship to a party. Congressional revision of section 455 was also meant to
eliminate the “duty to sit” doctrine that Justice Rehnquist had relied on in Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824. See Frost, supra note 20, at 545–47 (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s refusal to recuse and the ABA’s reaction); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L.
REV. 813 (2009). For a good summary of the duty to sit doctrine, see Roy J. Rodney, Jr. & John K. Etter, The Last Stand of the Duty to Sit: Recusal in Louisiana, 61
LA. BAR J. 255 (2013–14). It is important to note the current ABA Model Code,
R. 2.7 (2011), makes the “responsibility to decide” subservient to the disqualification mandate of R. 2.11. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.7 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2011).
67. Regarding the promulgation of the 1972 Code, see generally Walter P.
Armstrong, Jr., The Code of Judicial Conduct, 26 SW. L.J. 708 (1972); see also
Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411,
425–29 (2014). The enumerated disqualifying circumstances included, for example, personal bias or prejudice, participation as a lawyer or material witness, and
financial interest.
68. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548 (referring to provision as a “catchall”). A
word of caution is necessary since the term “objective” can be misleading. All
decision-making, to some degree, is inherently subjective. “Objective” in the
recusal context simply connotes that the ethical assessment is made from the perspective of a detached reasonable observer (regarding the alleged conduct or circumstances), one who does not have a personal interest in the assessment.
Recognizing that all decision-making occurs somewhere on the subjective-objective spectrum, this article simply suggests that there should be an endeavor to optimize the potential for more objective, fairer decision-making and processes in
recusal matters (consistent with and supportive of governing ethical principles),
given the stark reality of an ever-present mystifying dynamic of subjectivity and
the subconscious.
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objective appearance standard, “the judge does not have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.”69
The new ethical standard, however, was increasingly criticized
as being ineffectively hortatory, not mandatory.70 The 1972 Code
was couched in terms of “should” rather than “shall.”71 Thus, in
1990, the ABA engaged in another reform effort to make clear that
the ethical standards were mandatory and enforceable.72 Specifically, Canon 2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“1990 Model
Code”) provided: “A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities.” Canon
3E(1) provided, in part: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself
in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.”73 The broad mandatory appearance standard, a
critical aspect of the appearance of impropriety precept, is then fol-

69. See id. at 553 n.2 (emphasis in original) (referring to the federal disqualification statute); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)
(noting that actual bias is not determinative, stating “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”). For purposes of the discussion herein, the standard shall also
be referred to as the objective appearance standard. In some respects, the new
objective appearance standard could be viewed as an historical echo of the Roman
“suspicion” standard. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. It is also worth
noting a limiting aspect of recusal. In Liteky, Justice Scalia emphasized the general
rule that the prejudice warranting recusal must result from an extra-judicial source,
i.e., from facts arising from other than the judge’s participation in the underlying
case; but the source of bias is one factor a judge should consider. See Liteky, 510
U.S. at 553 n.2. Where the alleged bias or prejudice emanates from the proceeding
itself to warrant recusal, the bias or prejudice must “reveal such a high degree of
favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” See id. at 555. See
also Toni-Ann Citera, A Look at the Extrajudicial Source Doctrine under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1114 (1995); see also Thomas v. Walker, 860
S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. App. 1993) (extrajudicial source rule is a threshold standard); see also Commonwealth v. Lucky, 2020 Pa. Super. 39 (2020) (sentence vacated and remanded for re-sentencing without prejudice to defendant’s right to file
a motion to recuse where record demonstrated that defendant’s harsher re-sentence may have been the product of bias or ill will toward the defendant; appellate
court could not remand to a different judge where trial judge was not asked to
recuse and judge made no on-the-record recusal ruling).
70. See Rotunda, supra note 16, at 1351–52.
71. See McKeown, supra note 18, at 47.
72. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1990). The 1990 Code was re-structured into four canons accompanied by blackletter rules and other sections (preamble, statement of scope, terminology, and
application). See also Harrison, supra note 59, at 259.
73. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1990). See also Marbes, supra note 52, at 831 n.142 (noting that of the 49 states
that have adopted the ABA Model Code, only 16 still use “should” in their rules);
see also Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ.
L. REV. 949 (1996).
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lowed by specific illustrative categorical instances automatically requiring disqualification.74
Finally, in 2007, in the face of growing attempts to dilute the
objective appearance standard,75 the ABA engaged in a complete
re-evaluation of the 1990 Model Code.76 As a result, the ABA
amended the 1990 Model Code to prominently position judicial disqualification as a black-letter rule. Rule 2.11(A) states, in part: “A
judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which
the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”77 As one
author noted: “Whether labeled as Canon 3(C)(1) (1972), Canon
3E(1) (1990), or Rule 2.11(A), the black-letter disqualifying principle has remained almost constant.”78 For practical purposes, the
objective appearance standard of recusal has become the benchmark or “gold standard” of judicial conduct, making proof of actual
bias—an extremely difficult task—largely irrelevant.79
As a result of the codification efforts by the ABA, most states
have adopted the objective appearance disqualification standard of
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.80 The objective standard, relying on external evidence of bias,81 embodies the foundational
value emphasized in Liljeberg: “The guiding consideration is that
74. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1990). The 1990 version also expanded the code’s provisions to include personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party’s lawyer and expanded its reach regarding
relationships. See McKoski, supra note 67, at 429–30. The ABA later revised the
code to include the disqualifying factor of contributions to the judge’s judicial campaign from a litigant or a litigant’s attorney. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (amended 2003) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990), Canon 3E(1)(e)
(1990).
75. See Rotunda, supra note 16, for a critical assessment of the appearance
standard; cf. McKeown, supra note 18, for a forceful judicial defense of the appearance standard.
76. See Harrison, supra note 59 (discussing the processes and significant
changes attending the ABA’s comprehensive revision of the 1990 Code).
77. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.11(A) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2007).
78. See Leslie W. Abramson, What Every Judge Should Know About the Appearance of Impartiality, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2015–16).
79. See McKoski, supra note 67, at 426, 429; see also Marbes, supra note 52, at
828 (noting that the Model Code’s disqualification standard is the benchmark for
states); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (actual or subjective
bias or prejudice is no longer the law).
80. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 888 (2009) (“Almost
every State . . . has adopted the ABA’s objective [appearance of impropriety]
standard.”).
81. See Marbes, supra note 52, at 831 (noting that the “might reasonably be
questioned” standard requires an evaluation of external facts measured from an
objective, not subjective, state of mind of the challenged jurist).
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the administration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be so in fact.”82
II.

THE KEYSTONE STATE’S83 APPROACH TO RECUSAL—A
CASE STUDY

A. Overview—Ethical principles and infrastructure regarding
recusal in Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania’s judiciary is an elected one.84 Whether elected
or temporarily appointed, all Pennsylvania jurists are constitutionally and statutorily required to comply with the judicial code of ethics, which is incorporated in the state’s constitution.85
In Republican Party v. White, Justice Kennedy observed that
states may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process
requires.86 In the same case, Justice O’Connor observed that states
which have chosen to select judges through the popular electoral
process have voluntarily assumed certain risks to judicial bias.87 As
with other states, to minimize such risks of bias, Pennsylvania
adopted ethical principles and structures governing judicial conduct, including an independent judicial disciplinary system88 and a
code of judicial conduct.89
82. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 869–70 (1988)
(citing Pub. Utilities Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466–67 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., in chambers)). See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)
(“[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”) (citing Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)); see also Andrew L. Kaufman, Judicial Ethics: The Lessoften Asked Questions, 64 WASH. L. REV. 851, 854 (1989) (appearance of impropriety standard is foundational to the Code, “the one to which all other rules are
mere commentary . . .”).
83. Pennsylvania is commonly referred to as the Keystone State. The
historical origins are obscure. The label was used in the late 18th century by
Jeffersonian Republicans who believed Pennsylvania was pivotal in the triumph of
Jefferson’s presidential election, touting Pennsylvania as the “keystone in the
democratic arch.” See SANFORD W. HIGGINBOTHAM, THE KEYSTONE IN THE
DEMOCRATIC ARCH 1 (1952).
84. See PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 12–13. In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 792, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion noted that 31
states use popular elections to select some or all of their appellate and/or general
jurisdiction trial court judges.
85. PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(b); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2005) (judges shall
not violate canons of judicial ethics). See also Kilimnik, supra note 37, at 717.
86. See White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (providing a historical overview
of judicial selection and election in the United States).
88. See PA. CONST. art. V.
89. See PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2014), which was substantially revised in 2014. The Code applies to all judges, including senior judges, above the
magisterial district judge level, namely, the Supreme Court, the two intermediate
appellate courts (Superior and Commonwealth), the trial courts (Common Pleas),
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Pennsylvania’s Code of Judicial Conduct substantially incorporates the provisions of the ABA’s 2011 edition of its Model Code of
Judicial Conduct.90 Thus, Pennsylvania’s Code of Judicial Conduct,
similar to the ABA’s Model Code, is replete with references to judicial impartiality, impropriety, and the appearance thereof.91 In particular, Pennsylvania’s Rule 1.2. states that a judge “shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” The accompanying comment states: “The test for appearance of impropriety is
whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception
that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that
reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.”92 In addition, Pennsylvania’s
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] judge shall hear and
decide matters assigned to the judge, except where the judge has
recused himself or herself or when disqualification is required by
Rule 2.11 or other law.”93
and Philadelphia Municipal Court. See PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Application, para. 2 (2014). Specific rules governing standards of conduct for magisterial
district judges, and judges of the Philadelphia Municipal Court/Traffic Division are
set forth in the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of Magisterial District
Judges, which substantially replicate the disqualification standards of Pennsylvania’s Code of Judicial Conduct. PA. RULES GOVERNING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OF MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGES (2014).
The applicable ethical
provisions for the magisterial district judges can be found at Rules 1.1 to 4.5.
90. See PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl., para. 9 (2014) (referring to
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)).
91. For example, preceding the black-letter rules, the Preamble, para. 3, states
that “Judges should uphold the dignity of the judicial office at all times, avoiding
both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives.” Pennsylvania’s judicial code defines “impropriety” as “conduct that
violates the law, court rules, or provisions of this Code, and conduct that undermines a judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.” PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Terminology (2014).
92. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2, cmt. 5 (2014); see also id. r. 2.3,
c.2 (“A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced
or biased.”). See infra notes 94, 140 regarding Pennsylvania’s complicating gloss
on the application of the ABA’s appearance standard.
93. See PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.7 (2014), often viewed in terms
of a “duty to sit.” See supra note 66 and infra note 174 regarding the discredited
“duty to sit” doctrine. Additionally, Pennsylvania’s comment 2 to Rule 2.7 makes
reference to the ABA’s appearance standard and seems to embellish it by including the following “substantial question” consideration: “In addition, however, a
judge may recuse himself or herself from presiding over a matter even in the absence of a disqualifying fact or circumstance where—in the exercise of discretion,
in good faith, and with due consideration for the general duty to hear and decide
matters—concludes that prevailing facts and circumstances could engender a substantial question in reasonable minds as to whether disqualification should be required.” PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.7, cmt. 2 (2014); see also infra note
140 (regarding Pennsylvania’s apparent calibration of the ABA’s standard).
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Thus, for purposes of assessing the ethical imperative of
recusal and disqualification, the pivotal provision is Rule 2.11(a).
Embodying the catch-all objective appearance standard, Rule
2.11(A) states: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”94 Rule 2.11’s appearance standard reinforces Rule
1.2’s appearance of impartiality mandate. Appearance of impropriety—the perception of judicial conduct by reasonable minds—is an
ethical standard predicated on an objective, not subjective, analysis.95 As with most state jurisdictions,96 the black-letter rules of ethical judicial conduct are mandatory.97
With respect to the ethical behavior and responsibilities of jurists, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is constitutionally vested
with general authority to promulgate the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct and to administer the state’s unified judicial system.
The Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct is administered and interpreted in specific cases through the investigatory and
prosecutorial Judicial Conduct Board,98 the adjudicatory Court of
Judicial Discipline,99 the two intermediate appellate courts (Superior and Commonwealth), and ultimately subject to the supremacy
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s pronouncements.100
94. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (2014).
95. Almost every state has adopted the ABA’s objective appearance of impropriety ethical standard. See Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d 107, 137 n.26 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2015). Rule 2.11(A)’s appearance standard is, as in the ABA model code, followed by a list of per se disqualifying factors, such as personal bias or prejudice,
economic interest in the subject matter, family and professional relationships, likelihood of being a material witness, prior involvement in the proceeding, and receipt of judicial campaign contributions that would raise a reasonable concern
about fairness and impartiality. See also supra note 67 (discussing the enumerated
disqualifying circumstances). Except for campaign contributions, such disqualifying factors have been historically common to modern recusal practice.
96. See supra note 73 regarding the terminology of “should.”
97. Pennsylvania’s Canons and Rules are couched in mandatory terms. The
Model Code states that the Canons are overarching principles of judicial ethics
that all judges must observe and that a judge may be disciplined only for violating
a Rule. The Comments provide guidance and aspirational goals. The black letter
of the Rules is binding and enforceable. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Scope, paras. 2, 3, 4, 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). The PA. Ethics Commission’s advisory opinion, supra note 19, has observed that while the ABA model code includes
Comments as well as Canons, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the
Rules without mentioning the Comments, thereby creating uncertainty as to the
legal weight of such comments. See also infra note 140.
98. PA. CONST., art. V, § 18(a).
99. Id. art. V, § 18(b).
100. Regarding the supreme court’s constitutional powers and responsibilities, see id. art. V, §§ 1 (Unified Judicial System), 2 (Pennsylvania Supreme Court),
10 (Judicial Administration), and 18(c) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court review of
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B. The Public Face of Recusal in Pennsylvania: Some Examples
The issue of judicial recusal and disqualification in Pennsylvania is not an academic matter. Recusals and the appearance of
judicial bias can have significant practical effects on the litigating
parties and can affect the public’s perception of an individual judge,
as well as the fairness and integrity of the judicial system, especially
in highly publicized cases.
A non-exhaustive data search has identified a substantial number of Pennsylvania cases—primarily appellate—that have involved
recusal issues.101 Recusal, either directly or indirectly, has been an
issue in numerous high-profile cases. In one particularly noteworthy case, Williams v. Pennsylvania, the U.S. Supreme Court criticized Pennsylvania’s chief justice for an unconstitutional risk of bias
when he denied a death penalty defendant’s recusal motion, despite
his prior involvement as a prosecutor in the defendant’s case.102
The electorate often hears about recusal controversies through
media coverage in high-profile cases. Because of the notoriety of
the parties or issues in a given case, recusal terrain can be wideranging. The following sample of cases are illustrative: a popular
rapper—Meek Mill—embroiled in a highly contentious and protracted recusal challenge in which the supreme court could not
agree whether its immediate intervention in the issue of the trial
final adverse orders). See also In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 641 (Pa. 2014) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court controls judicial discipline pursuant to its King’s Bench
power). The PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 89, pmbl., para. 8 provides that the Ethics Committee of the Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial
Judges is given the authority to render advisory, non-binding opinions to judges
and judicial candidates regarding judicial ethical concerns, which may be a factor
in determining whether discipline should be recommended or imposed.
101. The search of relevant caselaw (beyond the trial court level) revealed the
following numbers of cases that involved, either directly or indirectly, recusal issues (i.e., ordering or not ordering recusal) in the Pennsylvania courts: United
States Supreme Court (recusal—2 cases); Pennsylvania Supreme Court (recusal—
8; non-recusal—20); Superior Court (recusal—3; non-recusal—12); and Court of
Judicial Discipline (recusal—1; non-recusal—1). An overwhelming majority of the
cases span 1970 through 2019. The data search was not comprehensive and is intended only to demonstrate that recusal in Pennsylvania caselaw has not been
infrequent.
102. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2016) (noting “Where a
judge has had an earlier significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision in the defendant’s case, the risk of actual bias in the judicial proceeding rises to an unconstitutional level”). The state’s chief justice denied the recusal
motion in the postconviction proceeding of a capital murder case without a hearing. The U.S. Supreme Court’s five-to-four decision, reversing the judgment of
sentence, was based on due process grounds, i.e., unconstitutional risk of actual
bias.
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judge’s refusal to recuse was necessary;103 a nationally popular actor—Bill Cosby—on trial for sexual assault charges;104 legislative
reapportionment implicating significant statewide political consequences;105 a clerical sex abuse case in which litigants raised the
issue of financial disclosure of the justices;106 and the protracted litigation of a convicted cop killer—Abu-Jamal—a case generating
substantial national and international attention.107
Occasionally, and unfortunately less publicized, have been
commendable instances of independent ethical introspection when
a jurist acknowledged the potential risk of the appearance of partiality and recuses, sometimes with explanation—such as in the Penn
103. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 188 A.3d 382, 382 (Pa. 2018), in which
an equally divided court denied Williams’ Emergency Application for King’s
Bench Jurisdiction; Justice Baer, joined by Justices Todd and Donohue, would
have ordered disqualification and re-assignment based on the trial judge’s appearance of impropriety. See also Max Mitchell, PA High Court Won’t Toss Judge
Brinkley from Meek Mill Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 21, 2018), https://
bit.ly/3eL3G3M. Thereafter, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 215 A.3d 1019, 1029
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2019), a three-judge panel of the Superior Court granted post-conviction relief and vacated the judgment of sentence. Because the trial judge had
heard highly prejudicial testimony from a discredited material witness, the appellate court remanded the case to a different judge. The case was the subject of
considerable and prolonged national media attention. As a result of his experience
in the criminal justice system, Meek Mill became a vocal advocate for criminal
justice reform.
104. Commonwealth v. Cosby, No. CP-46-CR-3932-2016, 2018 WL 4608703
(Montgomery Cty. Ct. C.P., Sept. 19, 2018) (trial court’s memorandum opinion
and order denying defendant’s motion for recusal and reconsideration of its prior
order of recusal and sentence of three to ten years), aff’d, 224 A.3d 372 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2019) (recusal issue waived), petition for allowance of appeal granted in Commonwealth v. Cosby, No. 9 MAL 2020, 2020 WL 3425277 (Pa. June 23, 2020) (review limited to two evidential issues). See, e.g., Maria Puente, Bill Cosby Seeks to
Dump Judge—Again—Two Weeks Before Sentencing of Sex-Crime Conviction,
USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2018), https://bit.ly/3ifp976 [https://perma.cc/4WML3RD7]; Maryclaire Dale, Bill Cosby’s Wife Wants Ethics Board to Investigate
Judge, INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2BoKMBt [https://perma.cc/
CQ6V-PZX2].
105. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083, 1084
(Pa. 2018) (invalidating Pennsylvania’s congressional districting scheme).
106. In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 190 A.3d 560, 563 (Pa.
2018) (regarding public access to a grand jury’s report to reveal the names of the
clerical sex abusers of minors). See Liz Navratil & Angela Couloumbis, Pa. Supreme Court Justices Got More Than $180K in Donations From Law Firms in
Clergy Abuse Case, Records Show, PHILA. INQUIRER (last updated July 11, 2018),
https://bit.ly/3dJ559K. Justice Todd, followed by Justices Mundy and Wecht, issued
a public letter acknowledging receipt of contributions from attorneys and law firms
tied to the case and offered to consider any requests for recusal.
107. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 121, 127 (Pa. 1998) (justice’s
opinion in support of denial of appellant’s motion for recusal). See infra note 137
regarding the protracted history of this case.
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State Jerry Sandusky sex abuse case.108 Likewise, there have been
instances when a jurist has denied a motion to recuse, providing a
good-faith ethical assessment and detailed public exposition of the
facts to explain the decision and rationale.109
Aside from published appellate opinions in which recusal is
raised as a specific issue in an appeal, judicial disciplinary enforcement actions addressing the refusal to recuse sometimes culminate
in published adjudications.110 Of course, there are many unre108. See Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019) (post-conviction proceeding in which Judge Nichols notes Judge Cleland’s
sua sponte recusal; appellate court orders re-sentencing). Judge Cleland explained
his recusal as follows:
In the current national environment in which some have chosen to embroil the courts and judges in controversy for less than honorable motives, the reality is that courts must err on the side of demonstrating
fairness . . . . It would be imprudent to allow such a cloud to linger and to
permit it to cast a shadow of legitimacy on the court, or any decision I
would make.
Jeremy Roebuck, Exasperated Sandusky Judge Withdraws From Case, Urges Probe
of Lawyers, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 18, 2016), https://bit.ly/3ggUYun. Sandusky
was resentenced (30–60 years). Judge Foradora, who had been assigned to resentence Sandusky, thereafter recused without explanation. See Phil Ray, Sandusky
Sentencing by Judge Skerda Scheduled for Friday, TIMES OBSERVER (Nov. 22,
2019), https://bit.ly/31wYM6D [https://perma.cc/49X9-QAAA]. Other Pennsylvania examples include Chief Justice Saylor’s voluntarily recusing (without explanation) in a matter involving the legal propriety of submitting to the electorate
a proposed constitutional amendment to change the mandatory judicial retirement
age. See Sprague v. Cortes, 145 A.3d 1136, 1136–37 (Pa. 2016) (evenly divided
court unable to grant relief). In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 204 A.3d 326, 326–27
(Pa. 2018), Justices Saylor, Baer, and Todd recused in a post-conviction appeal
challenging a former justice’s participation in a prior appeal. See Zack Needles,
Justices’ Even Split Dooms PCRA Petition Over Eakin’s Porngate Emails, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 14, 2018), https://bit.ly/3gdmyc9.
At the national level is the example of Justice Felix Frankfurter. Preliminarily
noting that reason cannot control the subconscious influence of feelings, Justice
Frankfurter recused in a case concerning the regulation of a street railway company’s amplified radio programming through the loudspeakers of its passenger vehicles. In an extraordinary public acknowledgement of predisposition, he
explained: “My feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it.” Pub. Utils.
Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952). Professor Dailey notes that Justice
Frankfurter “had come to accept the central tenet of the unconscious and its influence on judicial decision-making.” DAILEY, supra note 1, at 61.
109. Justice Wecht provided detailed explanations in the cases of League of
Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018), and Freilich v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 191 A.3d 739 (Pa. 2018). See also Judge Stabile’s explanation in Commonwealth v. Spanier, No. 1093 MDA 2017, 2018 WL 3802068 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2018) (non-precedential memo opinion in support of denial of
recusal motion alleging appellate jurist’s prior personal association with appellant
years ago).
110. Disciplinary-related recusal cases include: In re Zupsic, 893 A.2d 875,
890 (Pa Ct. Jud. Disc. 2005) (magisterial district judge failed to recuse from crimi-
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ported and behind-the-scenes examples in which a jurist has voluntarily recused without explanation or for reasons revealed only to
the parties and their attorneys, creating an unfortunate lacuna in
recusal jurisprudence. Thus, it is largely through reports in the
press and the medium of published opinions that the bench, bar,
and public learn about how recusal is implemented and interpreted.
C.

From Theory to Practice: Recusal in Pennsylvania

If one adopts the perspective that Justice O’Connor proffered
in White,111 Pennsylvania’s electorate voluntarily assumed an increased risk of judicial bias when it embraced an electoral process
for choosing its judges. The responsibility to safeguard against or
minimize such risks of bias, consequently, falls upon the shoulders
of the state’s judicial system to apply and enforce the mandatory
canons and aspirational objectives of its judicial code of ethics.
Commentators have not been charitable in describing and evaluating recusal in Pennsylvania. In his 1947 survey of American judicial disqualification practices, John Frank contrasted two states,
New Mexico and Pennsylvania. The former was identified as an
“easy” state regarding disqualification. Pennsylvania was labeled as
a “hard” state—i.e. disqualification being difficult.112 Similarly,
Kenneth Kilimnik extensively analyzed and criticized Pennsylvania
for its “backwards recusal rules,” suggesting that the legislature
should step in if the state’s supreme court refuses to initiate reform.113 Another critic has described recusal in Pennsylvania as a
“black hole of judicial ethics,” given the absence of clear guidelines,
public instances of questionable judicial conduct, and the infrenal case involving defendant whose father had close personal contacts with judge;
judge is obligated to disqualify at any point in proceedings when it becomes obvious that judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned); In re Lokuta, 964
A.2d 988, 1105 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2008) (finding that a judge’s bias against plaintiff’s counsel equates to bias against the plaintiffs in medical malpractice case for
purpose of appearance standard of recusal); In re Jonathan Grine, Compl. No.
2016-721 (Jud. Conduct Bd., Aug. 10, 2017) (judge had a “support relationship”
with attorney in case making judge subject to improper influence because of the
emotional and personal relationship; Letter of Counsel issued, as noted in Commonwealth v. Buckley, No. 1747 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2018), https://
bit.ly/31zQFGz [https://perma.cc/GD84-T5WY]; and Judicial Inquiry & Review
Bd. v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358, 368–69 (Pa. 1987) (interjection of religion and religious
bias in judicial proceedings warranted removal of judge).
111. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791–92 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). See supra notes 86 and 87.
112. See Frank, supra note 46, at 609. His 1947 article cited In re Crawford’s
Estate, 160 A. 585 (Pa. 1931).
113. See Kilimnik, supra note 37, at 773.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-1\DIK103.txt

96

unknown

Seq: 28

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-20

13:06

[Vol. 125:69

quency of judicial recusals.114 Pennsylvania recusal caselaw and
practice has been the subject of on-the-record insightful and
thoughtful commentary by two Pennsylvania appellate jurists.115
Those jurists have publicly acknowledged that Pennsylvania recusal
practice is confusing, substantively and procedurally.
It is difficult to make a principled analysis of Pennsylvania’s
recusal practices given the ad hoc, oftentimes confusing, conclusory
pronouncements, which are unsupported by formal fact-finding. In
a critical 1991 commentary, Kilimnik noted that “[b]efore 1972,
recusal rules in Pennsylvania and elsewhere were generally set by
statute or general court rule. The introduction of a judicial conduct
code shifted the legal analysis from applying general legal norms to
judging moral behavior of judges.”116 Pre-1972 recusal practice, the
author notes, was governed by various statutes that specifically provided for the transfer of recusal challenges to another judge for assessment.117 In an attempt to map one’s way through the tortuous
terrain of recusal in Pennsylvania, three cases can provide guidance:
Reilly,118 Goodheart,119 and Abu-Jamal.120
D. Reilly
Reilly is a critically important starting point. When the case
reached the intermediate appellate level in 1984, the prospects for
an enlightened, rational, and predictable recusal practice were
bright. In an opinion by a widely-respected appellate jurist,121 the
114. See supra notes 38 and 101.
115. See Judge Stabile’s opinion partially concurring in Lomas – OISR, 130
A.3d 107, 132–48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), whose views were substantially echoed by
Chief Justice Saylor’s dissenting opinion in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s subsequent review in Lomas-II, 170 A.3d 380, 391–400 (Pa. 2017). These thoughtful
analyses, however, did not address the long-standing recusal problem of judicial
self-assessment of impartiality, as discussed herein, infra Sections 4(D) and 5(1).
Lomas – OISR provides a particularly good summarization of disqualification and
the objective appearance standard.
116. See Kilimnik, supra note 37, at 716.
117. Id. at 719 n.21 and 726 n.66.
118. Reilly by Reilly v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (Reilly-I), 479 A.2d 973 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984), aff’d Reilly by Reilly v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (Reilly-II), 489 A.2d
1291 (Pa. 1985) (but reversing portions of the Superior Court’s opinion that had
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of recusal of the trial judge).
119. Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1989).
120. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1998).
121. Judge Edmund Spaeth was the president judge of the Pennsylvania Superior Court (1983–86) and a jurist for more than two decades. He declined to run
for retention for a second term because he did not want to solicit contributions for
political support in the belief that doing so was inconsistent with the appearance of
impartiality. He was instrumental in the formation of Pennsylvanians for Modern
Courts. He died in 2016. See Bonnie L. Cook, Judge Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., 95,
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Superior Court of Pennsylvania determined that the issue of
recusal, raised at the post-trial stage, had to be assessed by another
judge because the challenged judge, given his alleged hostility,
could not objectively resolve the issue of his own impartiality. The
Superior Court majority said that the recusal standard was an objective one, requiring an assessment of whether a reasonable observer would question the judge’s impartiality; proof of actual
prejudice was not required. The concurring and dissenting opinion,
however, complained that the factual record was inadequate.122
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania swiftly stepped in and demolished the Superior Court’s recusal edifice. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s opinion is abrasively authoritarian in tone123 and
largely uninstructive about any prescriptive framework to replace
the Superior Court’s recusal process and analysis. As the court
pointedly stated: “We declare this procedure inappropriate and
preclude its use.”124 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s approach
was transparently autocratic, predicated on asserting and protecting
judicial autonomy—institutionally (the supreme court) and individually (the challenged jurist). As others have recognized, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s approach undermined the objective
appearance standard and effectively endorsed an actual prejudice
standard.125
To a certain extent, however, the supreme court’s jurisdictionally protective response was justifiable given the court’s specific
constitutional authority to establish rules of procedure and judicial
conduct. Nevertheless, preoccupied with its supervisory powers
and myopically viewing recusal primarily through the lens of disciplinary enforcement, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pushed
recusal into a rip tide far away from any safe harbor. Citing the

Headed Pa. Superior Court, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 6, 2016), https://bit.ly/
2C4Ki3u.
122. Reilly-I, 479 A.2d at 1003–04 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
123. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court (per Justice Papadakos) criticized the
Pennsylvania Superior Court for its “unwarranted intrusions” and “impermissible
meddling into the administrative and supervisory functions of this Court.” ReillyII, 489 A.2d at 1298–99.
124. Id. at 1298.
125. See Kilimnik, supra note 37, at 736–37. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had criticized the Pennsylvania Superior Court for ignoring the necessity of
showing actual prejudice. Reilly-II, 489 A.2d at 1298 (“Superior Court determined
that a showing that a judge’s rulings actually prejudiced a party[ ] was no longer
required, contrary to our previous holdings . . . .”).
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inapposite 1931 case of In re Crawford’s Estate126 and concerned
with theoretical dangers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
. . . If the judge feels that he can hear and dispose of the case
fairly and without prejudice, his decision will be final unless there
is an abuse of discretion. This must be so for the security of the
bench and the successful administration of justice. Otherwise,
unfounded and oftimes malicious charges made during the trial
by bold and unscrupulous advocates might be fatal to a cause, or
litigation might be unfairly and improperly held up awaiting the
decision of such a question or the assignment of another judge to
try the case. If lightly countenanced, such practice might be resorted to, thereby tending to discredit the judicial system.127

Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court added a jurisprudentially unremarkable but necessary concession, consistent
with its holding in another opinion issued the same year128; if the
presiding judge desired a full exposition of the question of unfairness, he could follow the “unusual practice” of summoning another
judge to decide it, “but he is not required to do so.”129 Thus, in the
126. In re Crawford’s Estate, 160 A. 585 (Pa. 1931). See supra notes 112 and
117 and accompanying text regarding past recusal practice. Crawford’s statutory
context was not acknowledged; the statute therein was later repealed.
127. Reilly-II, 489 A.2d at 1299 (emphasis supplied). The judicial autonomy
approach to recusal is not unusual. See, e.g., Consiglia v. Consiglia, 711 A.2d 765,
769 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) where the court recognized the independence of judges
in recusal matters, noting that the presiding judge had no power to recuse another
judge because recusal is “an intrinsic part of the independence of a judge.” Similarly, as explained in a Pennsylvania appellate court opinion, the county’s president judge in Commonwealth v. McCullough noted that, despite the trial judge’s
referral of a recusal challenge to the president judge for an independent evidentiary hearing, the president judge had no authority to order the recusal of the trial
judge because recusal was “completely personal” to the challenged jurist. 201
A.3d 221, 232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (opinion by J. Stabile); see also Commonwealth
v. Lucky, No. 1672 EDA 2018, 2020 WL 727983, at *9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (notwithstanding that record called into question the appearance of the trial judge’s
bias or ill-will toward the defendant, who abruptly received a harsher resentence,
appellate court could not remand case to a different judge for resentencing where
trial judge was not asked to recuse and made no recusal ruling). In Goodheart v.
Casey, three supreme court justices noted with respect to their own court: “Where
disqualification is raised before the Court and the merit of the motion obvious, the
remaining Justices have the duty to request the Justice to accede to the recusal
request.” 565 A.2d 757, 764 (Pa. 1989) (emphasis supplied). See also infra note
336, regarding the notion of individual judicial independence.
128. See Municipal Publ’ns, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Phila. Cty., 489
A.2d 1286, 1290 (Pa. 1985) where the court also noted that “fabricated, frivolous,
or scurrilous charges” raised against the presiding judge could be summarily
dismissed.
129. Reilly-II, 489 A.2d at 1299. The irony is that the option of transfer was
statutorily in existence prior to 1972. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
Such an option was exercised in Commonwealth v. McCullough, wherein the judge
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adjudicatory context, Reilly gave the trial judge sovereignty in handling and resolving a recusal challenge to the judge’s impartiality,
subject to a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion review in the
event of an appeal.
E.

Goodheart

Four years after Reilly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of recusal in a high-profile case involving a constitutional challenge to a statute that affected the interests of judges in
a tangible way, namely, retirement benefits.130 On application for
reconsideration, which raised the issue of recusal of the justices who
had participated (by concurring in the result) in the appellate decision, Chief Justice Nix issued an opinion that seemed to create an
analytically distinct, two-prong substantive standard for recusal
challenges.131 Chief Justice Nix’s opinion prescribed the ethical
standard as follows:
Where there is a question of the impartiality of one or more of
the Justices, it is the individual Justice’s responsibility to make a
conscientious determination whether he or she can impartially
assess the issues in question. It is to be emphasized that this assessment is two tiered. First, whether the Justice would have a
personal bias or interest which would preclude an impartial review. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the
jurist can make. Second, whether his participation in the matter
would give the appearance of impropriety. ‘[T]o perform its high
function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.’132
cautioned that his review of the recusal challenge would be purely advisory. 201
A.3d at 232. See also infra note 142 and accompanying text.
130. Goodheart, 565 A.2d 757, 759 (opinion in support of reconsideration following Goodheart v. Casey, 555 A.2d 1210 (Pa. 1989)). The rule of necessity, see
supra note 47, was not mentioned in connection with the later non-participation of
the justices (Larsen, Zappala, and Papdakos) regarding reconsideration. As noted
in note 3 of Goodheart, Justice Stout, the fourth justice, did not participate because
she had retired from the bench at the time of the supreme court’s reconsideration.
Goodheart, 565 A.2d at 764 n.3.
131. Judge Stabile provided an insightful analysis of Goodheart in Lomas –
OSIR, 130 A.3d 107, 132 (Pa. Super Ct. 2015) (Judges Bowes, Donohue, and Shogan joined in his concurring and dissenting opinion). As he noted: “The specific
provisions of prior Canon [3 C] challenged in Goodheart can be found in current
Rule 2.11 to Canon 1 of the current Code of Judicial Conduct that instructs “[a]
judge . . . shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Id. at 148
n.27.
132. Goodheart, 565 A.2d at 764 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). As noted by Judge Stabile in Lomas –
OSIR, 130 A.3d at 138, Goodheart’s second-tier assessment incorporated the appearance of impropriety as part of Pennsylvania’s substantive law. He cites, for
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Optimistically embracing Goodheart as an attempt to create a
distinct two-tier recusal standard (namely personal bias, appearance), however, may not be advisable. First, one can view the language in Goodheart as narrowly confined to the recusal of the state
supreme court justices (not jurists in general), given the court’s discussion and emphasis about the need to have a full complement of
the state supreme court. Second, the court’s three-justice opinion,
resting on the non-participation of the other four justices, represented the view of only a minority of the seven-member court in the
reconsideration proceeding.133 Third, paradoxically, given that
Goodheart has been cited as support for an independent appearance-of-impropriety standard, Goodheart utters troubling comments that may appear to diminish the importance of appearance,
exhibiting Pennsylvania’s confusing jurisprudence on recusal.134 Finally and significantly, the Goodheart standard was undermined in
the subsequent high-profile case of Abu-Jamal.135
F. Abu-Jamal
As discerned by another jurist,136 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court—either intentionally or unintentionally—identified in subsequent cases a recusal standard that deviated in a subtle, but significant way. Nine years after Goodheart, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated in Abu-Jamal:
example, In re McFall, 617 A.2d 707, 712 (Pa. 1992) (appearance of impartiality
was deemed compromised because the trial judge was cooperating with federal law
enforcement at the time of defendant’s trial, mandating recusal, to support the
contention that under Pennsylvania/s substantive law, appearance of impropriety
alone is sufficient to warrant recusal).
133. See supra note 130. See also Richard B. Cappelli, What Is Authority?
Creation and Use of Case Law by Pennsylvania’s Appellate Courts, 72 TEMP. L.
REV. 303, 340 (1999) (noting that a minimum of four justices constitutes a quorum
and that “to create precedent at least three of four or five judges, and four of six or
seven judges, must agree on a result and, expressly or implicitly, a rationale”). See
also Miller v. Keystone Ins. Co., 636 A.2d 1109, 1113 (Pa. 1994) (an opinion of less
than four out of seven justices may not establish or reverse laws); Jonathan Remy
Nash, The Majority that Wasn’t: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule and the Mischief of
Quorum Requirements, (Univ. of Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 227, 2008), https://bit.ly/2VuXPZ4 [https://perma.cc/6CBW-EEJR].
134. Goodheart stated: “The second assessment [viz., appearance of impropriety] is of lesser importance because ‘appearances’ are not justice. When a request for recusal is made upon the record, and the alleged impediment is made
public, ‘appearance’ alone diminishes in importance . . .” 565 A.2d at 764.
135. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 121, 126–27 (Pa. 1998).
136. Judge Stabile in Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d 107, 132–45 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015). Among Pennsylvania jurists, Judge Stabile has appeared to be particularly
knowledgeable and articulate about the ethical appearance standard and the need
for jurisprudential clarity in recusal matters.
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As a general rule, a motion for recusal is initially directed to and
decided by the jurist whose impartiality is being challenged. In
considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an
impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of
impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence
in the judiciary. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that
only the jurist can make.137

Notwithstanding the belief that Goodheart’s two-tier analysis
should govern recusal—consistent with other cases that have
viewed the appearance of impropriety as a separate and distinct factor of analysis138—subsequent caselaw has produced uncertainty as
to the import and application of the appearance standard. Thus,
Pennsylvania jurisprudence remains unclear whether appearance
and/or the possible undermining of public confidence in the judiciary is an independent objective factor that should not be subordinated to the judge’s subjective self-assessment of bias.139
137. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. 1998). Aside from the supreme court’s
rejection that the trial judge should have recused, Justice Castille had also denied
Abu-Jamal’s petition for the justice’s recusal. See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal,
720 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1998) (opinion in support of denial of appellant’s motion for
recusal). The case involved a highly publicized killing of a Philadelphia police officer. Abu-Jamal’s appeal rights were reinstated by a post-conviction trial court
judge in Commonwealth v. Wesley Cook a.k.a. Mumia Abu-Jamal, CP-51-CR0113571-1982 (Dec. 27, 2018). The highly publicized (nationally and internationally) case has had a protracted history in state and federal courts. See, e.g., George
Parry, Mumia Abu-Jamal, Back in Motion, AM. SPECTATOR (May 2, 2018), https://
bit.ly/2Vy26eh [https://perma.cc/E67H-BGSX]; Rick Riley, Philadelphia DA
Drops Fight Against Mumia Abu-Jamal’s Latest Appeal, Blavity (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2BUUOtM [https://perma.cc/T3H2-C84Q]. The supreme court exercised its extraordinary Jurisdiction (King’s Bench) in ordering the appointment of
a special master to examine and make recommendations regarding allegations of a
conflict of interest involving the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office in the Abu
Jamal’s continued appellate proceedings. See In re Conflict of Interest of the Office of the Philadelphia District Attorney, No. 125 EM 2019 (Pa. Feb. 24, 2020)
(C.J. Saylor, JJ. Baer and Todd not participating); Zack Needles, Justices Tap GoTo Special Master to Probe Krasner’s Office for Alleged Conflicts in Abu-Jamal
Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Zncc2B. Senior Judge
John Cleland was appointed special master.
138. Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d at 140–41 (citing cases supporting the proposition that a judge’s self-evaluation must yield when there is an appearance of impropriety and that appearance of impropriety alone is sufficient to warrant
recusal). See also In the Interest of McFall, 617 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. White, 910 A.2d 648, 658 (Pa. 2006); and Commonwealth v. Darush,
459 A.2d 727, 731 (Pa. 1983).
139. Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d at 140–41, acknowledges that a few cases may
be viewed as presenting a view contrary to the Goodheart test, citing Common-
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G. Reflections
Notwithstanding the difficulty of finding one’s way through the
fog of Pennsylvania’s recusal jurisprudence, some generalizations
are appropriate:
1. There remains a credible sense of uncertainty as to how one
should assess and apply the objective standard with regard to a jurist’s ethical duty of impartiality.140
2. Regardless of the jurisprudential status of the objective appearance standard as a separate and independent factor in recusal
assessment, ultimately the determination of recusal has been entrusted to the autonomous province of the challenged jurist—subject to the possibility of judicial review in the event that recusal is
raised as an issue in a subsequent appeal.
3. While the actual prejudice or bias of a jurist may be ultimately inscrutable, the appearance of impropriety or partiality is
not.
4. There are no prescribed processes or procedural safeguards
that govern recusal challenges, assessments, and determinations.141
Deferential appellate review and disciplinary investigation (confidential) and enforcement, rather than prompt judicial review by a
neutral jurist regarding a decision to deny recusal, provide the general regulatory framework for recusal.
wealth v. Druce, 848 A.2d 104, 106–07 (Pa. 2004) and Commonwealth v. Travaglia,
661 A.2d 352, 369 (Pa. 1995).
140. See Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d at 134–37 supra note 131 and accompanying text; Kilimnik, supra note 37. It is clear that, in principle, Pennsylvania’s judicial code of conduct, supra note 89, mandates disqualification under the
appearance standard of Rule 2.11. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania seems to apply a
stricter calibration of the appearance standard as reflected in its caselaw and commentary to R. 2.7, by requiring proof of “substantial doubt” or a “substantial question in reasonable minds.” See supra note 89; Commonwealth v. Dip, 221 A.3d
201, 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (noting that the party requesting recusal has the
burden “to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises
a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside impartially,” citing AbuJamal, 720 A.2d at 89; trial court’s denial of Commonwealth’s motion and refusal
to order an evidentiary hearing before another judge did not demonstrate abuse of
discretion; trial court order affirmed without prejudice for the Commonwealth to
develop the record below). To complicate recusal analysis further, although the
commentary to PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.7 (2014), makes clear that
the common law test (“a significant minority of the lay community could reasonably question the court’s impartiality”) no longer applies, caselaw has cited it approvingly. See Dip, 221 A.3d at 207. But see Commonwealth v. Spanier, 2018 WL
3802068, at *9 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (noting that the lay minority is no longer
the applicable test for appearance of impropriety).
141. The Ethics Committee of the Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial
Judges has offered an instructive “worksheet” to assist judges in responding to
recusal challenges. See PA Formal Advisory Op., supra note 19.
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5. Neither caselaw nor any procedural rule, however, prevents
a jurist, challenged for bias, from voluntarily asking the president
judge to transfer a recusal motion to another jurist (including the
president judge) for an independent advisory assessment of the disqualification challenge or simply asking the president judge to reassign the case in order to avoid any objective concerns of the
appearance of impropriety.142
III.

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES GOVERNING RECUSAL
REFORM

Pennsylvania serves as a useful case study because it exemplifies common and often-criticized problems regarding predominant
judicial recusal practices among the states, including: the erosion of
fundamental legal and ethical principles, ad hoc decision-making
processes, lack of procedural safeguards, and the absence of timely
and independent review mechanisms—all of which contribute to
what the ABA has observed as overlapping, conflicting, and confusing substantive and procedural disqualification requirements.143
Given the contention that common recusal practices may border on
unconstitutionality,144 recusal reformation should begin with an
identification of overarching principles that can guide the construction of a recusal process that is fair, coherent, transparent, and
workable.
A.

Judicial impartiality is a compelling state interest of the
highest order and should not be inflexibly presumed in
the recusal context.

Socrates is attributed as having said that there are four things
that belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to
consider soberly, and to decide impartially.145 Impartiality is a bed142. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCullough, 201 A.3d 221 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2018), illustrating the ad hoc option of referring a recusal challenge to the president judge. Formalizing such recusal referrals as a local rule of court, in the absence of approval by the supreme court, would probably be inadvisable because it
might invite the type of jurisdictional skirmish that was involved in Reilly-II, 489
A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985).
143. AM. BAR ASS’N, DRAFT REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
PROJECT 16–17, 29 (2008) [hereinafter referred to as the “ABA DRAFT REPORT”].
See Geyh, supra note 31, at 727–28 (noting that the ABA’s draft resolution and
underlying report were eventually withdrawn).
144. See Bam, supra note 22, at 1136. The Supreme Court of the United
States has not addressed the constitutionality of a state’s recusal procedures.
145. Socrates Quote, LIBQUOTES, https://bit.ly/2ZnUJbE [https://perma.cc/
KG47-6N22] (last visited July 12, 2020). See Charles G. Geyh, The Dimensions of
Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 498 (2013).
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rock principle of justice esteemed since ancient times.146 Impartiality’s importance, recognized since the formation of our republic,147
is a paramount value of due process.148 Judicial impartiality is a
value of the highest order, one in which the state has a vital and
compelling state interest.149
In noting impartiality’s importance to the independence of the
judiciary, one commentator observed that “even the slightest hint
of bias or undue influence must, as a general rule, disqualify a particular decisionmaker. Only when it is all but impossible to rectify
bias should a potential lack of independence be tolerated.”150 International law accords with these views.151 An independent judiciary necessarily depends on the power and ability to monitor and
regulate the conduct of those who exercise judicial power. Nevertheless, impartiality, while recognized as a bedrock principle of justice, has been identified as an elusive concept that is difficult to
define.152 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which stresses im146. See Adrian Vermeule, Contra nemo Index in Sua Causa: The Limits of
Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 386 (2012); Frost, supra note 20, at 565, n.166 and
167; text accompanying supra notes 41–46.
147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Easton Press 1979).
See text accompanying infra note 221.
148. See Miller, supra note 52, at 577 (mandate of impartiality of judges is
enshrined in at least three amendments, to the U.S. Constitution—the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth).
149. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (fairness requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases, and our system has always endeavored to
prevent even the probability of unfairness); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (“It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process.’”); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433,
449 (2015) (given Florida’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in
the integrity of its judiciary, Florida’s ban on the personal solicitation of campaign
funds by judicial candidates did not violate the First Amendment).
150. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicating Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 504 (1986) (critical
analysis of the Supreme Court’s balancing approach to due process; advocating
that due process must not be subordinated to government interests).
151. See Frost, supra note 20; Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher,
Perceptions of Justice—An International Perspective on Judges and Appearances,
36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 136 (2013); and C. Okpaluba & L. Juma, The Problems of
Proving Actual or Apparent Bias: An Analysis of Contemporary Developments in
South Africa, 14 POTCHEFSTROOMSE ELECTRONIC L.J. 13, 20–21 (2011).
152. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30
REV. LITIG. 733 (2010–11); Okpaluba & Juma, supra note 151; Bassett &
Perschbacher, supra note 151. Others have described impartiality as necessarily
flexible, not absolute, exaggerated, and a misleading half-truth given the instances
in which the principle has been compromised (for example, in the matter of judicial salaries and judicial immunity with respect to the rule of necessity). Nevertheless, notwithstanding competing values and trade-offs (such as expertise,
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partiality in the captions of three of its four canons153 defines
“[i]mpartial, impartiality, impartially” as “absence of bias or
prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues
that may come before a judge.”154
Consequently, given the difficulty in defining an abstract concept, as well as the fallibility of human nature, impartiality cannot
be achieved or defined in precise or absolute terms—”imperfect
partiality” or being “impartial enough” is the more practical and
attainable goal.155 In some respects, the ideal of a completely objective adjudicator may be counterproductive because it will inevitably fail to achieve the abstract ideal of perfect objectivity.156 It is
a truism that the perfect can be the enemy of the good. Thus, it is
probably wise to recognize that ethical probity, not human perfection, should be the animating principle to inspire reform efforts.
The flip-side of impartiality—i.e. partiality, bias, prejudice—
can manifest in various ways by a judge who may be compromised
by personal bias or extralegal influences, which may implicate personal, relational, or political interests in the outcome of the case.157
The Model Code’s comment to Rule 2.3 notes:
Example of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are
not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative
stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant
references to personal characteristics.158
institutional autonomy and independence, administrative efficiencies), impartiality
remains an enduring and predominant value. See also Vermeule, supra note 146.
153. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1–2, 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011).
154. The ABA Model Code (“Terminology”) also implicates impartiality by
including it in the definition of “impropriety.” Id. Terminology. See also supra
note 91 regarding Pennsylvania’s Code of Judicial Conduct.
155. See Geyh, supra note 145, at 497 (perfect impartiality may be unattainable). Cf. Rodriquez, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing bias in the context of administrative agency decision-making regarding the pursuit of “optimal bias” as a
realistic goal). The ABA Model Code stresses that the Canons, while binding and
enforceable, are rules of reason designed to provide guidance. MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons Scope, para. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
156. See McKee, supra note 2, at 1711. Judge McKee’s life experiences on the
bench prompted him to assess how his ideals and beliefs must confront everyday
realities.
157. It has been suggested that there are three distinct dimensions of impartiality: procedural, political, and ethical. See Geyh, supra note 145, at 497; Marbes,
supra note 52, at 866.
158. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons Scope, r. 2.3 cmt. 2
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). The ethical constraints, however, are presumptively
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Bias or prejudice is a force that corrupts and destroys the fundamental integrity of the judicial process.159 Given the preeminent
role of the jurist in the adjudicatory process, bias or prejudice has
been viewed as constituting a structural error, as opposed to a mere
procedural error.160 Even in the context of a multi-member court,
the unacceptable and unconstitutional risk of actual bias is sufficient to require the vacating of a judgment.161
While impartiality is a noble, overarching value of justice, in
some respects, it has occupied an uncomfortable and problematic
presence when placed in the context of recusal. The expression that
judges are presumed to be fair and impartial is commonplace in
caselaw,162 a succinct and polite expression of respect and deferential faith in a Blackstonian image of an ideal judge.163 The legal
system is predicated on the presumption of impartiality. Impartiality is the baseline of judicial decision-making and is essential to inspire trust and confidence in the judicial system in the litigating
viewed as not encompassing a judge’s judicial philosophy or views on public policy.
See Geyh, supra note 145, at 496 n.9 (citing RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 10.7 (2d ed.
2007)).
159. See Frank, supra note 1, at 35 (“[T]he ‘pull’ exercised on a crooked,
bribed judge is often no more powerful than the ‘pull’ which a strong bias exercises
on a ‘straight’ judge.”); McKoski, supra note 27, at 516 (partiality destroys the
foundation of the judicial process and has enormous destructive impact).
160. See Blanck, supra note 27, at 893.
161. See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (employing an objective standard in analyzing and rejecting a harmless error approach in the context of bias where the state’s chief justice, who denied a motion to recuse, had
served as the district attorney at the time of the defendant’s murder trial); Lauren
Keane, Williams v Pennsylvania: The Intolerable Image of Judicial Bias, 49 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 181, 184 (2017).
162. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 556 U.S. 868, 891 (2009) (Chief
Justice Roberts noting, in dissent, that there is a “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators”); Armstrong v. Ypsilanti, 640 N.W.2d 321,
336 (Mich. App. Ct. 2001) (insufficient evidence to overcome presumption of impartiality); Commonwealth v. Druce, 848 A.2d 104, 109 (Pa. 2004) (court presumes
judges of the Commonwealth are honorable, fair and competent); Commonwealth
v. Dip, 221 A.3d 201, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (appellate court says it was compelled to assume that judges are honorable, fair, and competent); ABA DRAFT
REPORT, supra note 143, at 57 (noting that judges are “loath to abandon” the presumption given their oath of office, traditional conceptions of the judicial role, and
the fear that conceding perceived bias might be viewed as a concession of the appearance of impropriety resulting in a greater reluctance to self-disqualify); Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial
Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification Standards to Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238, 261 (2017).
163. See supra notes 44–46, and accompanying text, regarding the historical
background of judicial ethical standards.
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parties, the legal profession, and the public.164 In the international
context, one commentator has explained the nature and purpose of
the common law presumption:
[T]he rationale for the presumption is founded on: (a) public
confidence in the common law system, which is rooted in the fundamental belief that those who engage in adjudication must always do so without bias or prejudice and must be perceived to do
so; (b) impartiality is the fundamental qualification of a judge
and the core attribute of the judiciary; it is the key to the common law judicial process and must be presumed on the part of a
judge; (c) in view of the training and experience; the fact that
they are persons of conscience and intellectual discipline; and capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its
own circumstances, appellate courts inquiring about apprehension of bias grant considerable deference to judges by the presumption of impartiality on the part of judges; and (d) this
presumption carries “considerable weight” since the law “will not
suppose possibility of bias in a judge, who is already sworn to
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends
upon the presumption and idea.”165

The almost unreflective application of the presumption of impartiality, however, has been criticized in the special context of
recusal and a jurist’s independent self-assessment of impartiality.
The modern appearance-based disqualification approach has challenged the traditional view of presumed judicial impartiality, given
the inadequacy of procedural safeguards and the inherent unfairness of recusal processes.166 As the subsequent discussion herein
will explore,167 how can one be impartial—or be presumed impartial—about oneself? It is humanly impossible. The presumption,
recognizably mystifying in application,168 presents practical difficul164. See Stempel, supra note 152, at 810 (noting “[t]he system begins with a
presumption of judicial impartiality that, although not as strong as in Blackstone’s
time, remains quite vigorous.”); Geyh, supra note 31, at 732 (noting that “[a] muscular presumption of impartiality suits a formalized world in which the neutrality
of judges is widely accepted . . .”). The presumption of honesty and integrity has
also been applied to the decision-making of administrative agency officials. See
Rodriquez, supra note 14, at 16 n.79.
165. Okpaluba & Juma, supra note 151, at 23–24.
166. See Geyh, supra note 31, at 732.
167. See section 4(D) infra.
168. See McKoski, supra note 67, at 423 (referring to the “almost impenetrable presumption of impartiality”). The author also notes that the appearance standard effectively makes the presumption of impartiality irrelevant. See id. at 429; cf.
Stempel, supra note 152, at 757 (noting that a minority of jurisdictions take the
view that once the appearance of partiality has been shown, prejudice is
presumed).
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ties for a litigator who challenges the impartiality—actual or apparent—of a jurist. The litigator’s burden to rebut the presumption is
a heavy one.169
Consequently, in examining the presumption of impartiality,
some commentators have opined that the presumption should be
calibrated according to the context and competing values rather
than be inflexibly or blindly applied.170 With respect to assessing
jurist’s self-assessment of impartiality and the appearance thereof,
it makes eminent sense to conclude that the presumption of impartiality should be irrelevant.171 As an Illinois Supreme Court justice
observed:
The law may presume that judges are impartial . . . but there is no
presumption that they are in the best position to make an objective assessment of whether their own actions present an appearance of impropriety. To the contrary, individual judges may
often be in the worst position to make such assessments.172
169. The presumption affects the weighty burden of proving bias or prejudice.
See Commonwealth v. Dip, 221 A.3d 201, 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (speaking in
terms of the burden of production and persuasion); Commonwealth v. Spanier,
2018 WL 3802068 at *2–3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (party bears the burden of proof to
produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to jurist’s ability to preside impartially; burden of proof may be more
exacting when the recusal motion is filed after a decision, noting also that the
recusal assessment may be different when the impartiality of an appellate jurist is
in question); Francis H. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law
Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 313 (1920) (explaining that
presumptions are creatures of policy requiring abnormal weight to be given to
meet some judicially felt need or to accomplish some purpose judicially recognized
as desirable); Miguel Mendez, Presumptions and Burden of Proof: Conforming the
California Evidence Code to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 139,
140, 146–48 (2003).
170. See Vermeule, supra note 146, at 389 (urging that one should assess
whether the conflict is avoidable or unavoidable, and whether it would be good or
bad to avoid it; stressing also the importance of recognizing the risk of self-dealing
or self-serving bias); Marbes, supra note 162, at 300–03 (acknowledging that there
is a lack of consensus regarding the strength of the presumption in disqualification
matters and proposing a flexible and lower presumption depending on whether the
challenged jurist is the initial decision-maker; noting also, at 258, that there was no
clear presumption of impartiality in ancient Roman law); cf. Rodriguez, supra note
14 (suggesting the re-calibration or re-balancing of bias principles toward the goal
of “optimal bias” in the complex world of administrative law decision-making).
171. See McKoski, supra note 67, at 429.
172. See In re Marriage of O’Brien, 958 N.E.2d 647, 675 (Ill. 2011) (Karmeier,
J. concurring) (quoting Goldberg et al, supra note 18, at 530). In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1982), Justice Marshall noted that “When constitutional
error calls into question the objectivity of those charged with bringing a defendant
to judgment, a reviewing court can neither indulge a presumption of regularity nor
evaluate the resulting harm.”
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In the words of one author, the common law principle of judicial impartiality should be reconceptualized.173 More pointedly, another commentator, regarding the jettisoned concept of a jurist’s
“duty to sit,”174 has suggested that, in the recusal context, there
should be a logical presumption in favor of disqualification.175
173. See Geyh, supra note 145, at 497–98 (advocating a reconceptualization of
impartiality in reference to the contexts or dimensions of impartiality—procedural,
political, and ethical). With respect to a judge’s self-assessment of impartiality in
the recusal context, might it be more appropriate to view or re-conceptualize the
foundational presumption of judicial impartiality as a legal fiction that relies on a
false, debatable or untested factual premise? Professor Peter Smith has analyzed
the concept of “new legal fictions,” explaining that they may reflect our aspirations
for society and the law, such as expressing a positive value fundamental to our
system of justice or promoting an unexpressed normative goal that legitimates
some aspect of our legal system. See Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1435, 1440 (2007). Some cited examples include the presumption of the good
faith of legislators in connection with the constitutionality of statutes, id. at
1460–61; the presumption that jurors can follow limiting instructions about inadmissible evidence, id. at 1450–52; the competency of jurors to assess the reliability
of eyewitness testimony, id. at 1452–55; the presumption that the public is familiar
with the law’s requirements, id. at 1459; and the application of the reasonable person standard, id. at 1474. Such concealed or obscure legal fictions represent normative choices. Professor Smith concludes that, regardless of purpose or intent,
there should be a presumption of candor to explain when and why a judge employs
a legal fiction. Id. at 1480–95.”
A critical examination of such legal fictions and the procedural use of presumptions inevitably leads one to a deeper dilemma, viz., the presumption that sustains
the legal and judicial edifice—the presumption (or legal fiction) of rationality. As
Professor Dailey explains: “Why does the law insist on the presumption of rationality in the face of incontrovertible evidence of deeper forces at work? Law resorts to a fiction of rationality in large part because doing so seems essential to
furthering the goals of a liberal legal system committed to the ideal of individual
liberty. The law is a practical discipline requiring practical tools, and the presumption of rationality is one of them . . . We fear collapse of the system if the law were
to dig beneath the surface of human conduct.” See DAILEY, supra note 1, at 21.
See also supra note 68 (regarding the quest for reasonable objectivity).
174. See supra notes 66 and 93 regarding the discredited duty-to-sit doctrine
and supra note 20 regarding Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Kelly’s decision to
“unrecuse” in a high-profile voter purge case. Recusal has been a hot button issue
in Wisconsin. See infra note 277.
175. See Rodney & Etter, supra note 66, at 255. It is difficult to ascertain the
practical effect of the presumption: is it a factor that tips the scales at the outset or
is it a procedural device that can be employed to rationalize a result? In any event,
at least with respect to appellate review of judicial self-assessments that deny motions to recuse, such a venerable presumption is unreasonable and should not be
invoked. It is interesting to observe that, on occasion, there has been judicial acknowledgement that there may be limits to the presumption of impartiality and a
judge’s ability to adjudicate objectively. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 215 A.3d
1019, 1029 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019), where the appellate court remanded the highly
publicized case to another jurist because the trial judge had heard highly prejudicial testimony in the first trial from a material, discredited witness; prior efforts to
disqualify the judge were unsuccessful. In addition, the presumption of impartiality can be a pliable concept and was turned on its head in Wisconsin where its

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-1\DIK103.txt

110

unknown

Seq: 42

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-20

13:06

[Vol. 125:69

B. The appearance of impartiality is an independent and essential
component of procedural fairness in the recusal process.
While actual impartiality is fundamental to the principle of
fairness, the appearance of impartiality is equally fundamental. The
objective reasonable person/appearance standard (that is, whether
a “judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned”) represents
the judicial system’s recognition that justice must also satisfy the
appearance of justice.176 The jurisprudential concept of appearances is not uniquely American. Viewing judicial conduct through
the objective prism of appearances is consistent with international
practice.177 The appearance standard is a fundamental safeguard
that addresses the practical reality of the potential impact of a jurist’s decision-making in a proceeding when facts might suggest bias
or prejudice.178
supreme court perceived that efforts to reform Wisconsin’s recusal rules were
animated by a presumption of partiality, which the court strongly and summarily
rejected. See infra note 277 regarding the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s (majority)
summarily rejecting a motion for recusal reform brought by retired jurists.
176. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 564 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986); In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
177. See Okpaluba & Juma, supra note 151, at 14. The authors provide an
analysis of South Africa’s recusal approach that is remarkably similar to the ABA
Model Code’s objective appearance standard. The factual context of the case
bears similarities to the Pennsylvania case of Lomas v. Kravitz, 130 A.3d 107 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2015) and 170 A.3d 380, wherein a belated full bench recusal request,
seeking to salvage a substantial monetary judgment, was ultimately rejected. The
commentators made references to American recusal caselaw. See also Kilimnik,
supra note 37, at 762–70 (discussing Switzerland and Germany).
178. Litigants, the judicial system, and the public’s confidence in the judicial
system are affected whether actual prejudice does or does not exist. The issue of
appearance versus reality has received extended scholarly analysis, particularly
with respect to the justifications for appearance-based regulations. See Adam M.
Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1565 (2012),
noting that an important reason to tolerate crude regulatory over-breadth (for example, through prophylactic rules) is that the feared conduct is too difficult to
detect and that a clear proxy represents the preferable approach. Id. at 1567 n.11.
Nevertheless, appearance-based regulation has been criticized as imprecise, vague,
or difficult to implement. See Bam, supra note 21, at 992–1002 (suggesting a modified appearance-based procedural approach to recusal reform rather than the prevailing outcome-based recusal jurisprudence that focuses on substantive
standards); Geyh, supra note 31, at 732 (noting that the appearances regime is
crumbling and proposing procedural reforms); McKoski, supra note 15, at 1936–37.
But see McKeown, supra note 18, at 58 (providing a forceful judicial response in
favor of the appearance standard). Professor Stempel has asked whether the appearance disqualification standard requires a consensus/super-majority or a “substantial group of doubters” as a trigger; he favors the latter. See Stempel, supra
note 152, at 806–23. In actuality, whether a judge’s impartiality might “reasonably
be questioned” is no more self-defining than other elusive legal terms like abuse of
discretion, proximate cause, best interests, or reasonable doubt. The quest for def-
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The ABA Model Code provides commentary on how appearances can be manifested in subtle ways.179 Instances of potentially
disqualifying appearances are not susceptible to precise or to exhaustive identification, hence, the generality of the standard. However, the permutations of fact and circumstance that may raise
legitimate concerns about the appearance of partiality are indeed
myriad—including, for example, perceived prejudicial remarks on
or off the bench; participation in a prior case involving a former
client or former client’s opponent; professional relationships with
attorneys, other judges, and organizations; claims filed by or against
the judge; judge’s personal connection with the proceedings; family,
social, or business relationships; and campaign activities, statements, or campaign contributions.180
Proving actual prejudice is often impossible. An examination
of a recusal challenge necessarily requires that judges be given initial deference regarding their self-assessment and assertions of impartiality; they know best what is in their hearts.181 Nevertheless, to
initional certainty or specificity of such value-laden terms is like a dog trying to
catch its tail, ultimately an unproductive aspiration.
Some critics have touted the peremptory approach as a low cost, easy-to-apply
mechanism to remove biased or problematic judges. See id. at 789–93. Others
have suggested replacing the appearance standard with per se rules or standards.
See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s
Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 56
(2000); McKoski, supra note 15, at 1984–86; Stempel, supra note 152, at 767–88.
The need for more empirical research regarding the appearance of impropriety
standard has been recognized. See Blanck, supra note 27, at 901.
179. ABA Model Code OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)
states: “Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or
prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as biased
or prejudiced.” Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has observed that a
judge’s exalted position underscores the potentially prejudicial significance of a
judge’s words and expressions upon the perceived fairness of the proceedings. See
Commonwealth v. Hammer, 494 A.2d 1054, 1058–59, 1064 (Pa. 1985) (discussing
the context of the judge’s manifestation of personal bias through the judge’s
prosecutorial-like actions contributing to the prejudicial tenor of the trial).
180. Many of these potential concerns have been identified by Professor Abramson, see Abramson, supra note 178, at 76–101, who laments the lack of judicial
ethical guidance. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 823–24 (1986)
(discussing that state justice’s participation in the case had the clear and immediate
effect of benefitting his financial interests); see also Miller, supra note 52, at 614
(advocating that close friendships should be an additional per se factor); Okpaluba
& Juma, supra note 151, at 15–16 (suggesting that actual or apparent bias can be
demonstrated through the facts of the case, conduct of the judge (either before or
during the proceeding), relationship of the judge to the parties, an interest in the
outcome of the case, and circumstances surrounding the case).
181. As noted in Lomas the jurist’s self-assessment of his or her personal bias
or interest, sufficient to preclude an impartial review, is the initial step of a twostep process in assessing whether disqualification is warranted. Lomas – OISR,
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grapple with the hidden (and often unconscious) possibility of
prejudice or bias, the objective appearance standard provides a sensible and effective tool to address sub-conscious bias182 and to safeguard the rights of litigants to fundamental fairness in the
proceeding and decision-making.183 As a result, the objective appearance standard, rather than proof of actual prejudice, has necessarily become the predominant approach to recusal analysis.184
Judge Margaret McKeown, a federal circuit judge and a strong advocate of the objective appearance standard, has observed that the
standard is workable, manageable, and practical.185
Being an essential component of procedural fairness, the appearance of partiality is itself sufficient to justify recusal—proof of
actual bias is not required.186 Furthermore, violation of the appearance standard does not require scienter. In Liljeberg,187 the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that the federal appearance standard for
disqualification can be violated even though the challenged jurist
was not aware of the circumstances that created an appearance of
impropriety. Quoting the lower appellate court, Justice Douglas
stated that appearance-based disqualification may be warranted
130 A.3d 107, 137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). See Okpaluba & Juma, supra note 151, at
35 (actual bias is hard to prove and is akin to proving fraud, noting that the due
process standard in Caperton, based on the likelihood of bias, bears similarities to
proving actual bias); supra note 169 (regarding the heavy burden of proof); see also
Bam, supra note 21, at 943.
182. See Marbes, supra note 162, at 292; see also Samaha, supra note 178, at
1567 n.11 (regarding the utility of prophylactic rule-making).
183. See Timothy J. Goodson, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal
Practice in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v. U.S. District
Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181, 182, 219–220 (2005) (with Justice Scalia’s refusal to
recuse as a backdrop, author explains the recusal standards and practice in the
Supreme Court and recommends recusal reform given that the appearance standard has not been met).
184. See Marbes, supra note 162, at 285–86; AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 105C ADOPTED BY HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2014) [hereinafter referred to as
RESOLUTION 105C].
185. McKeown, supra note 18, at 49. Caselaw recognizes the importance of
the appearance standard. As Justice Kennedy noted: “[I]n matters of ethics, appearance and reality often converge as one.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
565 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Okpaluba & Juma, supra note 151, at
14 (noting in reference to recusal under South Africa’s jurisprudence, appearance
is just as important as the reality).
186. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (noting that
justice must satisfy the appearance of justice and that proof of actual or subjective
bias is not required; state justice’s financial interest demonstrated a possible temptation “not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true”); Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554 n.2
(the federal statutory appearance standard does not require a judge to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so).
187. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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even if the challenged jurist is “pure in heart and incorruptible.”188
At the state level, in an extended analysis of the appearance standard, a Pennsylvania jurist emphasized that appearance is independently important and sufficient to mandate recusal under
appropriate circumstances.189
C. Judges have an ethical duty to maintain and promote the
public’s trust and confidence in the impartiality, as well
as the appearance of impartiality, of the judiciary.
Judicial conduct must manifest ethical principles in order to inspire and promote public confidence in the judiciary. Judicial conduct that contravenes—or appears to contravene—precepts of
ethical conduct and procedural fairness can contribute to the erosion of the public’s trust and confidence in the judicial system. As
Justice Breyer reflected in a speech, “The judicial system, in a
sense, floats in a sea of public opinion.”190 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct embodies the importance of the public’s trust and
confidence in the judicial system and rule of law.191 With respect to
its investment in public trust and confidence, the judicial branch of
government arguably may have a greater stake in its institutional
reputation than the other two branches of government.192 As one
commentator has explained, judges have for centuries relied on
188. Id. at 860 (applying the federal statutory appearance standard).
189. See Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d 107, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). The supreme court majority later rejected the recusal challenge on the basis of untimeliness. Lomas-II, 170 A.3d 380, 391 (Pa. 2017). Another commendable analysis of
recusal in the context of a case can be found in the concurring opinion in In re
Marriage of O’Brien, 958 N.E.2d 647, 667–86 (Ill. 2011) (Karmeier, J., concurring).
190. See Laurel A. Rigertas, The Supreme Court and Recusals: A Response to
Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 939, 940 n.12 (2013) (citing Stephen Breyer,
Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, An Independent Judiciary: In Honor of
the Sesquicentennial Anniversary of the Massachusetts Superior Court (Sept. 22,
2009) (transcript available at https://bit.ly/2ZMn5Lm [https://perma.cc/HB85NU22]); See Geyh, supra note 10, at 877 (noting that Pound’s 1906 speech, see
supra note 3, provided the impetus for a growing recognition of the importance of
the public’s trust and confidence in the courts).
191. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)
Canon 1 r. 1.2 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2010); see also id. pmbl., para. 1 (“Inherent in all the
Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to
maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.”).
192. See Frost, supra note 20, at 553; see also AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, JUSTICE
IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 13
(2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY] (stating: “The need for public support
and confidence is all the more critical for the judicial branch, which by virtue of its
independence is less directly accountable to the electorate and, thus, perhaps more
vulnerable to public suspicion”).
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public confidence to maintain a role in social life.193 Appearances
are as important and impactful as reality. There is a wide consensus
that judges should appear impartial to inspire and promote public
confidence in the judicial system and the rule of law.194
The judicial system’s concern for public confidence is a pragmatic one, rooted in years of experience. In his 1906 address to the
ABA, Roscoe Pound acknowledged the public’s growing dissatisfaction with the administration of justice and the need for reform.195 Public and professional discontent with the courts has
been an historical reality.196 Recent surveys, while substantially
positive in general about the image of the judiciary, nevertheless
reveal the public’s persistently negative views and concerns about
the potential or apparent influence of political, economic, racial,
and ethnic factors in the fairness of judicial decision-making.197
Judge Kevin Burke, a district court judge, has exhorted state
courts to be accountable for and publicly committed to procedural
fairness. He cites a Pew Research Center survey, which documented that 75 percent of the American public believes judges’ decisions are, from a moderate to significant extent, influenced by
their political and personal philosophy, as well as their desire for
elevation to a higher court.198
Notwithstanding the potential problems about the statistical
reliability of surveys and the definitionally elastic scope of “pub193. See Samaha, supra note 178, at 1566, 1603.
194. Id. at 1582.
195. See Pound, supra note 3, at 854.
196. See Arthur Selwyn Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some
Notes and Reflections, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 74 (1970) (historical overview
regarding public confidence in the judicial system and the factors that affect such
confidence); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp, 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)
(acknowledging the reality of prevailing suspicions and doubts of the lay public
about the judiciary).
197. See David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and Confidence
in the Courts: What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, 36 COURT REV. 24,
24–29 (1999) (citing a national survey in 1999 sponsored by the National Center
for State Court and the Hearst Corporation, which highlighted particular concerns
from the African-American and Hispanic-American communities about the judicial system. Finding that the public’s view of judges is not good and that there is
apparently “extensive, and surprising dissatisfaction, with judges,” the authors
noted that 80% of the survey’s respondents believed that judges’ decisions are
influenced by politics). Discontent has also been evident with respect to legislative
threats to judicial independence. See infra note 339.
198. See Kevin S. Burke, A Vision for Enhancing Public Confidence in the
Judiciary, 95 JUDICATURE 251, 252 (2012); see also Kevin Burke & Steve Leben,
Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 COURT REV. 4, 8
(2007); Marbes, supra note 162, at 255–56 (regarding new lows in public confidence in the justice system).
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lic,”199 such barometers of belief deserve serious reflection on how
courts can and should improve the public’s confidence in the justice
system’s credibility. As to the general problem of public trust and
confidence, Judge Burke’s prescription is a straight-forward one:
There needs to be a direct confrontation of the attacks on the
legitimacy of judicial decision-making. Legitimacy is achieved in
part by building a reservoir of goodwill so that people will stand
by courts when a decision is made with which they disagree. Legitimacy is also in part trust of the judges and courts. Trust is
earned, not given.200

A symbiotic relationship exists between the public’s trust and
confidence and the appearance of impartiality in the justice system.
The ABA has stated that “[a]ppearances matter because the public’s perception of how the courts are performing affects the extent
of its confidence in the judicial system. And public confidence in
the judicial system matters a great deal . . . [P]ublic confidence in
our judicial system is an end in itself.”201
The public’s perception of the judicial branch is particularly
relevant to the problem of recusal given the public’s documented
suspicions about adjudicatory fairness, especially with respect to the
disturbing specter of judges receiving increasingly large amounts of
campaign contributions.202 As to the impartiality of the decisionmaker, ad hoc or woefully inadequate recusal procedures can foster
199. Commentators have noted the need for more and better empirical research in measuring public trust and confidence in the courts. See Samaha, supra
note 178, at 1602 (lamenting the absence of serious empirical research despite the
“mountain of legal scholarship” on appearance arguments). Samaha’s context is
campaign finance regulation. A particular challenge is the definitional scope of the
term “public” and particular difficulties in relying on survey data. See Geyh, supra
note 31, at 721–27 (in the context of “the public confidence puzzle,” the author
observes that the “public’s” perception goes beyond the general public and should
factor in the views of parties, attorneys, and those who use the court system). See
also Frost, supra note 20, at 53, cautioning, in the context of Justice Scalia’s duck
hunting controversy, the media’s limited role in assessing the level and impact of
public perception in the formulation of public policy; and Miller, supra note 196, at
73, 77, and 91 (endorsing the need for better empirical research and noting that
“public” confidence represents multiple populations).
200. Burke, supra note 198, at 252. See Rottman & Tomkins, supra note 197,
at 30. The authors observe that the public’s negative perceptions may make it
“difficult for even demonstrable court improvements to become translated into
higher levels of public confidence.”
201. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 192, at 18. See also Sara C.
Benesh, Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts, 68 J. POL. 697
(2006); Damon M. Cann and Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support for State Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 297 (2008).
202. See Alicia Bannon, Judicial Elections after Citizens United, 67 DEPAUL
L. REV. 169, 183 (2018) (citing a Brennan Center for Justice poll involving the
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an image of arbitrary judicial decision-making and thus can contribute to diminished public confidence in the judicial system.203 To
increase the public’s trust and confidence, one obvious approach
has been recommended—adopt fair procedures.204 With respect to
elected courts, others have urged such courts to embrace the public’s demand for accountability by taking concrete steps to preserve
both the reality and appearance of justice while recognizing the
need to “appreciably distance themselves from situations in which
their fairness and impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”205
In other words, adherence to the objective standard of the appearance of judicial impartiality, integrated within a recusal process that
is fair and transparent, should be viewed as ethically essential.
D.

Judges are human—they do not have the capability of being
objective or disinterested decision-makers when their
actual or apparent impartiality is questioned.

In the Brothers Grimm’s fairy tale about a beautiful and fair
heroine, Snow White, the Queen of the story is described as often
looking into a magic mirror and asking: “Mirror, mirror, on the
wall, Who’s the fairest one of all?” The mirror’s consistent reply (at
least until Snow White grew up) was: “You, O Queen, are the fairest of all.” As the Brothers Grimm remarked, “Then she was
happy, for she knew that the mirror always spoke the truth.”206
issue of judicial campaign contributions and the public’s belief that contributions
skew judicial decision-making).
203. See Frost, supra note 20, at 534.
204. See Geyh, supra note 31, at 720 (citing a study by the National Center for
State Courts regarding fair procedures as an important factor in promoting a
favorable public perception); and Burke, supra note 198, at 253–54 (advocating a
commitment to procedural fairness to enhance the public’s confidence in the judiciary, adding, “As scary as it may seem, judges need to be willing to be publicly
accountable for fairness . . . Procedural fairness is what judicial excellence is
about.”).
205. See Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 504 (noting that current disqualification doctrines and procedures are inadequate). See also Judge Bork’s comment:
“The democratic integrity of the law . . . depends entirely upon the degree to which
its processes are legitimate.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 2 (1990).
206. JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM GRIMM, Snow White, in THE ANNOTATED
BROTHERS GRIMM 240, 244 (Maria Tatar ed., W.W. Norton & Co., 2004). The
Queen’s self-infatuating gaze is reminiscent of a narrative in a fourteenth century
book wherein, to entertain her companions during their attempted escape into the
countryside from the Black Death, Emilia sings: “I’m so enamored of my loveliness . . . When in my looking glass I view myself, / I see the good that makes the
mind content, / Nor can some new event or some old thought / Serve to deprive me
of such sheer delight.” GIOVANNI BOCCACCIO, THE DECAMERON 44 (Norton Critical ed. 2016).
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As with most fairy tales, there is a deeper meaning or didactic
message. In an annotation of the story, Maria Tator offers this
commentary:
“Who’s the fairest one of all?” The voice in the mirror may be
viewed as a judgmental voice, representing the absent father or
patriarchy in general, which places a premium on beauty. But
that voice could also be an echo of the queen’s own self-assessment, one that is, to be sure, informed by cultural norms about
physical appearances.207

Grimms’ fairy tale is particularly instructive when applied to
the problem of judicial recusal. When faced with a recusal challenge, the judge will conduct a self-examination in the metaphorical
mirror and—influenced (or pressured) by sacrosanct cultural
norms, such as the presumption of judicial impartiality—will make
a dispositive assessment about his or her ability to adjudicate without bias or prejudice. The judge will think that the self-assessment
is “objective,” one that also may be believed to reflect the reasonable views of others.208 Naturally, the judge will believe that he or
she knows all of the facts and is certainly in the best position to
objectively assess them. The concept of true objectivity is, of
course, chimeric, but certainly a worthy value and pursuit.209 Impartiality, like beauty, reveals itself to be truly in the eye of the
beholder. In reality, the voice in the mirror is nothing more than an
echo, paradoxically, of biased impartiality. From the perspective of
Snow White’s fairy tale, one might say that the image in the mirror
is a self-deceiving illusion—a manifestation of the Magical Mirror
Syndrome.
The problem is compounded because, like the self-gazing
Queen in Snow White, the judicial community has been unable—or
willfully resistant—to acknowledge the untenability of objective
self-assessment. Scholarly research and commentary confirm, however, that objective self-assessment of impartiality is a tenaciously
romantic notion that presents a serious risk to the ideal of fundamental fairness. There is abundant literature regarding the problem of cognitive predispositions in judicial decision-making. The
complicating psychological factors largely come under the rubric of
“biases”—often analyzed in descriptive terms such as the “intro207. GRIMM & GRIMM, supra note 206, at 244.
208. It has been observed that there is consequently a serious risk that the
self-assessment will be that of a “reasonable judge” rather than the “reasonable
person.” See Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 151, at 158.
209. See supra note 68 regarding the definitional implications of “objective.”
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spection bias disorder”210 or the Bias Blind Spot211—which, in turn,
can be broken down into many specific psycho-analytical categories.212 Judicial systems, however, have refused to grapple with
such mystifying subterranean psychological vulnerabilities when the
issue of recusal arises.
Donning a black robe213 or possessing superior intelligence
does not magically confer infallibility, nor does an entirely sincere
and deep-seated belief in one’s integrity or impartiality provide special ethical insulation.214 The Caperton and Williams cases are par210. See Geyh, supra note 31, at 709 n.152 (citing STEVEN LUBET, THE IMPOROF BEING HONEST: HOW LYING, SECRECY, AND HYPOCRISY COLLIDE
WITH TRUTH IN LAW 6 (2008)).
211. See Marbes, supra notes 52 and 162; Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind
Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 309, 374 (2002) (discussing three surveys regarding self-serving attributions
and the concept of naı̈ve realism).
212. The constellation of biases has been conveniently referred to as “the fallibility of belief.” See SUSANNAH CAHALAN, THE GREAT PRETENDER: THE UNDERCOVER MISSION THAT CHANGED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF MADNESS 44
(2019). There are many analytical terms to describe particular biases. See, for example, Uphoff, supra note 25 (identifying egocentric biases, including anchoring,
hindsight, and self-serving, and concluding, based on the author’s experience of 30
years, that the justice system faces a serious problem of bad judging and bad
judges); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORN. L. REV. 777, 784
(2000–01) (identifying cognitive illusions, such as anchoring, framing, hindsight
bias, the representative heuristic, egocentricity); ROBERT GREENE, THE LAWS OF
HUMAN NATURE 28–32 (2018) (discussing generally the biases of confirmation,
conviction, appearance, group, blame, superiority, and cautioning that “We imagine
we are looking for the truth, or being realistic, when in fact we are holding on to
ideas that bring a release from tension and soothe our egos, make us feel superior.
This pleasure principle in thinking is the source of all our biases.” Id. at 28); Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 151, at 155 n.86 (identifying various psychological
studies and stressing the need to reform the recusal process with an emphasis on
appearances); and Anne E. Mullins, Opportunity in the Age of Alternative Facts, 58
WASHBURN L.J. 577 (2019) (discussing cultural bias and judicial predispositions in
the assessment of empirical evidence); and DAILEY, supra note 1, at 57–61 (discussing the psychoanalytical aspects of decision-making; author laments that “Psychoanalysis reveals how law’s failure to take human subjectivity seriously poses
grave risks for a liberal system of justice committed to just treatment and fair outcomes.” Id. at 3).
213. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away from Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 346, 352 (2009–10)
(judges may acquire a false sense of infallibility); Sam Stretton, The Term “Black
Robe Disease” Is Used to Describe Judges Who Let Their Own Self-Importance
Cloud Their Good Judgment, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July 10, 2012), https://bit.ly/
2WdCqUj.
214. See Marbes, supra note 162, at 280–81 (no scientific evidence to support
the belief that more intelligent persons are less prone to the Bias Blind Spot);
Geyh, supra note 31, at 727 (noting the paradoxical problem of disqualification
standards that are designed to second guess the impartiality of judges, standards
which are interpreted and applied by judges who are so committed to their own
impartiality that they are loath to second guess themselves). See also Slovenko,
TANCE
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ticularly egregious examples of judicial blinders in the selfassessments of impartiality, notwithstanding the fact that the state
jurists presumably acted in good faith and with confidence in their
capacity to be impartial.215 In cautioning his fellow judges that “the
tenacious tentacles of bias” can cloud objectivity, one federal jurist
has acknowledged that the black robe is not magical: “[E]ach of us
harbors some bias in some degree, and [ ] our biases may be impacting a given situation in ways in which we are simply not
aware.”216
What is particularly troublesome about the self-assessment aspect of the traditional recusal process is the obvious personal interest that a jurist has in his or her potential recusal.217 When one’s
reputational interest or professional image is implicated, objectivity
about oneself is not possible. Judges are not immune from an understandable gravitational pull to defend and assert a positive image when faced with an unsettling—perhaps surprising or
baseless—ethical challenge.218 Because of such understandable
self-interest, judges have an incentive to narrowly construe recusal
and to resist a formalized process that constrains their authority and
discretion.219 Moreover, with respect to disqualification, a judge
may be reluctant to admit his or her cognitive vulnerabilities because the judge may view the recusal challenge as a frontal attack
on the judge’s competency and integrity, an especially serious consupra note 42, at 645 n.6, stating: “The act of becoming a judge does not convert a
person into an individual without emotion and prejudice . . . As Judge Frank put it,
‘Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and taking
the office as a judge, a man ceases to be a human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine.’” Quoting Frank, Cult of the Robe,
28 SAT. R. LIT. 12 (Oct. 13, 1945). Slovenko adds: “My intimate acquaintance
with judges confirms my impression that the robe works no major transformation.”
Slovenko, supra note 42, at 645 n.6.
215. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); and Williams
v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016). Professor Virelli characterizes Williams as
a narrow decision regarding due process recusal but exemplifying the Supreme
Court’s more expansive and flexible approach. See VIRELLI, supra note 17, at
136–37.
216. See McKee, supra note 2, at 1712. In a lighter metaphorical vein, the
judicial author notes that detecting bias in oneself may be more difficult than defining and identifying the strike zone in baseball. Id. at 1723–24.
217. See Geyh, supra note 145, at 546. As Justice Brennan remarked in Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 829–30 (1986) (concurring op.), a disqualifying interest does not have to be pecuniary. See also Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 14
n.65 (author notes that, in the administrative law context, improper self-interest
bias is not limited to financial interests).
218. See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 19 (acknowledging a judge’s personal motivation and interest in vindicating one’s reputation).
219. See Frost, supra note 20, at 552.
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cern for those judges who are elected.220 It is certainly plausible
that the judge’s self-interest is as strong as, or perhaps stronger
than, the traditional per se disqualifying factor of economic self-interest. Publius’s admonition in Federalist No. 10 is instructive: “No
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity.”221 Self-interest in one’s ego and reputation impairs impartiality (and, consequently, the appearance thereof) and should
be recognized as a disqualifying factor in the recusal decision-making process.
E.

Recusal is a praiseworthy manifestation of judicial morality.
Appearance-based disqualification is not a reflection of a
judge’s competency or integrity.

Aside from the psychological impact upon a judge when confronted by a recusal challenge, recusal might superficially connote
something negative about the judge’s qualifications, competency, or
integrity.222 Such a negative perception is unfortunate and distorted, especially when recusal is considered in the context of appearances and the imperative of inspiring the public’s trust and
confidence in the judiciary. Thus, recusal needs to be explained and
understood by the public in a more positive and realistic light.
In the self-assessment recusal context, appearance-based
recusal can be viewed as multi-dimensional. As previously described, one aspect of looking in the mirror is personal or psychological—it is solipsistic, and impartiality is seriously compromised.
At the other end of the spectrum is society’s idealized image or
220. See McKee, supra note 2, at 1716 (reflections of a federal jurist).
221. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 147, at 57 (James Madison).
Authorship of this essay has been attributed to James Madison. Publius’s commentary, offered in the belief that factions produced damaging mischief, reflects
the ancient maxim Nemo debet esse index in propria causa (“No man ought to be a
judge in his own case.”) and Nemo potest esse simul actor et index (“No one can be
both litigant and judge at the same time.”). See Vermeule, supra note 146 (analyzing the limits and costs-benefits of the nemo principle and positing the view that
one must consider and assess the risk of self-dealing and self-serving biases regarding individual and institutional decision-makers); and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986) (noting that no judge can be a judge in his own case
or be permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome, concluding
that the state justice’s participation in the case raised a question regarding his possible financial self-interest justifying disqualification).
222. See Kilimnik, supra note 37, at 773, regarding the public’s misguided
negative perception of recusal. In Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d 107, 148 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2015), Judge Stabile cautioned that his pro-recusal analysis, based on the appearance of impropriety, should not be viewed as casting doubt on the trial judge’s
ability to reach a fair and impartial verdict.
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perception of a jurist. Among the three branches of government,
judges possess an almost sacred mystique—elevated, black-robed
officials who operate within a framework of stylized procedural
rituals. Society places judges on a pedestal as guardians of democracy—fair, impartial, and ideally (albeit mistakenly) infallible in
judgment.223 The sobering reality is that such an idealized image of
the jurist presents another impediment in the recusal context. How
can such exalted public figures acknowledge the possibility of bias
or prejudice while avoiding the risk of criticism or diminished stature, especially when they believe that they have an equally compelling ethical duty to decide cases assigned to them? The pressures
create public and private difficulties. Given the tensive relationship
between ethical duties and a judge’s almost sacred public persona,
recusal presents an inherently difficult decision for a jurist.
The dilemma, however, is resolvable if recusal is re-conceptualized.224 Focusing on the objective appearance aspect of recusal can
provide an important shift in perspective and emphasis, one that
places a jurist in a more positive light. Recusal should not be perceived as signifying dishonor or a denigration of a jurist’s competency and integrity.225 Quite the contrary—recusal should be
viewed as a commendable manifestation of integrity and judicial
morality. A coalition of former state chief justices addressed the
value of an appearance-based approach to recusal when it stated:
The appearance of impropriety is also an essential basis for
recusal because it is difficult and awkward for a judge to admit
223. See Lomas–OISR, 130 A.3d at 147 (courts perform a “critical gatekeeping function”). William Howard Taft, who served as President and later Chief Justice of the United States, is reported to have said: “I love judges, and I love
courts . . . They [judges] are my ideals, that typify on earth what we shall meet
hereafter in heaven under a just God.” BUDIANSKY, supra note 3, at 401. Chief
Justice Roberts made a passing reference to those who believe in the “oracular
sanctity of judges.” See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 456 (2015).
224. Consider the advisability, for example, of taking a fresh look at the presumption of impartiality. See text notes 160–173 and accompanying text; and Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 151, at 161 (discussing perceptions of justice and
how to implement changes that will “re-orient” the judiciary’s perspective on
disqualification).
225. See Goodson, supra note 183, at 218 (to recognize that one’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned does not imply incompetency or unethical conduct); Geyh, supra note 31, at 729–30 (addressing the unwarranted stigma of disqualification); Marbes, supra note 162, at 286 (noting that in federal court most
cases rely on and use appearance of bias standard, which is less critical of a challenged judge’s ethics and does not impugn the judge’s actual motives); In re Moses
W, 842 N.E.2d 783, 789–90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (court determined that trial judge,
who had filed an affidavit in response to the motion for a substitute judge, should
have recused and notes that decision is not meant to impugn the trial judge; motion had been referred to another judge for review and decision).
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actual bias. Admission of actual bias runs counter to the deeply
ingrained obligation to be fair. Recusal based on the perception
of impropriety allows a judge to avoid admitting actual bias,
making recusal more acceptable.226

Similarly, another jurist observed: “By transforming a potentially intimately personal dispute into an objective discussion over
how a reasonable person might view the situation, a litigant can
give voice to concerns without going nuclear by accusing the judge
of being unethical.”227
These viewpoints are consistent with the ABA’s 2008 report,
advocating the application of the general or “catch-all” disqualification standard, stating:
The Model Code focuses on the appearance of impartiality,
rather than on a judge’s actual impartiality. This concern with
appearances has deep roots, dating back to the progressive era,
and is animated by the view that if public confidence in the courts
is to be preserved, judges must not only act properly but appear
to act properly as well. Moreover, if one is concerned about the
reluctance of judges to disqualify themselves, there is a strategic
benefit to focusing on the appearance of impartiality: judges who
are loath to admit actual bias or partiality might be more willing
to concede the existence of a perception problem.228

Reconceptualizing recusal in a positive ethical perspective also
requires a re-examination of the disciplinary aspects of recusal. The
negative connotations of disqualification are arguably sustained by
the fact that the failure to recuse may provide a basis for judicial
discipline. The problem is one of emphasis. Pennsylvania’s re-direction of recusal in the 1980s, for example, signaled an inadvisable
emphasis on the disciplinary aspects of such judicial conduct.229
Such a focus on or preoccupation with discipline erects an unnecessary obstacle to recusal reform. Three points, in this regard, are
relevant.
First, the disciplinary aspect of recusal should be recognized as
separate and distinct from the more commonplace adjudicatory as226. Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices In Support
of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08-22),
2009 WL 45979, at *4. The Conference of Chief Justices had also filed a separate
amici brief. See infra note 280.
227. McKeown, supra note 18, at 55.
228. See ABA DRAFT REPORT, supra note 143, at 18.
229. See text accompanying supra notes 121–30.
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pects of recusal.230 Recusal may indeed provide an independent
basis for future discipline, but recusal is often not addressed or resolved through the time-consuming and potentially devastating process of disciplinary investigation and enforcement.231 The
traditional adjudicatory and supplemental disciplinary dimensions
of recusal are distinct.232
Second, disciplinary enforcement of recusal infractions should
be relegated only to the most egregious cases. Regarding its recommendations for recusal reform, the Institute for the Advancement
of the American Legal System (“IAALS”) noted its agreement
with the conclusion of the Conference of Chief Justices, namely,
that states should not rely on the disciplinary process as a deterrent
for handling recusal matters.233
Third, in conjunction with the preferred practice of having another jurist assess a recusal motion, the issue of discipline becomes
less relevant. As the ABA Model Code emphasizes: “Although
the black letter of the Rules is binding and enforceable, it is not
contemplated that every transgression will result in the imposition
of discipline.”234 In fact, most reported cases on the topic of recusal
230. Pennsylvania caselaw, for example, has acknowledged that the state’s judicial disciplinary authority is separate and distinct. See In re Zupsic, 893 A.2d
875, 893, 893 n.6 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2005) (noting that reported opinions from
intermediate appellate courts regarding recusal do not constitute precedent in disciplinary matters and cautioning that perceived violations of the judicial code of
conduct are not within the purview of intermediate appellate courts).
231. See In re Lokuta, 964 A.2d 988 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2008) (jurist removed
from office in connection with, inter alia, the jurist’s on-the-record manifestation of
bias against plaintiff’s counsel); In re Zupsic, 893 A.2d 875 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2005)
(jurist violated rules of conduct in failing to disqualify himself where record
showed his personal contacts with defendant’s father); cf. In re McCutcheon, 846
A.2d 801 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2004) (Board failed to prove personal bias or prejudice
or establish a reasonable question about the judge’s impartiality; failure to recuse
assessed in relation to the realities of the administration of justice in small communities and the adventitious nature of a jurist’s contacts with citizens and law
enforcement).
232. See, e.g., John P. Freeman, Appearance of Impropriety, Recusal, and the
Segars-Andrews Case, 62 S.C. L. REV. 485 (2011) (author focuses on a truly unusual case, in the context of appearance of impropriety, in which the disciplinary
commission disagreed with three prior non-disciplinary adjudications supporting
the jurist’s non-recusal).
233. See IAALS REPORT, supra note 39, at 11.
234. The ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 19, para. 6 of the “Scope” section,
continues: “Whether discipline should be imposed should be determined through
a reasonable and reasoned application of the Rules, and should depend upon factors such as the seriousness of the transgression, the facts and circumstances that
existed at the time of the transgression, the extent of any pattern of improper activity, whether there have been previous violations, and the effect of the improper
activity upon the judicial system or others.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Scope, para. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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can be found within the non-disciplinary context of appellate adjudications in which recusal is often one of many issues raised in an
appeal from a final judgment.
Thus, the objective appearance standard is beneficial in addressing the inherent tensions of recusal by placing it in a more
positive, less critical, and non-disciplinary context, absent egregious
circumstances of misconduct. Regarding the perceptions of justice
and the understandable “protective impulses” of jurists,235 in time,
with greater focus on the objective appearance standard, “judges
will come to recognize that they are not being personally challenged—it is appearance that matters.”236
IV.

PROCEDURAL IMPERATIVES FOR RECUSAL REFORM

Legal literature on the topic of judicial ethics is a fertile field.
While the 20th century has concentrated on promoting general
rules and codes of judicial conduct, the last few decades have placed
particular emphasis on a core feature of the justice system—the integrity of the decision-maker and decision-making process as it applies to the ethical value of impartiality. Many organizations, as
well as judicial and legal scholars, have concentrated their criticism
and recommendations on disqualification and recusal.237 The insightful assessments and recommendations of such organizations
and commentators have demonstrated substantial consensus that
various procedural reforms should be implemented to address the
issue of judicial impartiality, and the appearance thereof, in decision-making. Selecting and prioritizing such recommendations can
be challenging. But the following procedural norms are essential
building blocks for meaningful recusal reform:
1. Independent judicial assessment and disposition of motions:
Motions to disqualify or recuse a jurist should be transferred to another jurist for an independent and objective assessment and disposition. Self-assessments of impartiality clearly subvert the objective
appearance of impartiality standard of recusal.
This recommendation, based on the aforementioned categorical imperatives of impartiality and the appearance of impartiality, is
clearly the most important procedural reform urged by many commentators. A survey of the American public indicates that 80 percent believe that disqualification requests should be decided by a
235. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 151, at 161.
236. Id.
237. See supra note 23.
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different judge.238 Aside from states that have adopted a peremptory challenge approach to recusal,239 many states give the jurist
autonomy to make a self-assessment of his or her own impartiality
and do not require transfer of a recusal motion to another jurist.240
Stressing the paramount importance of an impartial adjudicator241
and recognizing that cognitive illusions influence such self-assessments, commentators identify the failure to transfer motions to disqualify/recuse as the major common flaw in how states handle
recusal challenges.242 This infirmity has been severely criticized as
an ethical and process failure.243
Transferring the recusal motion, in the first instance, to another
jurist for an independent determination is an essential recusal reform.244 As one commentator has observed:
Only when it comes to recusal procedure do we tolerate the presence of a decisionmaker who is not neutral or impartial. This is
an odd exception because the presence of an impartial arbiter
may be more important in the context of recusal proceedings
than at other stages of litigation, not less.245
238. See Geyh, supra note 145, at 547 n.310. The survey was conducted in
2009.
239. See supra notes 54–56.
240. For the practice among other states, see Abramson, supra note 39, at
545–58 (identifies 27 states); MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 19, at 21–22 n.43
and 23–24 n.47; Marbes, supra note 52, at 837; and Serbulea, supra note 15, at
1151–73 (appendix identifying specific state statutes and rules). Generally, the
recusal/disqualification procedures vary among the states: many allow the challenged jurist to exercise discretion and decide the motion; others restrict the challenged jurist to determining the sufficiency and timeliness of the motion; and
others require the jurist to transfer the motion to another judge. See also ABA
RESOLUTION 107, supra note 36, at 8–9.
241. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 150, at 504 (also linking impartiality
to the value of judicial independence); Serbulea, supra note 15, at 1141 (process
and procedural safeguards are important to judicial independence).
242. See Marbes, supra note 52, at 835.
243. See Bam, supra note 24, at 653.
244. See James Sample & Michael Young, Invigorating Judicial Disqualification—Ten Potential Reforms, 92 JUDICATURE 26, 30–32 (2008); ABA DRAFT REPORT, supra note 143; Abramson, supra note 39; MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra
note 19. At the least, others have suggested a modified approach, insisting on
prompt review by an independent adjudicator or tribunal regarding a jurist’s decision not to recuse. See Stempel, supra note 213, at 360; RESOLUTION 105C, supra
note 184. In 2014, the Conference of Chief Justices adopted two resolutions regarding recusal: Resolution 8—Urging Adoption of Procedures for Deciding Judicial Disqualification/Recusal Motions: Ensuring a Fair and Impartial Process
[hereinafter referred to as CCJ RESOLUTION 8A]; and Resolution 8—In Support of
American Bar Association Resolution 105C [hereinafter referred to as CCJ RESOLUTION 8B]; and see IAALS REPORT, supra note 39, at 6 (suggesting that “judges
shouldn’t grade their own homework”).
245. See Bam, supra note 21, at 1181.
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An incisive judicial criticism of the self-assessment disqualification process is particularly noteworthy. In In re Marriage of
O’Brien, Justice Karmeier stated:
The notion that individual judges have sole and exclusive authority for determining whether they should continue to participate
in a given case is untenable. It would enable judges to continue
to sit in cases even where their participation in the case would
deprive one of the litigants of a fair trial . . . . Not only should
judges not be the sole and exclusive arbiters of whether they
should continue to participate in a case, some have questioned
whether they should ever be permitted to sit in judgment of requests for their own disqualification. As one recent scholarly
work has pointed out: ‘The fact that judges in many jurisdictions
decide on their own recusal challenges, with little to no prospect
of immediate review, is one of the most heavily criticized features
of the United States disqualification law—and for good reason.
They challenge the fundamental legitimacy of adjudication. They
also challenge the judge in a very personal manner; they speculate on her interests and biases; they may imply unattractive
things about her. . . .246

Justice Karmeier’s concurring opinion provides an insight that
should be obvious but must be emphasized—the subjective self-assessment disqualification approach subverts the objective standard
that a jurist must apply in deciding a recusal motion. Echoing the
exhortations of others, the justice explained:
Allowing judges to decide their own recusal motions is in tension
not only with the guarantee of a neutral decision-maker, but also
with our explicit commitment to objectivity in this arena. “Since
the question whether a judge’s impartiality ‘might reasonably be
questioned’ is a ‘purely objective’ standard, it would seem to follow logically that the judge whose impartiality is being challenged should not have the final word on the question whether
his or her recusal is ‘necessary’ or required.”247

There is a self-evident conflict between the ethical obligation
of impartiality and prevailing recusal procedures. Subjective selfassessments of impartiality collapse the objective “reasonable person” standard of disqualification.248 To justify such an extraordi246. In re Marriage of O’Brien, 958 N.E.2d. 647, 677 (citing and quoting from
Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 530) (emphasis in original).
247. Id.
248. See Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 151, at 154; Bam, supra note 22,
at 1176 (“[I]mposing an objective disqualification standard is futile because, regardless of the substantive test, judges must assess the objective appearances of
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nary compromise of judicial impartiality, various reasons have been
offered. The belief that appellate review is an adequate corrective
to an erroneous recusal decision is a common, superficially satisfying, justification.249 In reality, however, appellate review of recusal
decisions is plainly an inadequate, ineffective, and inefficient option—the standard of review is woefully deferential and rarely results in reversals; the record on review is sparse, given the lack of
traditional procedural safeguards; and appellate review is substantially delayed (and always costly) for the aggrieved litigant. As the
Supreme Court pointedly identified the substantial downsides when
it assessed a recusal challenge to Judge Landis:250
To commit to the judge a decision upon the truth of the facts
gives chance for the evil against which the section [regarding peremptory disqualification] is directed. The remedy by appeal is
inadequate. It comes after the trial and, if prejudice exist, it has
worked its evil and a judgment of it in a reviewing tribunal is
precarious. It goes fortified by presumptions, and nothing can be
more elusive of estimate or decision than a disposition of mind in
which there is a personal ingredient.251

Likewise, an extraordinary writ represents a procedurally remote alternative when challenging the denial of a motion to recuse.252 Other common justifications for self-assessment include:
their own conduct. And the evidence is overwhelming that this is an impossible
task.”) (emphasis in original).
249. Such justifications have been criticized by others. See Stempel, supra
note 152, at 753–54; Marbes, supra note 52, at 854–55.
250. See text accompanying supra note 15, regarding Judge Landis.
251. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921). The defendants, charged
with espionage, had filed an affidavit under section 21 of the Judicial Code (which
required another judge to hear the matter), alleging personal bias and prejudice on
the part of Judge Landis. The disqualification was sought because Judge Landis
had made prejudicial comments about Germans and German-Americans. Id. at
28–29. The defendants were of German ancestry. Id. at 28. Landis summarily
denied the motion and the defendants were convicted. The Supreme Court held
that the defendants’ affidavit was legally sufficient and that Landis was not legally
justified in proceeding further in the matter. Id. at 36. See also Marbes, supra note
162, at 293 (noting the costs of appellate review and appellate leniency in recusal
matters); and Bam, supra note 22, at 1175 (recognizing the fact that appellate reversals regarding the refusal to recuse are rare).
252. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 150, at 504 n.180 (noting the heavy
burden on petitioners and the reluctance of courts to grant such extraordinary relief). Nevertheless, there have been instances when a court will grant such review.
See Municipal Publ’n, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Phila. Cty., 489 A.2d 1286
(Pa. 1985) (supreme court assumes plenary jurisdiction to review recusal decision
erroneously precipitated in the intermediate appellate court by writ of prohibition); State ex rel. McCullough v. Drumm, 984 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
(applying an objective recusal appearance of impropriety standard, court grants
state’s writ of prohibition requiring judge, notwithstanding judge’s reputation for
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the challenged jurist is in the “best position” to know and assess
“the facts,” or self-assessment enhances efficiencies, deters fishing
expeditions, or prevents the manipulation of the judicial system.253
Such rationales are specious and can easily be addressed by procedural safeguards.254 In evaluating costs and benefits, procedures
that protect judicial integrity (institutional and individual), promote
fairness, inspire public trust and confidence, and safeguard the
rights of litigants—all compelling state interests—arguably outweigh countervailing considerations of costs, efficiencies, personal
judicial autonomy, and ego.255
2. Procedural safeguards: Given the fundamental importance
of impartiality and fairness in decision-making, adequate procedural safeguards should be presumptively incorporated in the recusal
process regardless of the procedural context.
It is not uncommon to witness a supreme court justice summarily deny a motion to recuse. Caperton and Williams are prominent
examples of how recusal motions are often litigated and denied,
often without a hearing or explanation.256 Notwithstanding the critintegrity and honesty, to recuse himself where he previously acknowledged on the
record that he could not be objective regarding defendant’s mental capacity).
253. Such justifications or concerns were identified, for example, in Reilly-II,
489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985). See also Robinson Nursing Home & Rehab. Ctr. v.
Phillips, 502 S.W.3d 519 (Ark. 2016) and infra note 256.
254. See Serbulea, supra note 15, at 1146–47. Imposing an affidavit requirement or using the threat of sanctions as a deterrent are possible procedural tools to
address concerns about the potential abuse of the recusal process. See infra section 6.
255. Regarding costs and benefits, see Marbes, supra note 52, at 859–66;
Vermeule, supra note 146, at 400–420 (suggesting that impartiality of the decisionmaker is one institutional good among others); Randall J. Litteneker, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 267 (1978)
(administrative concerns of potential increases in judicial disqualification merit
only secondary consideration); Samaha, supra note 178, at 1583 (general discussion
of cost, need, efficiency, and institutional competence in justifying appearancebased decision-making); and Serbulea, supra note 15, at 1143–48 (discussing benefits outweighing administrative burdens in the context of various recusal reform
measures).
256. “Summary denial” is used in the sense that the action is arbitrary, i.e.
there is an absence of traditional procedural safeguards and articulated reasoning.
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 882, 885 (2009) (Caperton moved
three times for disqualification; Justice Benjamin issued four separate opinions to
explain why he harbored no actual bias); and Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct.
1899 (2016) (recusal motion denied without a hearing). See also Robinson Nursing
and Rehab. Ctr., 502 S.W.3d 519 (Ark. 2016), where the Arkansas supreme court
referred the disqualification motion to the challenged individual justice, who conducted a self-assessment and denied the motion to recuse, which was focused on
contributions to her 2014 judicial campaign. The justice relied, in part, on the
“presumption” of her “duty to sit,” see supra notes 66 and 93, and the perceived
risk of litigants manipulating the make-up of the court through recusal challenges.
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ical importance and high stakes in securing a fair tribunal, recusal
litigation represents a process that has been blithely diminished and
ignored. Professor Amanda Frost forcefully explains the problem
as follows:
Ironically, the recusal process is unique in the degree to which it
has eschewed the basic procedural elements that have been
viewed as indispensable to maintaining the legitimacy of adjudication. Unlike almost any other area of the law, the process by
which judges decide whether to recuse themselves ignores the
systems usually employed to resolve disputes in a fair and impartial manner. As a general matter, the recusal process is usually
not adversarial, does not provide for a full airing of the relevant
facts, is not bound by a developed body of law, and often is not
concluded by the issuance of a reasoned explanation for the
judge’s decision. Most importantly, the decision itself is almost
always made in the first instance by the very judge being asked to
disqualify himself, even though that judge has an obvious personal stake in the matter. My contention is that it is this very ad
hoc and informal process, rather than any problem with the substantive standards for recusal, that has led to the recurring dissatisfaction with the law.257

Professor Frost’s criticisms have been acknowledged by others
to support their contention that the predominant recusal procedures violate the core tenets of our adversarial system of justice.258
While one may quibble whether a recusal challenge is “adversarial” (since the jurist is technically not an opposing “party”),259
the gravity of a recusal challenge certainly necessitates the applicaSee also League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083 (Pa. 2018),
where the legislative petitioners cited the importance of the public’s interest in
having a hearing on the recusal motion; Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 680–81
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), where appellant complained of the lack of a hearing or an
explanation for the denial of his recusal motion; and Commonwealth v. McCullough, 201 A.3d 221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018), where appellant asserted the need for
the trial judge’s testimony at the recusal hearing and argued that the lack of such
testimony constituted structural error, and note 129, supra.
257. See Frost, supra note 20, at 536.
258. See Serbulea, supra note 15, at 1141–42 (stating that current recusal practice is incompatible with our legal norms); Geyh, supra note 31, at 719 (“Having a
judge rule on the propriety of his own conduct without the benefit of adversarial
argument, without the need to explain his decision, and subject to a deferential
standard of review or no review at all, reflects the extent to which disqualification
has been marginalized.”).
259. See Bam, supra note 22, at 1141 (maintaining that the typical disqualification process is presumptively unconstitutional and fails to protect the appearance
of fairness and impartiality); Serbulea, supra note 15, at 1142 (judge plays the role
of an adversary in an unfair way); cf. Bam, supra note 21, at 999 (cautioning about
the potential negative effect of placing recusal in a traditional adversarial context).
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tion of basic procedural protections, such as a meaningful opportunity to present facts and to be heard,260 a fair resolution of
contested record facts, a reasoned explanation for the decision to
deny a motion to disqualify, and an opportunity for meaningful appellate review of a factual record developed in the trial court.261
Among such criticisms, the absence of a reasoned explanation
for the denial of a recusal motion is often singled out as a critical
weakness. The deficiency has been referred to as a judicial “black
box.”262 To be fair, however, one can probably point to notable
examples in state court systems in which a jurist has invested the
time and effort to provide a detailed exposition of the facts and law
supporting the decision not to recuse, albeit in the problematic context of a self-assessment.263 Aside from the inherent fairness to the
litigants, an on-the-record explanation serves many beneficial purposes: it facilitates more effective appellate review; promotes transparency and accountability to the public; provides valuable
guidance to the bench and bar; and contributes to the creation of a
body of precedent on the topic of recusal.264 Such rationales sup260. See PA Formal Advisory Op., supra note 19, which recommends that a
judge should hold a hearing when a party moves for disqualification, quoting Reilly
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291, 1299 (1986), and emphasizing the importance of the appearance of fairness in the administration of justice.
261. See Justice Kennedy’s recognition of West Virginia’s (all too typical)
recusal process where “there is no procedure for judicial factfinding and the sole
trier of fact is the one accused of bias.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 885.
262. See Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 531 (noting that the failure of a
jurist to give reasons violates the basic tenets of liberal democracy, distorts the
development of precedent, and deprives the appellate courts of meaningful review,
and stymies accountability); and Suzanne Levy, Your Honor Please Explain: Why
Congress Can, and Should, Require Justices to Publish Reasons for Their Recusal
Decisions, 16 J. OF CONST. LAW 1161 (2014) (critically addressing the justices’ failure to explain their recusal decisions and suggesting that Congressional action regarding the Court’s recusal procedures would be appropriate).
263. Pennsylvania cases are illustrative. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v.
Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083 (Pa. 2018) (Justice Wecht); Commonwealth v.
Spanier, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2897 (Aug. 10, 2018) (Judge Stabile);
Commonwealth v. Cosby, No. CP-46-3932-2016, 2018 WL 4608703 (Montgomery
Cty. Ct. C.P., Sept. 19, 2018) (Judge O’Neill); Robinson Nursing and Rehab. Crt.,
502 S.W.3d 519 (Ark. 2016) (Justice Wood, referring to the ABA’s balancing factors). At the Federal Supreme Court level, detailed justifications for a refusal to
recuse have been provided by Justice Scalia in Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.,) (denying recusal motion regarding his duck hunting trip with Vice-President Cheney); Justice Rehnquist’s denial of recusal in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., memo. op.);
Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) and note
108, supra.
264. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text; Reilly v. Se. Pa. Transp.
Authority, 479 A.2d 973, 1004 (Pa. Super Ct. 1984) (Johnson, concurring and dissenting) (trial court’s opinion is not part of the record; court can only review facts
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port the importance of on-the-record explanations for recusal
decisions.265
Regarding the importance of procedural protections in the
recusal decision-making process, artificial distinctions are also proffered to rationalize superficial (legal and factual) appellate review
that often ignores or minimizes alleged disqualification errors.
Such artificial distinctions may include that the record reflects that
the defendant already had a fair trial (by a judge or jury), which
effectively serves to moot any claim of judicial bias; the recusal decision was made by a judge of a multi-member panel or court, thus
making any error harmless; or the disqualification challenge was
presented in the midst, or after completion, of a trial.266 These jusdeveloped on the official record); Commonwealth v. Darush, 459 A.2d 727, 732
(notwithstanding the lack of record evidence from the trial judge regarding the
allegation of prejudicial statements, the Supreme Court or Pennsylvania remands
the case for re-sentencing to a different judge); In re Marriage of O’Brien, 958
N.E.2d 647, 675 (Ill. 2011) (noting importance of record facts to subsequent appellate review). See also Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Authority, 489 A.2d 1291
(Pa. 1985) (noting that the appellate court can only look to the record prepared in
the trial court, not facts alleged in a brief which the trial court has not passed on);
Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (appellate court refuses to consider supporting affidavit where it was not made a part of the certified
record; recusal claims deemed waived as a result of a substantial delay, 167 days, in
raising it); In re D.D., 597 A.2d 648, 653 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (citing Pa.R.A.P.
1921; the trial court record is not part of the record on appeal). Nevertheless, a
factually deficient trial court record may not be an insuperable barrier to appellate
review. See Commonwealth v. Dip, 221 A.3d 201, 208 (court reviews recusal issue
even though the state failed to place in the record any evidence for its claims).
265. See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 19; Sample & Young, supra note
244; Stempel, supra note 152; Marbes, supra note 52; Burke, supra note 198; James
Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More Rigorous, JUDGES J.,
Winter 2007, at 17, 22; IAALS REPORT, supra note 37. See also Theodore W.
Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
341, 376 (2004) (discussing the “norm of reason-giving,” recognizing that such a
norm constrains discretion within the bounds of precedent and logic, facilitates
broader discourse among academics, makes judges produce better results, and engages the judge in a more robust civic dialogue with the public); Zygmont A. Pines,
The Recycling of Justice: Transitions in Criminal Law and the Dilemma of Rationality, 89 DICK. L. REV. 283, 336 (1985) (discussing the judicial system’s symbolic
and functional obligation of dialogue with and justification to the public, as well as
the importance of transmitting information and knowledge of the law through the
medium of judicial opinions); Zhuang Liu, Does Reason Writing Reduce Decision
Bias? Experimental Evidence from Judges in China, 47 J. LEGAL STUDIES 83 (2018)
(suggesting that biased judgments may be reduced by requiring judges themselves
to provide written reasons for their decisions; delegation of writing may reinforce
biases).
266. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 178, at 74 (criticizing assessment of disqualification motions that focus on whether a judge or jury decided the case, noting that in a jury trial the judge still exercises a considerable amount of discretion
and decides issues that may affect a jury); Slovenko, supra note 42, at 662 (maintaining that the common law jury/non-jury distinction no longer has relevance; a
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tifications are irrelevant (although a purposeful and inexcusable delay in alleging error may be a procedurally relevant factor in finding
waiver). The impartiality of a jurist or tribunal, as well as the appearance thereof, should always be a fundamental consideration,
regardless of the procedural context of a case. As the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania succinctly noted: “A tribunal is either fair or
unfair.”267
3. Judicial campaign finance-related regulations: The appearance of judicial impartiality should be reinforced by regulations addressing judicial campaign contributions and expenditures,
specifically through ethical standards mandating recusals (if contributions exceed a specified threshold) and/or requiring meaningful
and timely disclosure by attorneys, litigants, and judges.

judge plays an important role even in a jury trial, after the verdict, and in imposing
sentence); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986) (in the context of discrimination in the selection of grand jury, Court notes that, as in the case when it is
believed that a judge had some basis to render a biased judgment, the structural
integrity of the process has been undermined and a fair trial does not purge the
taint; the systemic flaw requires reversal). In Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct.
1899 (2016), the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that the supreme
court justice’s failure to recuse in a death penalty appeal affected the whole adjudicatory framework, constituted a structural error denying due process, and was not
harmless error, noting “a multimember court must not have its guarantee of neutrality undermined, for the appearance of bias demeans the reputation and integrity not just of one jurist, but of the larger institution of which he or she is a part.”
Id. at 145. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (finding that
the appearance of justice required the state justice’s disqualification where the justice cast the deciding vote and authored opinions in the underlying case that implicated his potential financial interests; concurring Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and
Marshall disputed that the justice’s alleged deciding vote should be viewed as a
dispositive factor in requiring disqualification). For examples where the possibility
of partiality is a subordinate concern, see In re Zupsic, 893 A.2d 875 (Pa. Ct. Jud.
Disc. 2005) (Court of Judicial Discipline noting that, if there was a fair trial, alleged
disqualifying factors become moot); Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 653 A.2d 706 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (citing Reilly-II, 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985), remarking that the
verdict and award of damages were rendered by a jury and not by a trial judge;
accordingly, the jury and not the trial judge exercised full responsibility for the
fact-finding function). Professor Stempel has noted that harmless error appears to
be the norm in a majority of recusal cases in federal court, especially where the
appearance aspect of disqualification is at issue. See Stempel, supra note 152, at
755–64.
267. In Interest of McFall, 617 A.2d 707 (Pa. 1992) (jurist who, in effect, acted
as an agent of the judiciary and prosecution during defendants’ trial created a clear
conflict of interest justifying recusal on the basis of appearance alone; recusal challenge was made after the conclusion of the trial); In re Zupsic, 893 A.2d 875 (disqualification becomes an obligation at whatever point in the proceeding it is
evident that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned). See also
Kilimnik, supra note 37 (asserting that Pennsylvania caselaw and practice in
recusal matters should be returned to ordinary judicial processes).
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The infusion of big money (from attorneys, corporations, labor
unions, and lobbyists) in judicial campaigns presents a major difficulty for those states that elect their judges.268 In recent years, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, the staggering rise in the
costs of judicial campaigns, coupled with the phenomenon of underthe-radar independent expenditures that escape statutory reporting
requirements, present a unique threat to the integrity and independence of the judicial system.269 Judicial independence appears to
decline in direct proportion to a judge’s dependence on others for
financial support.270 Judicial campaign contributions may be perceived as a subtle form of judicial corruption.
268. See DOUGLAS KEITH WITH PATRICK BERRY & ERIC VELASCO, BRENCTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 2017-18: HOW
DARK MONEY, INTEREST GROUPS AND BIG DONORS SHAPE STATE HIGH COURTS,
THE BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (2019); ABA RESOLUTION 107, supra note 36
(report noting resistance to judicial campaign contribution reform efforts since
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), and the new concerns
raised by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2009), regarding the potential of
large corporations and labor unions contributing to judicial campaigns); and Stempel, supra note 152, at 778–88 (viewing money in judicial elections as one of the
greatest weaknesses of disqualification law). It has been noted that the factor of
elected judges changes the constitutional dynamics of recusal analysis. See
VIRELLI, supra note 17, at 263 n.88. The author also notes 95% of cases in the
American judicial system are in state courts, that 38 states use elections in some
capacity to select or retain their judges, and that 19 states have uncontested retention elections for judges in their courts of last resort. Id. at 192–93, 199, and 203.
269. See Keith, supra note 268; Letter from Kate Berry and Nathaniel Sobel,
Brennan Ctr. for Justice, to Diane Fremgen, Clerk of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals (Mar. 15, 2017), https://bit.ly/3eFolFT [https://perma.cc/4MDSJ86F] (regarding a petition of Wisconsin’s former jurists—see note 277, infra—to
establish objective rules for recusal when a judge has benefitted from campaign
contributions); ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHO PAYS FOR JUDICIAL RACES (2017), https://bit.ly/3gqvFGA [https://perma.cc/92RT-PXJ4]. See
also Billy Corriher, Campaign Finance Laws Fail as Corporate Money Floods Judicial Races, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2013), https://ampr.gs/2VKL1hc [https://
perma.cc/NQ3K-82Y9]. There is a certain historical irony in the contemporary
contretemps of money in judicial elections given that the narrow common law view
of recusal focused on a judge’s financial interest (direct, substantial) in a matter.
See text accompanying supra notes 43–47. The ethical problem of financial interests has always been a challenge to our concept of justice and tests the limits of
society’s tolerance for such financial entanglements.
270. See Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 366–67 and 369 (applying Robert Kligaard’s formula for corruption, author concludes that the current rules regarding
judicial campaign contributions allow for “legal bribery,” creating both the reality
and appearance of impropriety, a problem which is compounded by monopolistic
judicial power). See also Neel U. Sukhatme & Jay Jenkins, Pay to Play? Campaign
Finance and the Incentive Gap in the Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel (May 26,
2020), 70 DUKE L.J.(2020) (forthcoming), https://bit.ly/3gH81pA [https://perma.cc/
438E-FMU4]. Sukhatme and Jenkins, relying on empirical evidence, contend that
campaign finances directly harm defendants, where judges and appointed defense
counsel engage in a surprising lucrative arrangement of pay to play.
NAN
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The problem of judicial campaign contributions was starkly exposed in the egregious case of Caperton v. Massey Coal Co.,271 in
which Justice (later Chief Justice) Benjamin refused repeated requests (three) to recuse notwithstanding the fact that the officer of
the defendant coal company contributed $3 million to his judicial
campaign. The contributions were three times the amount spent by
Benjamin’s own committee.272 As a result, Benjamin defeated an
incumbent justice (by 50,000 votes) and then, despite Benjamin’s
colleagues urging him to recuse, Benjamin participated in his
court’s three-to-two reversal of a $50 million verdict against the
coal company (two other justices, Maynard and Starcher, had previously recused themselves). To substantiate the necessity of recusal,
the movant presented evidence of a public opinion poll indicating
that over 67 percent of West Virginians doubted that Benjamin
would be fair and impartial.273 Under these admittedly extraordinary facts, the Supreme Court reversed, in a five-to-four decision,
stating that there was a serious risk of actual bias, sufficiently substantial that it “must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is
to be adequately implemented.”274
Caperton generated considerable commentary from the judicial, legal, and academic communities.275 The ABA, for example,
revised the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to mandate disqualification when a party, a party’s lawyer, or a law firm made contributions to the judge’s campaign in excess of a threshold, measured by
271. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868. The majority opinion acknowledged that it was addressing an extraordinary situation with facts that
were “extreme by any measure.” Id. at 887.
272. Id. at 873.
273. Id. at 875.
274. Id. at 884 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). The majority observed that there is a serious risk of actual bias when a person with a
personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election
campaign when the case was pending or imminent. Id.
275. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the
Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80 (2009); Wade Kolb, III, Caperton v.
Massey: The Due Process Implications of Contributions to Judicial Campaigns, 4
DUKE J. OF CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 315 (2009); Lynne H. Rambo, High
Court Pretense, Lower Court Candor: Judicial Impartiality after Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 441 (urging the high court to commit to the
Caperton ideal). See also CYNTHIA GRAY, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS (2016), https://
bit.ly/2Othm8b [https://perma.cc/E7BV-AY2Y] [hereinafter identified as the
“NCSC Report”]. Professor Virelli characterized Caperton, given its caveats and
qualifications, as an enigmatic example of the Supreme Court’s apparently more
expansive view of due process to support recusal. See VIRELLI, supra note 17, at
135–36.
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specific amounts or percentages, as determined by each state.276
Only a handful of states, however, decided to adopt the ABA’s
easy-to-apply per se approach to judicial campaign contributions,277
perhaps attributable, as the ABA has surmised, to the concern or
fear of the ability of judicial candidates to raise campaign funds and
the right of voters to support their candidates.278 Nevertheless,
mandatory per se disqualification, reasonably calibrated, remains an
effective weapon, among others. Such a categorical approach has
been recommended as a salutary, convenient, and adaptable reform
measure,279 as compared to the difficulties in balancing various fac276. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, r. 2.11(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011), which states: “The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a
party, party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the previous
[insert number] year[s] made aggregate contributions to the judge’s campaign in an
amount that [is greater than $ [insert amount] for an individual or $ [insert
amount] for an entity] [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an
entity].”
277. See NCSC Report, supra note 275 (identifying five states (Alabama, Arizona, California, Mississippi, and Utah), which have adopted a disqualification rule
incorporating a specific amount or percentage). The NCSC report also identifies
11 other state supreme courts that have adopted disqualification rules without the
ABA-recommended triggers, but that have expressly or impliedly incorporated the
Caperton decision. Two states, Nevada and Wisconsin, were identified as expressly
rejecting proposals to adopt specific contribution thresholds that would trigger
disqualification.
In 2017, 54 retired Wisconsin jurists filed a petition with the Wisconsin Supreme
Court urging recusal reform connected to judicial campaign contributions. The
petition recommended the following recusal thresholds: Supreme Court ($10,000);
Court of Appeals ($2500); Circuit Court ($1000); and Municipal Court ($500). By
a five-two vote, the Wisconsin Supreme Court orally denied the petition without a
hearing and, more than two months thereafter, provided a terse and insubstantial
written justification, dismissive in tone, for its decision. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin noted that “. . . the petition presumes, as a categorical matter that justices of this state are incapable of fulfilling their oaths . . . This is an entirely unwarranted presumption and we will not entertain it.” WIS. SUPREME COURT, IN RE
RULE FOR RECUSAL WHEN A PARTY OR LAWYER HAS MADE LARGE CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS 3 (June 30, 2017), https://bit.ly/3iAb9F4 [https://perma.cc/36SMJXNY]. In a scathing thirty-page dissent, former Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson
(joined by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley) lambasted the Supreme Court’s process
and eviscerated the arguments of those opposing recusal reform as unsubstantiated
and misguided. Id. at 4–34. See also Matthew Rothschild, Wisconsin Supreme
Court Buries Recusal in Feeble Move, WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (July 5, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2YZwU9B [https://perma.cc/6M3U-L4CU]; Joe Forward, Supreme
Court Dismisses Retired Judges’ Petition on Recusal, Campaign Contributions, ST.
B. WIS. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://bit.ly/31NCRsk [https://perma.cc/BR5S-CSET];
Marbes, supra note 162, at 270–71 (noting the reality of limited recusal reforms).
278. See ABA RESOLUTION 107, supra note 36, at 2 n.6.
279. See Sample & Young, supra note 244 (urging per se disqualifications for
large contributions); Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 528–29; Serbulea, supra note
15. Goldberg et al. have noted the potential of using such automatic disqualification rules as gamesmanship to disqualify a judge, adding, however, this problem
could be addressed by permitting the other litigant(s) to waive such a disqualifying
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tors (such as the amount, source, and timing of the contribution) on
an individualized, ad hoc basis.280 The ABA adopted a resolution,
later supported by a resolution of the Conference of Chief Justices,
urging states and territories to adopt judicial disqualification procedures to address concerns regarding “certain campaign expenditures and contributions, including independent expenditures, made
during judicial elections.”281
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Caperton resolved the
egregious recusal issue in the context of the more stringent constitutional standard of due process,282 using the appearance standard to
illuminate the disturbing presence of judicial candidates’ growing
reliance on campaign contributors provides a pathway to recusal
reform. As a matter of principle and public perception, a judge
who receives financial support from a benefactor (attorney or party
in a case) should not be considered less potentially disqualifying
than a juror who has received a similar financial benefit. The solemn oath of a judge or juror does not necessarily guarantee imparfactor. Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 529. Rules, however, need to be practical
and reasonable. As recognized by Chief Justice Roberts, any rule requiring judges
to recuse from every case in which a lawyer or litigant made a campaign contribution would disable many jurisdictions. See also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575
U.S. 433, 453 (2015).
280. The Conference of Chief Justices (“CCJ”) filed an amici brief in
Caperton that supported neither party. The brief stressed the importance of
recusal and evolving notions of disqualification and suggested criteria for evaluating when due process required recusal because of campaign spending. The factors
included the size of expenditures, nature of support, timing of support, nature of
the supporter’s prior political activities and relationship with the jurist, and relationship between the supporter and litigants. Brief for the Conference of Chief
Justice as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). Pennsylvania has rejected the ABA’s per se approach in
favor of Caperton’s balancing test. See PA Formal Advisory Op., supra note 19.
281. RESOLUTION 105C, supra note 184, was adopted in 2014. See Geyh et al.,
supra note 18 (summarizing the ABA’s reform attempts regarding judicial campaign contributions). The Conference of Chief Justices’ Resolution 8 in favor of
the ABA’s Resolution 105C, see supra note 244, stated that the CCJ’s position was
consistent with another CCJ resolution, which had urged members “to establish
procedures that incorporate transparent, timely, and independent review for determining a party’s motion for judicial disqualification/recusal,” noting particularly
the concern about campaign contributions and expenditures during judicial elections in a post-Caperton world. See CCJ RESOLUTION 8A, supra note 244.
282. Justice Benjamin rejected attempts to have his behavior scrutinized
through an appearance lens. The Supreme Court explained: “Justice Benjamin
reiterated that he had no ‘direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in the
case’ . . . Adopting ‘a standard merely of ‘appearances,’ he concluded, ‘seems little
more than an invitation to subject West Virginia’s justice system to the vagaries of
the day—a framework in which predictability and stability yield to supposition,
innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations.’” Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (citations omitted).
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tiality nor does it automatically eradicate the suspicion that
neutrality and fairness may be compromised through such financial
relationships.283 In commenting upon the efforts of states to promote judicial integrity through their codes of judicial conduct, vis-avis the more rigorous due process analysis, Justice Kennedy in
Caperton referred to the appearance of impartiality standard and
commented: “The Conference of Chief Justices has underscored
that the codes are ‘[t]he principal safeguard against judicial campaign abuses’ that threaten to imperil ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.’ ”284
The concern about appearance, especially as it relates to
elected judiciaries, is a practical one. Survey results are sobering:
the public believes that money impacts judicial decision-making.285
The levels of trust and confidence are particularly troublesome
when analyzed in reference to skeptical minority populations.286
Thus, the ethical factor of appearance alone is a strong justification
for regulation. The problem of funding judicial campaigns has been
identified as one of the greatest conflicts with the appearance of
impartiality.287
Nevertheless, in the absence of per se automatic disqualification rules,288 based on specific judicial campaign contribution
283. See Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 446 (involving the constitutionality of a
state ban on the personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates). In
Williams-Yulee, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “it is regrettable but unavoidable
that judges who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity.” Id. at 434.
Likewise, Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in the matter observed that disproportionate spending to influence court judgments threatens both the appearance and actuality of judicial independence. Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion noted that “[m]any states allow judicial candidates to ask for contributions even today . . . .” Id. at 467 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889.
285. See Letter from Kate Berry and Nathaniel Sobel, supra note 269 (letter
regarding judges’ petition to reform recusal in Wisconsin); Bam, supra note 21, at
966 n.111 and 974–75 (citing a study that found a strong relationship between campaign contributions and judicial decisions); Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 371–80 (discussing the decline of the public’s perception of judicial integrity and judicial
fundraising being the most dominant contributing factor); Rottman & Tomkins,
supra note 197. See also Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 622 (2009); Michael S. Kang & Joanna Shepherd, The Partisan
Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial
Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69 (2011).
286. See Rottman & Tomkins, supra note 197.
287. See Bradley Siciliano, Attorney Contributions in Judicial Campaigns: Creating the Appearance of Impropriety, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 218 (1991).
288. See Pines, supra note 265, at 290 (in the context of criminal justice in
Pennsylvania, author analyzes the utility of selected per se rules and their potential
advantages, such as protection of litigants’ rights, administrative convenience, uniformity in the application of the law, and prevention of future abuse); Samaha,

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-1\DIK103.txt

138

unknown

Seq: 70

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-20

13:06

[Vol. 125:69

thresholds, mandatory disclosure of judicial campaign contributions
should also be considered. As one advocate for recusal reform observed, recusal has to go hand in hand with broad disclosure
laws.289 Three populations would be important participants in such
reforms: attorneys, litigants, and judges.290
First, in litigation matters, the parties and their attorneys
should be required to submit disclosure statements (or affidavits)
regarding judicial campaign contributions. Such information should
also cover contributions made to the presiding judge’s opponent(s).
The information could be provided by the parties and attorneys
upon commencement or assignment of the case. Viewed as a best
practice, the disclosure requirement could be easily accomplished
through a relatively simple form.291 The responsibility of an attorney to provide the verified disclosure statement would be in addition to an attorney’s professional obligation to provide annual
disclosure information, discussed infra, given the need to assess the
judge’s ethical qualification to preside in a particular matter. The
supra note 178 (benefits of general prophylactic rules). The difficult and elusive
quest to incorporate social norms (e.g. fairness, morality) into algorithms to promote fair and objective decision-making has been noted. See Kearns & Roth,
supra note 14. The utilization of easy-to-apply prophylactic per se rules (to identify
or categorically exclude) may be the closest we have come to achieving, in a crude
or simplistic sense, the ideals of fairness and the appearance of impartiality. But
such an impersonal and mechanical approach to issues of justice has limits—there
remains a tensive relationship with our cherished notions of individualized judgment and thoughtful, human decision-making. Nevertheless, in the matter of disqualification, categorical per se factors can play an important and beneficial role in
promoting the appearance of impartiality.
289. See Geyh et al., supra note 18, at 533, 546–47.
290. The following commentary is based on a review of a host of helpful commentaries addressing various disclosure reforms, particularly: Siciliano, supra note
287 (an especially good perspective that singles out the option of attorney disclosure reform); Geyh et al., supra note 18; Serbulea, supra note 15; Goldberg et al.,
supra note 18; Marbes, supra note 162; Stempel, supra note 213; Sample & Young,
supra note 244; Thomas M. Sussman, Reciprocity, Denial, and the Appearance of
Impropriety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influence of Campaign Contributions or Judges’ Decisions, 26 J. L. & POL’Y 359 (2011).
291. The form could be prescribed, for example, by the individual judge, the
supervising judge of the applicable judicial unit, or ideally by the state’s highest
court. Former Magisterial District (presently Common Pleas) Judge Bret M.
Binder (Chester County, Pennsylvania), for example, initiated a practice whereby
a “Conflict of Waiver” form was provided to the parties and counsel to give them
the opportunity to identify and waive potential enumerated conflicts, such as prior
representation, social and political interactions, etc. The form also included a
blank space for the identification of other potential disqualifying factors. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, r. 2.11(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011), provides the opportunity for the parties and lawyers, outside the presence of the judge and court
personnel, to consider waiver of disqualification. If there is agreement, the agreement is made a part of the record of the proceeding. See text accompanying note
294, infra, regarding disclosure responsibilities of a judge under Rule 2.11.
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parties would also be in a position to determine whether a waiver of
disqualification would be appropriate if permitted under the applicable rules. This protocol would reinforce and facilitate the individual judge’s ethical obligations and promote the judicial system’s
responsibility to be open and transparent.292
Second, as a general matter, attorneys (as officers of the court)
should be required to provide judicial campaign contribution information in their annual attorney registration statements. This information would cover all contributions (including independent
expenditures) made to or on behalf of a judicial candidate during
the reporting year by the attorney. The disclosure should also include information about aggregate contributions made by the attorney’s law firm. The reporting requirement should be incorporated
as an ethical requirement in a state’s rules of attorney disciplinary
enforcement.293 Such statements should be accessible for public inspection, for example, through a judiciary’s web page.
292. The Brennan Center for Justice, in a 2009 letter to the Michigan Supreme Court, recommended such enhanced disclosure, noting that
[F]ederal rules require that nongovernmental corporate parties appearing
in federal court to file a statement identifying any parent corporation or
publicly held corporation that owns a significant portion of the corporate
party’s stock early on in a court proceeding. This Court could adopt a
similar rule requiring all litigants and their attorneys to file an affidavit at
the outset of litigation disclosing specific information relevant to a disqualification decision, including information about campaign contributions and independent expenditures.
Letter from Brennan Ctr. For Justice & Justice at Stake Campaign to Corbin Davis, Clerk, Mich. Supreme Court 9–10 (July 31, 2009), https://bit.ly/2NR2Ne6
[https://perma.cc/SUQ4-LZST].
In addition, in the petition filed by 54 former Wisconsin jurists in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, the jurists proposed that “[o]nce the judge or judges assigned to a
case are known, each party or the party’s lawyer shall file an affidavit disclosing
any campaign contribution exceeding $250 made by the party or the party’s lawyer
to any assigned judge during the time periods described in subparagraph 3.” WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, supra note 277, at 37. The jurists’ proposed rule defined
“campaign contributions” to include: “(a) direct contributions to the judge or the
judge’s campaign committee; (b) independent expenditures made by the contributor either supporting the judge or opposing the judge’s opponent, or otherwise
attempting to influence the outcome of a judicial election; or (c) contributions by
or to a third party made with the intention or reasonable expectation that the third
party would use the contribution to make independent expenditures either supporting the judge or opposing the judge’s opponent, or otherwise attempting to
influence the outcome of the election. The definition includes monetary or in-kind
contributions.” Id. at 35.
293. This requirement would be in addition to any statutory or court rule requiring the filing of campaign contribution statements with a governmental entity,
such as the state’s department of state. This requirement would enhance oversight
and make information more readily accessible by putting judicial campaign financial information in a separate, open, and transparent silo within the judicial system.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-1\DIK103.txt

140

unknown

Seq: 72

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-20

13:06

[Vol. 125:69

Third, if the judge is aware of campaign contributions from a
party or counsel (or counsel’s firm) in the specific case before him
or her, the judge should disclose such information on the record or
in a written statement to counsel and the parties.294 The general
refrain that judges cannot personally solicit contributions and are
consequently unaware of the identities of contributors is difficult to
accept given the realities of campaigning and mandated reporting.
For example, judicial candidates are often required to inspect, approve, and/or verify campaign statements regarding expenditures
and contributions, which may paradoxically require the identification of the names of contributors and related information. In addition, especially in smaller communities, judges are often well aware
of who their “friends” and supporters are.295 Notwithstanding the
294. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011) (requiring a judge to keep informed about his or her personal and fiduciary
economic interests). Comment (5) of the rule furthermore states: “A judge should
disclose on-the-record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification,
even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.” Id. r. 2.11 cmt. 5.
295. See Siciliano, supra note 287, at 220–21 (state disclosure laws have essentially rendered useless the Code’s policy of anonymity). In Pennsylvania, for example, candidates for public office are required to file a campaign finance report
or campaign finance statement that is separate from and in addition to his/her
campaign committee. 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3246–47 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Regular Session Act 35) (the so-called “Election Code”).
The prescribed affidavit provides for signatures of the campaign committee’s treasurer and candidate. See Campaign Finance Report (DSEB-502), PA. DEP’T ST.,
https://bit.ly/3i0Ex7r [https://perma.cc/SN5H-VXBS] (last visited June 26, 2020).
The Supreme Court in Williams-Yulee, acknowledged that most donors are lawyers
and litigants who may appear before the judge that they are supporting. WilliamsYulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 447 (2015).
It is interesting to note that, whereas the ABA’s Model Code, R. 4.4(A), MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.4(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011), states specifically
in the rule itself that the “candidate is responsible for ensuring that his or her
campaign committee complies with applicable provisions of this Code and other
applicable law,” Pennsylvania places such responsibility for compliance in the
Rule’s comment (2) rather than in the text of the rule. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT r. 4.4 cmt. 2. As to the potential significance of such textual nuances and
differences, see supra notes 97 and 140 regarding the legal status of Pennsylvania’s
judicial code (and comments thereto) and differences with the ABA Code.
In requiring the judicial candidate to “take reasonable steps to cause the judge’s
campaign committee . . . to comply with all applicable statutory requirements for
disclosure . . . and to file a report with the Secretary of the Commonwealth,” Pennsylvania’s judicial code of conduct, PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.4(A),
(B)(3), states that the report will include “the name, address, occupation, and employer of each person who has made campaign contributions to the committee in
an aggregate value exceeding $250 and the name and address of each person who
has made campaign contributions to the committee in an aggregate value exceeding $50.”
The Judicial Conduct Board issued a policy statement to provide some guidance
to the judges who are faced with the daunting task of complying with both statu-
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idealistic intentions of ethical rules and guidelines regarding judicial
campaign conduct, alleged donor anonymity has become a convenient cloak to hide the troublesome aspects of judicial elections,
especially in a world saturated by social media. The political reality
of campaigning should not demean a jurist’s presumed integrity, but
it does create serious problem of appearance problems.
Elected judges are consequently placed in a truly untenable
and uncomfortable position in dealing with the realities of campaign funding and winning contested elections while maintaining an
artificial informational barrier in order to technically comply with
their ethical responsibilities. Consequently, whether consciously or
unconsciously—and regardless of a judge’s sincere beliefs, reputational integrity, or good faith—a judge’s impartiality may be subtly
influenced (or appear to be influenced) by a debt of gratitude and
the realities of political campaigning. Contested judicial elections,
which require increasing amounts of funding, inevitably create a
deplorable appearance that vitally affects public trust and confidence in the judicial system and rule of law.296 Sensitive to such
risks and perceptions, jurists have taken steps to publicly disclose

tory requirements and their ethical obligations. The Board notes that, while judges
are not necessarily required to review their campaign finance reports, judges are
required to sign their campaign finance reports; furthermore, the Judicial Conduct
Board says it will presume that judges know the amounts of contributions reported
in the required form. In addition, the Board cautions that judges are required to
review their campaign finance reports to determine if they are disqualified from
sitting on cases. The Board policy states that judges cannot remain ignorant of
contributions to their campaign to avoid compliance with their ethical obligations.
To provide some concrete guidance, the advisory statement suggested that a contribution of several thousand dollars will almost always require an analysis of
whether disqualification is warranted. See PA. JUDICIAL CONDUCT BD., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT BOARD STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION BASED
ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER RULE 2.11(A)(4) (2016).
296. See Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 447, 455 (quoting Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (holding that
Florida’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its
judiciary justified the ban on judicial candidates’ personally soliciting campaign
funds and did not violate the First Amendment, noting that “[e]ven if judges were
able to refrain from favoring campaign donors, the mere possibility that judges’
decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributors is likely
to undermine the public’s confidence in the judiciary.”). Judges in rural areas may
face special ethical pressures and constraints given the realities of social intercourse in less populated communities. See In re McCutcheon, 846 A.2d 801, supra
note 231; and Marla Greenstein, Ethical Relativity, JUDGES J., Winter 2002, at 38,
38 (2002). Professor Virelli has noted that the politicization of states’ legal systems
presents a special factor in analyzing recusal given the special pressures that
threaten judicial independence, including a sense of indebtedness to campaign donors or special interests. See Virelli, supra note 17, at 193–95.
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judicial campaign contributions from counsel or their parties without any noticeable adverse effect.297
Lastly, in the arsenal of reforms, there is always the possibility
that legislatures will attempt intervention and regulation, especially
when judicial integrity and judicial campaign contributions become
a public issue in a particular case.298 As to the increasing preva297. For example, in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, written disclosures
regarding campaign contributions were filed by Justices Debra Todd and Sally Updyke Mundy in a high-profile clergy sex abuse case. See In re Fortieth Statewide
Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018). See also Navratil &
Couloumbis, supra note 106. Justice Mundy also provided a written disclosure of
campaign contributors on February 5, 2018, to all counsel of record “in the interest
of full transparency” in League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737
(2018), a high-profile case involving Congressional re-districting.
298. See Bam, supra note 21, at 994 and 1001 (noting the apathy of legislatures and bar associations in recusal reform and concluding that the burden of
setting clear, consistent, and appearance-based recusal procedures will necessarily
fall to state and federal legislatures). In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)
(internal citation omitted), the Supreme Court commented: “All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus, matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.” See also William Raftery, “The Legislature
Must Save the Court from Itself”? Separation of Powers and the Post-Caperton
World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 785 (2010) (commenting that it is important for
state judiciaries to address the need for self-reform and to avoid a combative or
obstructionist approach to legislative attempts to enact fair and sensible judicial
recusal reforms).
In his extended analysis of the constitutional aspects of recusal in the United
States Supreme Court, Professor Virelli provides commentary on the particular
problem of recusal in state courts of last resort, addressing pivotal issues such as
who should establish recusal standards and how to protect litigants—and the
court—from the negative consequences of increased political pressures felt by
elected justices. He acknowledges at the outset that, with respect to elected justices, there are two competing values: public accountability and judicial independence. In a representative democracy, he notes, legislative control of judicial
recusal may appear to be more easily justifiable for elected supreme court justices
than for appointed ones. As noted herein, federal statutes have addressed recusal
standards and processes for a long time. And states have approached recusal in
various ways, through constitutional provisions, statutes, rules of court, procedural
rules, and operating procedures. See IAALS REPORT, supra note 39, at 18–24.
With respect to Virelli’s analysis of recusal at the state level, Professor Virelli
straddles the fence in trying to balance competing considerations. He eventually
concludes that, as to state courts of last resort, there should be a presumption
regarding recusal control, tilting in favor of the judiciary, which prioritizes judicial
independence and protects against legislative interference. Integral to Virelli’s
analysis is the safety valve of assignment of cases, which he insists should be in the
judiciary’s control. In his view, the judicial power of assignment is a constitutional
necessity. See VIRELLI, supra note 17, at 192–208.
The permissibility or extent of legislative involvement in matters of judicial conduct vis-à-vis recusal standards and processes necessarily depends on the statutes
and constitutions of the individual states, including binding judicial pronouncements. Legislative latitude ultimately depends on how and where one draws the
line between the blurred boundaries of sacrosanct and jealously guarded govern-
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lence of independent expenditures and judicial campaigns, the issue
is particularly difficult—legally and politically—but admittedly
needs to be addressed.299 Only with the requisite knowledge of fimental powers. Judicial independence and accountability of public officials
presents a challenging and tricky separation-of-powers dynamic. Where there is
uncertainty or stalemate, when the potential for prudent cooperation and comity
has been exhausted, constitutional amendment may be the ultimate, albeit risky,
option to effectuate recusal reform.
In an inter-branch conflict, formidable and foundational legal considerations, express and implied, would arise. Consider, for example, Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 847 (Pa. 2008) where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
asserted that under art. V, sec. 10 of Pennsylvania’s constitution, it retains exclusive authority to establish rules of procedure precluding the legislature from enacting procedural law. (The constitutional provision in McMullen also gives the
supreme court the explicit and inherent power to regulate the admission of the bar,
the conduct of attorneys, and the administration of the judicial system). Consider
also Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971) (inherent
power of judiciary as a co-equal branch of government exists to protect itself from
another branch); Commonwealth v. Morris, 771 A.2d 721, 738 (Pa. 2001) (inherent
power is not unlimited and can be retracted by the legislature); Degen v. United
States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (in the context of a civil forfeiture suit, Court notes
that courts have the inherent power to protect their proceedings and judgments,
but that inherent power of the courts, which is limited by necessity, may be controlled or overruled by statute or rule); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence,
Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional
Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 160 n.26, and 164–65 (noting the uneasy
relationship between judicial independence and accountability, and viewing
recusal as an extra-constitutional functional aspect of judicial independence); Irving Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 693
(1980) (noting that the legislature cannot interfere in the core judicial function of
decision-making); Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can
Inherent Powers Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979,
985–1011 (2004) (explaining the historical roots of separation of powers and judicial independence); Lydia Brashear Tiede, Judicial Independence: Often Cited,
Rarely Understood, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129, 129–30 (2006) (noting the
need for definitional clarity of separation of powers and judicial independence);
Lewis Kornhauser, Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 53–54 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (critical assessment of the concept
of judicial independence); and Suzanne Levy, supra note 262 (positing that Congressional action regarding the Court’s recusal procedures is constitutionally permissible and requiring the Justices to provide written reasons would bolster the
public’s understanding and respect for the Court’s decisions). Lastly, aside from
potential legal arguments, the specter of an inter-branch conflict would necessarily
impact the public’s trust and confidence in government and the rule of law, a potentially significant cost, especially when core democratic values (such as judicial
impartiality) are at stake.
299. See supra notes 277 and 292 regarding a petition filed by retired Wisconsin jurists in response to the problem of judicial campaign contributions, including
independent expenditures. The Montana legislature, for example, has proposed
mandatory judicial disqualification legislation in connection with aggregate campaign contributions, including independent expenditures, that exceed specified
limits. See H.R. 157, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019). See also Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding provisions of the Federal
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nancial relationships between the decision-maker and others can
there be a factual foundation for a jurist, counsel, and litigant to
make a knowing and intelligent assessment about the proper ethical
course of action regarding a judge’s participation in a proceeding.300
4. Data Collection: Uniform and timely data regarding judicial
disqualification filings and dispositions, as well as the identification
of contributions and contributors to judicial campaigns, should be
collected and readily available by the judiciary for public
inspection.
Effective recusal reform requires the collection and dissemination of information so that judges, attorneys, and the public can understand and assess the relevant ethical obligations. In the area of
campaign financial disclosure, for example, ethical objectives may
be defeated or undermined if information is not readily accessible.
Likewise, judges may be disadvantaged if there is inadequate public
information about how colleagues have addressed and resolved
recusal challenges. To address these concerns, technology can provide vital assistance.
Proponents of recusal reform have recommended that courts
take steps to collect and disseminate aggregate data regarding
recusal motions and dispositions through their case management
systems. The IAALS has identified five states that collect some
type of statistical data on recusal and disqualification.301 On-therecord explanations for recusal decisions (preferably both grants
and denials) would facilitate and reinforce this reform measure.
With respect to the important issue of campaign financial disclosure, the National Center for State Court’s survey identified
New York State’s Unified Court System’s “assignment rule” regarding contributors to judicial campaigns. The salutary rule requires the Chief Administrator of the Courts to “publish
periodically a listing or database of contributions to judicial candidates, as disclosed by public filings, in a manner designed to assist in

Election Campaign Act that prohibit corporations and labor unions from making
“independent expenditures” in support of advertisements that advocate the election or defeat of a candidate for public office are unconstitutional under the First
Amendment).
300. Waiver, however, is not permissible with respect to a judge’s personal
bias or prejudice. MODEL CODE, r. 2.11(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
301. See IAALS REPORT, supra note 39, at 15 (citing Alaska, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Vermont, and Indiana). IAALS recommends that states should
consider pilot projects for the collection of such information.
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the identification of campaign contribution[s],” which may be pertinent to a motion to recuse.302
The sources for such campaign information would be the appropriate state entity that receives and files campaign financial disclosure statements, as well as the entity responsible for attorney
discipline—that is, if attorneys were obligated to disclose such campaign financial information, as suggested herein, in their annual attorney registration statements. The information could be easily
captured and posted on the judiciary’s website. The information
provided should be comprehensive, easily accessible for attorneys
and the public, and updated in a timely fashion. The fact that such
information may already be posted or available at multiple locations (state and local) reveals that public access may be tedious and
difficult, thus reinforcing the judiciary’s independent obligation to
provide one-stop-information-shopping regarding the financial
campaign support that judges have received.
5. Judicial Education: Judges should be provided with educational resources on the topic of recusal and disqualification. There
should be continuing mandatory ethics education courses on the
specific subject of recusal.
Judicial education can be the bridge between abstract ethical
precepts and ethical conduct. In the case law and literature on judicial disqualification, a common lament is that judges do not have
sufficient guidance about recusal procedures and substantive standards.303 Both the Conference of Chief Justices and the ABA have
stressed the need for adequate judicial training and education about
disqualification and recusal.304 Moreover, a survey of judges confirms that the judges themselves want more ethical guidance.305
302. See NCSC Report, supra note 275, at 10–11 (citing N.Y. CT. RULE § 151.1
(2011)).
303. See Lomas – OISR, 130 A.3d 107, 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); Lomas-II,
170 A.3d 380, 393 (Pa. 2017) (dissenting opinion); Abramson, supra note 178, at 56
(judges need useful guidance to overcome their uncertainty or unwillingness to
apply the catch-all appearance standard); Stempel, supra note 213, at 363–64 (noting need for education about cognitive psychology and criticizing the over-emphasis of substantive law and case management in judicial education); IAALS
REPORT, supra note 39, at 15 (need for continuing judicial education regarding the
substantive and procedural rules governing recusal and guidelines for judges concerning disclosure and disqualification obligations as they pertain to campaign
contributions).
304. See ABA RESOLUTION 107, supra note 36, at 1; RESOLUTION 105C, supra
note 184; ABA DRAFT REPORT, supra note 143, at 79–80; CCJ RESOLUTION 8A,
supra note 244 (“states and territories should provide guidance and training to
judges in deciding disqualification/recusal motions”).
305. See Miller, supra note 52, at 608.
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Promoting greater knowledge and understanding can be achieved
through various methods.
Judicial Ethics Education and Training: Most, if not all, state
court systems conduct annual judicial educational and training programs, often through the auspices of their judicial education departments or administrative offices. Some have characterized these
educational opportunities as a “soft solution” to recusal reform that
could promote a legal culture with a deeper awareness of disqualification law.306 Judicial awareness and sensitivity can be economically and effectively promoted through such forums. These
educational ventures are especially important for states that elect
their judges.307 The educational programs should address recusalrelevant topics including the psychology of bias,308 gender and race
bias,309 and campaign financing.310 National or regional educational forums, which involve jurists from various jurisdictions,
would enable judicial communities to share their perspectives about
the psychology of bias and their experiences, thus promoting
greater understanding.311 Ethics education, especially with respect
to recusal and the objective appearance standard, should be continuing and mandatory.312
306. See Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 532. “Soft,” however, should not
connote “unimportant.” The term is used in contra-distinction to structural and
procedural reforms.
307. See McKoski, supra note 27, at 506 (procedural reforms can help reduce
the damage done to the appearance of justice in systems that elect judges).
308. See Guthrie et al., supra note 212, at 822–25 (discussing various remedies
to address the problem of cognitive illusions).
309. See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 44, 58–59
(1994).
310. See IAALS REPORT, supra note 39, at 15.
311. See Geyh, supra note 31, at 731. In addition to judicial education, there
is a need for more empirical research into the psychological aspects of decisionmaking, including recusal. See, e.g., Mullins, supra note 212, at 593, 600 (addressing cultural cognitive bias and the need for more research). Citing the need for a
greater understanding of the relationship between psychoanalysis and the law, Professor Dailey says “cognitive research into the mind’s biases, frameworks, and distortions provides the opportunity for reforming the law’s presumption of
rationality by drawing on more accurate, scientifically established data about individual decision-making. With a better understanding of human choice, these scholars agree, will come better laws, legal decisions, and attitudes.” See DAILEY, supra
note 1, at 227–28.
To the judicial community’s credit, judges have been increasingly sensitized, in
educational forums and publications, about the problematic psychological aspects
of “implicit bias,” which focuses on the unconscious beliefs or attitudes that one
may harbor about others with respect to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
and culture. See JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS (2009).
312. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING PENNSYLVANIA’S JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SYSTEM
43–45 (2017) [hereinafter referred to as the PMC REPORT] (recommending
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Literature and guides: The judicial educational programs can
be reinforced through written resources such as benchbooks,
guides, and monographs. The Federal Judicial Center, for example,
has provided an extensive guide on recusal.313 There have also
been other helpful examples from states such as California and
Michigan.314
Judicial Codes of Conduct: One obvious place to guide judges
is through the judicial codes of conduct and the comments thereto.
Expanding guidance in the commentary of the codes is sensible and
beneficial.315
Public education: It is easy to overlook the “public” aspect of
recusal reform, which would be a mistake given the importance of
public trust and confidence in the judicial system. This consideration is especially important to elected court systems. Various suggestions have been made: bar associations taking a more active role
in educating the public about the importance of an independent judiciary and the value of non-partisan, impartial judicial decisionmaking;316 judges educating the public through written opinions regarding recusal decisions;317 court administrators posting a lay person-oriented explanation of a state’s recusal procedures on a
judicial website and providing a standard recusal form to assist selfmandatory judicial education in ethics education on subjects such as diversity, appearance of impropriety, and recusals through convenient modes of delivery). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has mandated 12 hours of continuing judicial education for trial and appellate judges, including justices, each year, including three
hours in judicial ethics, commencing January 1, 2017. See 204 PA. CODE § 31.4
(2016).
313. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 56 (providing substantial commentary and guidance regarding judicial recusal under applicable federal statutes).
314. See CENTER FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION, INC., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES (commentary on recusal
and disqualification law in California, by noted judicial ethics scholar, Richard
Flamm). See also MICH. JUDICIAL INST., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION IN MICHIGAN (2018); PA Formal Advisory Op., supra note 19 (advisory opinion providing a
sample recusal decision “worksheet”).
315. See Goldberg et al., supra note 18, at 532. Pennsylvania provides a good
example of the need for guidance. See supra note 97 (uncertainty about the legal
status and weight of comments to the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct); and
supra note 140 (regarding Pennsylvania’s arguably stricter explanation of the appearance standard).
316. See Uphoff, supra note 25, at 546–47 (regarding his claim that misjudging
is common, author acknowledges importance of educating the public regarding the
need for an independent, non-partisan, and impartial judiciary and the bar’s role in
educating the public).
317. See McKoski, supra note 27, at 513–14; supra note 265 (regarding the
value of on-the-record, reasoned, and transparent decision-making).
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represented litigants.318 Public education would foster a better understanding and respect for judges who conscientiously grapple
with their ethical obligations.
Informal Advice and Assistance: A report from IAALS indicates that there are 40 states that have judicial ethics advisory committees and that a frequent subject of inquiry is judicial
disqualification.319 Notwithstanding the inherent weakness and
limitations of any recusal process that is solely dependent on nonbinding advice,320 such informal non-binding advice and assistance
can be a welcomed and valuable resource for judges who are faced
with disqualification challenges. The IAALS report notes that
Ohio provides a “hotline” for judges who can obtain free confidential guidance from attorneys in three law firms who have been contracted to provide such services.321 These avenues of assistance are
318. See IAALS REPORT, supra note 39, at 4. Potentially instrumental in fostering and facilitating recusal reform and education about best practices would be
prominent national organizations (such as the National Center for State Courts,
Conference of Chief Justices, National Judicial College, American Judges Association, National Conference of State Trial Judges, National Association of Presiding
Judges and Court Administrators, National Association of Women Judges, National Association of State Judicial Educators, Conference of State Court Administrators, National Association of Court Management, Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System, State Justice Institute, the Brennan
Center for Justice, and the ABA) as well as the many state judicial education
organizations.
319. Id.
320. Recusal disputes are not limited to the judicial branch. Consider the
public controversies surrounding Attorney General Barr and Acting Attorney
General Whitaker regarding their rejection of internal ethics advice that recommended recusal from the probe of alleged Russian involvement in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. See THE MUELLER REPORT, supra note 20; Barbara McQuade & Chuck Rosenberg, Must Bill Barr Abide Ethics Advice on Recusal? A
Debate, LAWFARE (Jan. 22, 2019), https://bit.ly/3gZhxnN [https://perma.cc/VU95GPT8]; and Laura Jarret, Whitaker Rejected Ethics Official’s Advice He Should
Recuse from Russian Probe, CNN (Dec. 21, 2018), https://cnn.it/3913Amz [https://
perma.cc/U24X-QMYL]. Regarding the impeachment trial of President Donald
Trump, see Zachary Evans, Democratic Representative Calls on McConnell to Recuse Himself and Threatens Mistrial, NAT’L REV. (December 18, 2019), https://
bit.ly/2CxNeFW. At the state level, in Pennsylvania, the supreme court exercised
its extraordinary King’s Bench jurisdiction to appoint a special master (senior
Judge Cleland, see supra note 108) to investigate and make recommendations regarding an alleged conflict of interest of the Philadelphia district attorney’s office
in the ongoing Abu-Jamal case. See In Re: Conflict of Interest of the Office of the
Philadelphia District Attorney, 125 ER 2019 (Pa., Feb. 24, 2020); and Needles,
supra note 137; and Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1998) and supra note 137. Given
the limited efficacy of an advisory process in recusal matters, especially as it may
impact the appearance of impartiality and the public’s confidence when such advice is not adopted, this article has eschewed the advisory process as a viable mechanism for recusal reform.
321. IAALS REPORT, supra note 39, at 14 (free confidential advice limited to
two hours per year per judge on matters, including ethical, that have not been the
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certainly worth pursuing but are no substitute for meaningful reform of the recusal process.
V.

RECUSAL REFORM: A PROCEDURAL TEMPLATE TO ALIGN
RECUSAL CONDUCT WITH ETHICAL IDEALS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS

Ethical principles and policies are not self-effectuating. Without clear procedures and processes to promote and implement ethical ideals, there is a risk of a chasm between policy and practice.
There has been a woeful lack of recusal procedures—consistent with our notions of fairness and due process—to guide jurists.322 There is a critical need for rational, fair, and uniform
procedures to optimize the realization of ethical ideals regarding
the fundamental issue of recusal and disqualification.323 The
IAALS maintains that having written recusal procedures is a minimum requirement.324 Others agree. In 2014 the states’ chief justices urged their colleagues “to establish procedures that
incorporate a transparent, timely, and independent review for determining a party’s motion for judicial disqualification/recusal.”325
The chief justices’ particular concerns were due process (“one of
the most basic values of our justice system”)326 and the possible
effects of judicial campaign expenditures and contributions on the
appearance of judicial impartiality.327
Appendix A proposes a procedure to align the justice system’s
basic ethical values governing recusal with a predictable, rational,
subject of formal lawsuits or formal complaints). Others have made similar recommendations. See Sample & Young, supra note 244, at 33 (suggesting advisory bodies to identify best practices and advice for judges on recusal matters); Serbulea,
supra note 15, at 1148 (recommending advisory recusal bodies that judges would
be encouraged to consult). See also supra note 100 (advisory opinions on judicial
ethics in Pennsylvania).
322. See Bam, supra note 21, at 944. Professor Bam proposes a new role and
approach for recusal, acknowledging that legislative intervention or merit selection
of judges may be options. He recommends that recusal reform, which may be too
little and too late, requires the creation of ethical rules and regulations designed to
eliminate the appearance of partiality. See also Lomas-II, 170 A.3d 380, 391 (Pa.
2017) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (regarding Pennsylvania jurisprudence, dissent comments on the lack of statutory or rules-based recusal procedures creating ambiguity and uncertainty in recusal practice); Kilimnik, supra note 37, at 773 (fair recusal
procedures should be established).
323. See Frost, supra note 20, at 535 (recommending a “process-oriented” approach, incorporating core tenets of impartial and fair adjudication, for recusal
reform).
324. See IAALS REPORT, supra note 39, at 4.
325. See CCJ RESOLUTION 8A, supra note 244.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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and fair process, consistent with and responsive to the views and
recommendations of many commentators cited passim. The procedures in Appendix A incorporate an amalgam of recusal procedures and suggested “best practices” employed in various states.328
Whether implemented judicially or legislatively, the proposed rule
is simply a framework, sufficiently flexible and adaptable for a particular judicial system or entity.329
The procedural template incorporates the following features:
general application to all courts, but special procedural accommodations accorded to courts of last resort;330 mandatory and prompt
328. Regarding various aspects of the proposed recusal template, herein,
some state recusal procedures have been particularly helpful (including California,
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
and West Virginia). Recognizably, no one size fits all. For a helpful listing of the
states’ recusal statutes and rules, see MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 19, at
notes 43, 47, 67; Serbulea, supra note 15, at 1151–73; IAALS REPORT, supra note
39, at 18–24. The Center for American Progress surveyed and graded state recusal
practices with respect to judicial campaign funding. Of the 39 states that elect
judges, only eight states passed the Center’s test, and none scored higher than a C.
The top states included: California, Utah, Georgia, Michigan, Washington and Alabama. See BILLY CORRIHER & JAKE PAIVA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STATE
JUDICIAL ETHICS RULES FAIL TO ADDRESS FLOOD OF CAMPAIGN CASH FROM
LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS 2–3 (2014).
329. The Conference of Chief Justices acknowledged that “disqualification/
recusal rules may require different procedures for trial courts, intermediate courts,
and courts of last resort.” See CCJ RESOLUTION 8A, supra note 244.
330. Various states were instructive on this sensitive topic: Michigan, Nevada,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Likewise, the commentary and recommendations in the IAALS report provided sensible advice. See IAALS REPORT, supra
note 39, at 16. As to courts of last resort, the ABA has observed that disqualification challenges could be reviewed by the other justices or assigned to a special
panel of retired judges. See ABA DRAFT REPORT, supra note 143, at 71; MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 19, at 9–10, 13 (recommending independent review
and noting the option of replacing a disqualifying justice). The appropriate recusal
mechanism in state courts of last resort is especially nettlesome and can present
significant practical consequences when colleagues have a publicized acrimonious
relationship. See e.g., Robert Huber, War in the Supreme Court: Ron Castille and
Seamus McCaffery Just Can’t Get Along, PHILA. MAG. (June 28, 2013), https://
bit.ly/38Nh0Te [https://perma.cc/326H-J2FS]; Musmanno v. Eldredge, 114 A.2d
511, 511–12 (Pa. 1955) (wherein Justice Musmanno, in effect, brought a mandamus
action against his colleagues by suing the official court reporter to force the filing
and publication of the justice’s improperly submitted dissenting opinion and, at
oral argument, accused his colleagues of discrimination against him). With regard
to Justice McCaffery, the supreme court ordered an interim suspension; McCaffery
thereafter resigned. For a history of the McCaffery episode, see PMC REPORT,
supra note 312, at 6–10. See also Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (May 5, 2015), https://bit.ly/2Olnsrb; Associated
Press, Wisconsin Justice Says Fight Led to Choking, FOX NEWS (June 26, 2011)
(last updated Nov. 29, 2015), https://fxn.ws/38QuxcB [https://perma.cc/86BS7DWJ].
This article does not address the difficult and sensitive issue of recusal at the
Supreme Court level other than to identify two high-profile refusal-to-recuse con-
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transfer of recusal/disqualification motions to another judge for an
independent and impartial assessment and adjudication; requiring
that motions follow a prescribed procedural channel from the filing
of the motion to judicial disposition; affording an opportunity for
the parties and the challenged jurist to respond to contested allegations of a motion and record facts; requiring a good-faith affidavit
supporting a fact-specific motion to deter the potential for baseless,
frivolous or abusive motions, including the option of sanctions and/
or referral to attorney disciplinary authorities in the event of suspected ethical misconduct; requiring a written on-the-record explanation when a recusal motion is denied; generally recognizing, and
respecting, the independence and distinct responsibilities of the
state’s highest court and the state’s attorney disciplinary authority;
requiring prompt reassignment of a matter if a motion to recuse has
been granted;331 and requiring the collection and posting (on the
troversies regarding Justices Rehnquist and Scalia. See supra notes 20, 183, 263.
For an extended treatment of recusal and the Supreme Court, see VIRELLI, supra
note 17; Rigertas, supra note 190; Rambo, supra note 275, at 496 (urging greater
Supreme Court leadership in recusal matters, i.e. “justices should begin treating
themselves as every other judge in the nation is treated: recusing themselves
whenever their impartiality is in question, allowing an objective review of their
recusal decisions, and avoiding political activity that inflames the public sense of
bias rather than relieves it”); Bam, supra note 22 (unconstitutionality of recusal
procedures); Saidman-Krauss, infra note 331; and Levy, supra note 262.
331. States generally have statutes or rules of court to provide for the re-assignment or transfer of cases to another jurist. See, e.g., MENENDEZ & SAMUELS,
supra note 19, at 25–26, note 67 (identifying the replacement practices among the
states regarding recused justices); FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, r.
2.205 (a)(2)(B)(iii) (2020) (power of chief justice to assign active or retired judges
or justices throughout the state); id. r. 2.205(a)(3)(A) (power of chief justice to
temporarily assign justices and judges to any court); and id. r. 2.205(a)(4)(A)
(power of chief justice to assign any qualified judge when a justice is unable to
perform the duties of office). See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 325(e) (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Regular Session Act 55) (power of president judge to make
judicial assignments and re-assignments); and id. § 326 (c) (authority to make temporary judicial assignment when—because of vacancy, illness or disqualification—
a quorum is not available to conduct business); and PA. RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 701(C) (2020) (authority of chief justice to assign any active or retired judge or justice to temporary judicial service in any court). For an interesting
discussion regarding the powers of the Chief Justice and his unchecked statutory
authorization to select and appoint judges to “special courts,” see Ruger, supra
note 265, at 352–58 (discussing Chief Justice Taft’s modernist vision and reforms in
the early 20th century regarding the Chief Justice’s power to allocate judicial resources through assignments and transfers). See also VIRELLI, supra notes 17, 298
(regarding the importance of judicial control over assignment of cases); see also
Rebekah Saidman-Krauss, A Second Sitting: Assessing the Constitutionality and
Desirability of Allowing Retired Supreme Court Justices to Fill Recusal-Based Vacancies on the Bench, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 253 (2011) (discussing Senator Leahy’s
legislative proposal for the substitution of justices in the context of recusal).
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state’s judicial website) of judicial campaign contributions and
contributors.332
Given the fact that there are already various recusal rules and
practices among the states, the proposed procedures should prove
to be neither burdensome nor difficult to implement.333 As one
commentator has noted, a decision’s character and quality depend
on the structure of the decision process; appearance-based regulations may become a self-fulfilling prophecy and encourage judges to
psychologically internalize ethical norms; and, in turn, the behavioral effect may extend to those who perceive the appearance.334
The recusal procedures herein seek to promote the values of transparency, rationality, and fairness so that the ideal of judicial impartiality—in substance and appearance—will be strengthened.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to justify, or even understand, an outworn common law recusal process that manifestly undermines basic legal and
ethical norms. The prevalent recusal processes in the states are arbitrary and fundamentally unfair.335 Whether rooted in unintentional hypocrisy, wishful thinking, or a pathological cognitive
dissonance, recusal has been historically relegated to the periphery
of our administration of justice when its rightful place should be its
nucleus.
332. The separate and contentious issue of establishing specific disqualification thresholds for judicial campaign contributions would have to be addressed by
separate rules. Hence, that aspect of recusal, while certainly an important one, is
not addressed in the template.
333. See supra notes 54–56 (noting the option of a peremptory challenge process is a distinct issue that has been neither explored nor recommended herein).
See also Stempel, supra note 152, at 789–93 (presenting a litigator’s perspective in
favor of peremptory challenges in the context of disqualification).
334. See Samaha, supra note 178, at 1576 n.42, 1578–79, 1598.
335. A multiplicity of factors may explain the largely anemic response to the
many calls for meaningful recusal reforms: the comfort of custom and tradition,
apathy, a good-faith belief in one’s intelligence and competencies, self-defensiveness, hostility to criticism or control, financial dependence on campaign donors,
willful ignorance, or perhaps a self-protective desire to maintain independence and
power. Consider, for example, Kilimnik, supra note 37, at 772 (in the context of
Pennsylvania’s “backwards” recusal rules, suggests that the supreme court has endeavored to assert and increase its power over the judicial system); Barnhizer,
supra note 3, at 396–97 (in the context of the corrupting influence of judicial campaign funding, notes that judicial power, in itself, may be a factor in judicial moral
corrosion); Samaha, supra note 178, at 1597 (commenting about the exercise of
power for image control or appearance manipulation, generated for the purpose of
hoarding power, without checks, to ensure correspondence with actual performance, the concern being the alignment of appearance and reality).
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Impartiality of judgment and the integrity of the judicial process are critical weaknesses of a recusal regime that vests autonomy336 in a jurist to conduct an ad hoc self-assessment of his or her
own impartiality. In the face of factual assertions that challenge a
jurist’s ability to be fair and impartial, belief that one can be impartial about one’s own impartiality is misguided and bizarrely delusional. Yet many have refused to question or challenge it. The
plain fact is that judges are indeed human. Regardless of their presumed good faith and integrity, judges are susceptible to cognitive
weaknesses when their capacity to be fair and impartial in a particular matter, in a public forum, is questioned.
In addition to the dilemma of such biased impartiality, judicial
systems often ignore another aspect that is of equal importance—
the appearance of impropriety and impartiality—namely, whether a
reasonable person would objectively question a jurist’s ability to be
fair and impartial. It is a concern that is extraneous to the darker
and often impenetrable psychological dimension of actual
prejudice. The modern recusal practice of autocratic subjective
self-assessment subverts the mandatory objective appearance standard of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, as adopted by
almost all states.337 These concerns are critically important to the
parties and attorneys in a given matter and to the public’s fragile
trust and confidence in our system of justice. Such concerns are
compounded in elective court systems where judicial campaign contributions (often hidden in cumbersome-to-access disclosure reports) taint the judiciary’s vulnerable reputation for fairness and
impartiality.
The misalignment of recusal processes with our legal and ethical core values requires a transformative, albeit imperfect, process
that optimizes the potential for impartiality and fairness. There is a
need, especially with respect to the appearance of impartiality standard, to recognize that recusal/disqualification is a positive expres336. See, e.g., Ruger, supra note 265, at 353, 381 (commenting on the tradition
of the independence of judges, that is, from other branches of government and
from each other, but later noting that “while the judiciary may be ‘unaccountable’
in this sense [i.e. from other political branches], most important adjudicative decisions that judges make are conditional on the approval of other judges.”). Thus, it
is important to distinguish the aspect of judicial autonomy that is being scrutinized,
i.e., individual vs. institutional. Judges are not autonomous in matters of judicial
ethics, administrative supervision, jurisdictional limitations, or appellate review.
Disqualification rules do not dictate or control a judge’s decision-making; rather,
they precede decision-making and prescribe if it is ethically appropriate for a judge
to preside in a particular case. See also supra notes 127, 298, infra note 339 (addressing the complicating issues of judicial independence and judicial autonomy).
337. See supra note 80.
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sion of the morality of the justice system and its judges. Entrusting
a neutral decision-maker to objectively assess whether the appearance of another’s impartiality might be compromised—an assessment made through a decision-making process that is procedurally
fair and conducive to meaningful appellate review—would significantly improve the legitimacy and integrity of the recusal
process.338
Some have suggested that serious deficiencies in the judicial
system, including recusal, may ultimately require legislative intervention and systemic reform, such as the merit appointment of
judges.339 No system of justice, elected or appointed, is perfect.
338. A cost-benefit analysis should reasonably lead one to conclude that the
administrative costs of recusal reform are substantially outweighed by the benefit
of promoting public trust in the judicial system on an issue that goes to the heart of
the judicial process and ethical judicial conduct. See Geyh, supra note 31, at 725;
Geyh, supra note 10, at 885 (acknowledging that “time and again, when disqualification rules have collided with the needs of judicial administration, the former
have yielded to the latter.”); Vermeule, supra note 146, at 400–03 (discussing costs
and trade-offs in the context of the impartiality principle); Melinda A. Marbes,
Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Disqualification Disputes
and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 235, 305 (2013)
(administrative costs of reform outweighed by actual benefits); Samaha, supra note
178, at 1582–98 (addressing the need to consider issues of cost, need, efficacy, and
institutional competence in justifying appearance-based decision-making). A significant concern is the potential negative impact of prolonged publicity about protracted recusal challenges with respect to the public’s trust and confidence. See,
e.g., Emily Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effect of Corrected Misinformation (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (available at https://bit.ly/30489so
[https://perma.cc/T75P-A6E4]) (discussing the negative impact of misinformation
on a person’s cognitive belief system and how it may reinforce a person’s preexisting negative views; attempts to “correct” such misinformation may not necessarily change the echo effects of such misinformation on citizens’ attitudes).
339. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 275, at 101–03 (questioning the value of addressing systemic problems through an ad hoc individual rights balancing approach
particularly with respect to the post-Caperton problem of an elected judiciary that
relies heavily on campaign contributions); Raftery, supra note 298, at 777–85 (discussing the delicate dilemma of judicial autonomy vis-à-vis the legislature and the
pressures for recusal reform); Bam, supra note 21, at 1001 (noting that the burden
of setting clear, consistent, appearance-based recusal procedures may be on the
shoulders of legislatures given judicial reluctance for reform); Stempel, supra note
152, at 788 (noting that legislative intervention may be needed given lukewarm
judicial response); Thomas R. Sussman, Reciprocity Denial and the Appearance of
Impropriety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influence of Campaign Contributions on Judges’ Decisions, 26 J. L. & POL’Y 359, 382 (2011) (solution may be
merit solution and public financing of judicial elections); CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
supra note 328, at 10–11 (2014) (noting with alarm the negative impact of judicial
campaign funding on the public’s perception of judicial impartiality, suggesting
that, in view of the failure of courts to adopt the ABA’s call for mandatory recusal,
citizens may need to put pressure on judges and legislatures to assure that litigants
receive fair and equal treatment); and Kilimnik, supra note 37, at 773 (regarding
Pennsylvania recusal, author suggests that the legislature should step in if the su-
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Nevertheless, it is clear that the judicial system has the inherent
power to improve and reform its procedures and practices governing the impartiality of those who sit in judgment. The real question, however, is whether judicial leadership has the will to do so.
Actions—and appearances—always speak louder than words.340

preme court will not initiate recusal reform). See also Legislative Assaults On State
Courts—2019, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, https://bit.ly/2DQU6yF [https://
perma.cc/5TY8-YRDA] (updated Jan. 24, 2020) (noting that as of March 25, 2019,
there are at least 25 states considering at least 48 bills to diminish the role or independence of the courts).
340. The Introduction to this article offered the Serena Williams’ U.S. Open
2018 controversy as a backdrop to explain the parallel and common interests of the
justice system and the sports world as they contend with serious ethical challenges
of impartiality and fairness. It is appropriate to conclude with an instructive postscript about the U.S. Open’s reform efforts undertaken within one year, efforts
that remain a work in progress. Although there has not yet been any consensus on
specific rule changes, the U.S. Open leadership has adopted the following measures: (1) referees and other officials will appear on TV to explain their rulings;
(2) the U.S. Open will explore a collaboration with the University of Pennsylvania
to analyze matches for gender bias; (3) a database will be created regarding the
circumstances of code violations; (4) a new video-assistance review system will be
used to track in real time the umpires’ rulings and interactions with the players;
and (5) education and training on implicit bias will be initiated for judges and
umpires. Whether the focus is the tennis court or the courtroom, it is clear that
ethical reforms to achieve fairness and inspire public confidence is a daunting but
achievable task. See Christopher Clarey, What Changed After Serena vs. the Umpire? Not Much, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2CsRQgu [https://
perma.cc/6TFN-6ETN].
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APPENDIX A
RULE______: DISQUALIFICATION
APPLICABILITY: This rule applies to all judges within the state’s
judicial system, including justices of the supreme court [or the
state’s highest tribunal, hereinafter referred to as the “supreme
court”], unless a specific provision is stated to apply otherwise. The
word “judge” includes senior judges and justices of the supreme
court.
B. PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO ALL COURTS EXCEPT
THE SUPREME COURT: In any proceeding, if an unrepresented
party or party’s attorney of record believes that the impartiality of
the judge may reasonably be questioned, such unrepresented party
or counsel of record may file a motion to disqualify the judge (“respondent judge”). The motion must comply with the following
requirements:
1. CONTENTS OF MOTION: The written motion shall state with
specificity all factual and legal grounds to support the allegations
that the impartiality of the judge (“respondent judge”) might reasonably be questioned. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit by the counsel of record or by the unrepresented party, under
oath (or a declaration under penalty of perjury), affirmatively stating that the motion has been made in good faith, is not being
presented for any improper purpose such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in litigation, and is wellgrounded in facts sufficient to support the respondent judge’s
disqualification.
2. ANSWER: Other parties to the litigation may file a written response to the motion to disqualify within five days of the filing of
the motion to disqualify.
3. SERVICE: A party who files a motion or response must serve a
copy on every other party in accordance with the applicable rules of
procedure.
4. TIMELINESS: The motion to disqualify shall be filed at the
earliest practical opportunity when facts are discovered to justify a
motion to disqualify. The failure to file a timely motion, in the absence of good cause, may constitute a waiver of the right to object
to the respondent judge’s presiding in the proceeding and may constitute grounds to support the denial of the motion. The timeliness
of a motion shall not be determined by the respondent judge except
as provided in section B(6) of this rule.
5. TRANSFER OF MOTION: Upon the filing of the motion to
disqualify, the respondent judge must immediately refer the motion

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-1\DIK103.txt

2020]

unknown

MIRROR, MIRROR, ON

Seq: 89

THE

WALL

26-OCT-20

13:06

157

and all responses to the president judge (i.e. the judge who has supervisory responsibility over the judge, court or applicable judicial
unit) of the applicable judicial district or intermediate appellate
court. The respondent judge shall not proceed further in the matter. If the president judge is the subject of the motion to disqualify,
or if the president judge voluntarily disqualifies himself or herself,
the motion and accompanying filings shall be referred to the chief
justice of the supreme court for assignment of a judge who shall
proceed to review and rule on the motion to disqualify in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
6. INTERIM MOTION: (A) If the identity of the respondent
judge is not disclosed until the day of the proceeding, the counsel of
record or unrepresented party may make an oral motion seeking
disqualification of the respondent judge at the commencement of
such a proceeding. Unless the respondent judge voluntarily withdraws, the respondent judge shall stay all proceedings and grant
reasonable leave for the party or counsel to submit a written motion
to disqualify in accordance with the provisions of this rule. If the
party or counsel fails to submit the written motion to disqualify
within the time specified by the respondent judge, the motion shall
be deemed denied and the respondent judge may proceed in the
matter. If a written motion to disqualify is timely presented, the
motion shall be promptly transferred to and decided by the president judge in accordance with the provisions of this rule. (B) If
grounds for disqualification are first learned after the respondent
judge has commenced the proceeding, but before the respondent
judge has completed judicial action in the matter, the respondent
judge may continue with the proceeding, subject to a stay by the
president judge or his/her designee; if the respondent judge decides
to continue with the proceeding, the respondent judge shall contemporaneously provide a brief explanation on the record regarding the grounds asserted to support the disqualification request and
the reason(s) for denial.
7. RESPONSE OF RESPONDENT JUDGE: The respondent
judge, who is the subject of the motion to disqualify, may voluntarily disqualify (recuse) himself or herself from the matter. A voluntary withdrawal (recusal) by the respondent judge is consistent with
a judge’s ethical duty to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary and shall not be construed as an
admission of any allegations contained in the motion to disqualify.
In the absence of a voluntary withdrawal, the respondent judge
may, but is not required to, file a written verified answer admitting
or denying any or all of the allegations contained in the motion to
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disqualify and may set forth any additional facts that may be material or relevant to the question of disqualification.
8. DUTIES OF PRESIDENT JUDGE: The president judge or
his/her designee shall promptly decide the motion to disqualify. If
the motion to disqualify fails to comply with the procedural requirements of this rule, including the failure to file timely, the motion
may be summarily denied without a hearing. The president judge
may take any action necessary to rule on the motion to disqualify,
including, if necessary, conducting an evidentiary hearing, or requesting a response or information from the respondent judge. A
hearing, with notice to all parties, may be conducted by telephone
on the record. Documents submitted by facsimile or email, otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be considered.
The president judge may issue interim or ancillary orders in the
pending case as justice may require.
9. DECISION and DISPOSITION: (A) The order of the president judge shall be in writing, shall be made a part of the court
record, and shall be supported by written factual findings and legal
reason(s) in granting or denying a motion for disqualification. In
the event of a summary dismissal, the order shall briefly identify the
facts and reason(s) for such dismissal. (B) If the motion to disqualify is denied, the parties shall be promptly notified and the matter
shall be returned to the respondent judge for further proceedings.
If the motion to disqualify is granted, the matter shall be promptly
reassigned to another judge in accordance with the applicable procedures of the judicial unit or intermediate appellate court.
10. APPELLATE REVIEW: All orders relating to the motion to
disqualify shall be considered interlocutory in nature and not subject to a direct or immediate appeal. This rule, however, shall not
prohibit any party from seeking available redress by writ of prohibition or any other appropriate extraordinary writ in the supreme
court (or state’s highest court) or by raising a properly preserved
issue of disqualification in a subsequent appeal from a final
judgment.
11. SANCTIONS: After notice and hearing, the judge who decided the motion to disqualify may order the party or counsel who
filed the motion, or both, to pay the reasonable attorney fees and
expenses incurred by other parties if the judge determines that the
motion was (1) groundless and filed in bad faith, or for the purpose
of harassment; or (2) clearly brought to cause unnecessary delay
and without sufficient cause. The judge who decides the motion
may also make a referral to the appropriate disciplinary authority.
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C. PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE SUPREME
COURT:
(1) If an unrepresented party or counsel of record believes that
the impartiality of a justice might reasonably be questioned, such
party or attorney of record may file a motion to disqualify the justice (“respondent justice”) in accordance with the procedural provisions B (1) through (4) of this rule. If the respondent justice’s
participation in a case is challenged in a motion to disqualify, the
respondent justice may voluntarily withdraw from the case. Such
voluntary withdrawal shall not constitute an admission of any of the
allegations of the motion and is consistent with a justice’s ethical
duty to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary. If the respondent justice desires to oppose the motion to disqualify, the respondent justice shall not proceed further
in the matter. The respondent justice shall decide the motion and
shall provide a written explanation of his or her reasons. The other
justices shall be informed prior to the respondent justice’s decision
if the decision is to deny the motion.
(2) If the respondent justice denies the motion to disqualify, an
unrepresented party or counsel of record may move for the motion
to be decided by the entire supreme court. In such circumstances,
the respondent justice shall not participate further in the matter,
including the consideration or the decision of the motion to disqualify. The supreme court shall decide the motion to disqualify de
novo. The supreme court’s decision shall include the reason(s) for
its grant or denial of the motion to disqualify. The supreme court
shall issue a written order containing a statement of reasons for its
grant or denial of the motion to disqualify. Any concurring or dissenting statements shall be in writing.
D. INDEPENDENT REVIEW: Nothing in this rule shall preclude a party or counsel from submitting a complaint with the appropriate disciplinary authority pursuant to the Constitution of
XXX and applicable legal authority. Nothing in this rule shall prevent the supreme court or appropriate disciplinary authority from
exercising its independent constitutional authority as justice may
require.
E. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: The state administrative office of the courts shall periodically publish on the state’s judicial
website a listing of contributions and contributors to judicial candidates, as disclosed by public filings, in a manner designed to assist
the identification of campaign contributions and contributors. Such
information shall be regularly updated.
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COMMENT
Rule 2.11 of the American Bar Association’s Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (“MCJC”) (2011 ed.) requires a judge to disqualify in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of the application of any of the
disqualifying facts and circumstances identified in 2.11.
A judge’s obligation to hear and decide a matter is subordinate
to the judge’s ethical duty to disqualify under MCJC Rule 2.7.
Rule 1.2 of the MCJC 1.2 imposes an ethical duty of a judge to
promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and to avoid the appearance of
impropriety.
Rule 2.3 of the MCJC 2.3(A) notes that the duty of impartiality also applies to administrative matters.
Rule 2.11(C) of the MCJC provides for the parties and lawyers
to waive disqualification other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1).

